Aligned language models routinely misreport under non-evidential incentive pressure: they agree with a confident user or overstate certainty even when their internal belief is unchanged. We cast this as a failure of internal incentive-compatibility (IC) and present a method for learning and certifying counterfactual report mediators that hold a model's reports to a causal contract: invariant to forbidden influences (pressure, prestige, restyling) and responsive to licensed ones (genuine evidence). These two demands, resist and update, pull in opposite directions. We study them on a Bayesian-witness benchmark with known posteriors, in which the same user disagreement is licensed evidence or forbidden pressure purely by stated source reliability. We (i) causally identify, by interchange interventions rather than probe accuracy, low-rank report coordinates for answer, confidence, and caveat that are near-orthogonal and independently controllable, and (ii) introduce a training-free counterfactual report-coordinate (CRC) clamp that references the model's own report under a counterfactually incentive-neutralized context. On the witness benchmark the two-pass clamp attains resist and update of 1.00 jointly (Wilson 95% CI [0.99,1.00]), a causal certificate under a constructible reference, not a deployed solution. Global decoding and steering show a single-parameter tradeoff; output-level fine-tuning matches both objectives only when both are enumerated; resist-only training loses evidence-responsiveness. The deployable single-pass compilation is lossy (0.73/0.97). The mechanism and clamp reproduce across three model families and transfer to a natural sycophancy benchmark (SycophancyEval). Our contribution is the interface and certification method: activation-level counterfactual incentive-invariance as a structural primitive for internal IC.
Dimitar Chakarov, Lee Cohen, Nathan Srebrocs.GT cs.LG
We extend Incentive Compatible Exploration beyond the Bayesian full-information setting of Kremer et al. [2014]. We consider agents that may possess external information unknown to the principal. We show such settings require new notions of incentivized exploration, as well as going beyond a Bayesian perspective, and we introduce a definition where agents choose any reasonable (undominated) action. Furthermore, our framework provides for a more robust treatment of ties, and extends to settings where agents lack a single common prior and instead only know that reward distributions belong to a collection of potential priors.
Yuhong Luo, David M. Pennock, Xintong Wangcs.AI cs.GT
It is increasingly common to aggregate predictions from multiple LLMs, each with domain expertise or access to private tools and data, to improve collective prediction performance. In decentralized settings, aggregation weights need to be determined without access to models' private information and should remain robust to strategic reporting. We propose a family of advantage-aligned wagering mechanisms for LLM aggregation (WALLA), in which each model reports a prediction and a learned wager, and predictions are aggregated using wagers as weights. WALLA introduces a leave-one-out baseline into the net payout function, yielding three desirable properties: (1) dominant-strategy incentive compatibility of prediction under arbitrary belief structure, (2) advantage--wager alignment, where the optimal wager is proportional to the model's expected score advantage, and (3) prediction-agnostic wager optimization, enabling decentralized learning of wager policies without requiring optimal predictions. We further instantiate two mechanism variants that trade off normality and no-arbitrage while maintaining a bounded worst-case deficit for the mechanism. Experiments on question-answering and forecasting benchmarks across heterogeneous models and private-information settings show that WALLA matches centralized aggregation methods in predictive performance, while simultaneously achieving decentralized learning, advantage-aligned aggregation weights, uncertainty awareness, and incentive-compatible prediction.
Paper A defines a time-consistent actuarial runtime that prices each side-effect-bearing action against a contractually fixed safe default and gates execution against a reserve budget. It treats the operator as passive. This paper makes the operator strategic. We characterise a five-attack space for autonomous AI-agent insurance contracts and prove when the actuarial runtime is gaming-resistant. Two attack surfaces -- post-toll safe-default selection and within-boundary action splitting -- are closed by Paper A's minimal-authority and no-splitting clauses. The remaining three require new contract clauses. First, common-control aggregation prevents cross-boundary re-routing from reducing toll below the boundary potential applied to total exposure. Second, interface failures such as invalid JSON are contract-relevant events, not safety wins: treating them as zero-toll safe defaults can reward unreliable models, while escalation fees reverse the incentive. We validate this interface-compliance theorem on committed cross-model traces from the companion empirical paper. Third, a model-identity menu with a componentwise-minimum penalty schedule makes truthful reporting of the deployed model weakly dominant. We then compose these clauses with Paper A's runtime guarantees to obtain joint incentive compatibility over the five-attack space. Finally, a two-parameter premium family discharges operator individual rationality and weak budget balance at the truthful equilibrium. The result is an incentive-compatibility layer for actuarial control of autonomous-agent side effects.