Meena Jagadeesan, Tatsunori Hashimoto, Jon Kleinbergcs.AI cs.GT
As LLM adoption becomes more widespread, there is a growing interest in detecting LLM-generated content, for example through LLM detection tools and through heuristics based on language patterns. Detectors operate as an intervention that steers not only the detected attribute itself, but also downstream metrics such as LLM usage and output quality. In this work, we demonstrate how imperfect LLM detectors lead to counterintuitive impacts on these downstream metrics, by distorting how users are incentivized to use LLMs in their workflow. We develop a stylized model which captures how users strategically choose how much to use the LLM and how to post-process content to reduce the detected attribute. Using this model, we show that LLM detection can counterintuitively lead humans to increase their LLM usage. Moreover, even when reducing the detected attribute improves output quality, we find that introducing an LLM detector can lead users to produce lower quality outputs. In contrast, we show that detectors result in a clean "rise-then-fall" pattern for the detected attribute, which we empirically reproduce for word frequencies on arXiv abstracts. Altogether, our work illustrates how LLM detection can distort LLM usage and output quality, uncovering failure modes when LLM detectors operate as an intervention on these downstream metrics.
Lucas Bergholdt Hansen, Federico Torrielli, Filippo Tonini +1cs.MA cs.CL
LLM-based agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent environments whose incentives can shape their behavior. We introduce The Energy Society, a minimal survival economy for studying how competitive and cooperative incentives affect emergent behavior when inference cost is directly tied to survival: Agents spend energy based on model size when generating tokens, regain energy by completing jobs or receiving donations, and deactivate if their energy reaches zero. We compare competitive and cooperative objectives against a baseline setting and several control variants. Across experiments, larger models consistently consume the most energy and spend more energy than they gain, even in those settings where token cost is not size-dependent. Cooperative incentives substantially alter behavior: agents donate to reactivate others, sometimes at the cost of their own survival, and job allocation changes. Ablations reveal that allowing agents to recommend actions to each other supports coordination and ambitious job selection, while memory helps agents calibrate risk from past outcomes. Agents rarely choose direct sabotage, but show more subtle signs of self-serving behavior in the competitive setting. The Energy Society is a compact testbed for studying the interaction between token costs and group incentives under a survival pressure. Source code is available at https://github.com/LucasBergholdt/EnergySociety