Can AI systems be aligned to human values? The popularization of large language models (LLMs) and multi-modal foundation models has seen a rise in harms spanning from toxic speech and hallucinations to AI agents executing unauthorized actions. Within the field of AI safety, these harmful instances are often framed as the alignment problem, or of models being misaligned with human values. Researchers have responded by pursuing applied and theoretical AI value alignment efforts, often without specifying what they mean by human values. How does the field of AI value alignment conceive of human values? How are these conceptions of values technically operationalized and evaluated? What does the emergent theory of value from this field signify for the future of AI? We annotated 94 value alignment research papers to discern their implicit theory of values in AI. The majority do not define values, relying heavily on preferences as a stand in that runs the risk of reducing complex culturally situated concepts down to binary choices. As researchers dispense with using human annotators for model training and evaluation, turning instead to synthetic data and autorater approaches to aligning and evaluating models, we identify the potential to close off alternative methods for contesting and enacting values in foundation models. In making AI value alignments philosophical commitments explicit, we seek to bring great specificity and under explored perspectives in the debate on whether and how AI can address human values.
Human value detection is commonly formulated as sentence-level multi-label classification over the 19 refined Schwartz values, typically predicted as independent labels. Schwartz theory, however, describes them as a circular motivational continuum, in which adjacent values are compatible and opposing values are in tension. We ask whether this structure can be operationalized as an explicit output-space geometry and used as a soft bias rather than a hard constraint. On a DeBERTa-v3-base classifier, we compare two ways of injecting it: training-time geometry-aware objectives and a post-hoc Schwartz-aware energy decoder that scores whole label sets jointly. Across five seeds, training-time geometry gives only limited gains-no larger for the true continuum than for a random ordering-whereas the decoder makes label sets more coherent with the continuum-on theory-aware coherence metrics we introduce-at no cost to Macro-F1 or Micro-F1 (held fixed by its selection rule). The gain is specific to the true Schwartz ordering: it does not appear for a random permutation or an empirical co-occurrence graph through the identical decoder. A bounded Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct diagnostic shows that supplying the continuum at inference shifts behavior but does not match supervised structured prediction. Theory-aware decoding thus offers a lightweight, controllable way to make value detection faithful to its label space.
Measuring subjective constructs in naturally occurring social media text requires annotation procedures that are theoretically grounded, empirically validated, and transferable to an encoder model for scalable prediction. Using non-English social media posts annotated according to Schwartz's theory of basic human values, we investigate how different LLMs, prompts, and instruction languages operationalize the expression of values in text. We argue that although texts may permit multiple plausible interpretations, theory-based value definitions can constrain interpretations and reduce spurious value attributions. Beyond precision, recall, and F1, we evaluate structural alignment between values, error structure, confidence-ambiguity relations, and annotation stability. We show that different LLMs produce different value interpretations. Iterative prompt calibration through error analysis reduces misattributions and improves alignment with expert annotations. We also derive targeted expert verification rules from recurrent error structures and use them during corpus annotation. Finally, we show that LLM annotations can be transferred to an encoder model through soft-label training, retaining theory-based value interpretations and information about uncertainty in value expression.
Large Language Models (LLMs) are often fine-tuned through Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) to align with people's preferences and values. However, this method has known limitations: it aggregates conflicting preferences, often relies on unrepresentative samples, and uses only binary comparisons. Analysing 1,500 open-ended responses from the PRISM dataset across 75 countries, we examine what people actually want from AI systems and reveal concrete failures of current methods. We find that different people want different things: most values are requested by fewer than a quarter of respondents, with truthfulness the sole exception at 49%. Furthermore, the same words hide divergent meanings: when people describe what they mean by "truthfulness", they reveal distinct, potentially incompatible, epistemological bases, as some ask for sourced claims, some for expert opinions, and some even ask for unpopular views. Certain capabilities, namely how human-like a model behaves, and some features, like AI guardrails, are outright controversial, with some desiring them and others rejecting them. We additionally find that people often use contextual distinctions (what AI should do "by default" versus "if requested") that binary comparisons cannot capture. These findings expose fundamental problems in current alignment practices. When 49% request truthfulness but define it differently, this is unlikely to be captured by a single reward model. The persistence of high hallucination rates in well-funded models, despite users' clear demands for accuracy, suggests that current methods fail to identify actual preferences. This paper sheds light on the situated, contested, imperfect signals that are currently being flattened into universal preference models, a practice others have characterised as epistemic violence.