Manufactured Divisiveness: Decomposing the Hostile Content of Seven Social Media Influence Operations

State-backed influence operations are routinely measured as high-prevalence sources of ``hate'' and ``toxicity.'' We argue those rates rest on a measurement error: the detectors behind them are validated to catch a broader definition inclusive of hostility or divisiveness aimed at an out-group, and so over-attribute hate to content better described as partisan or geopolitical invective. Across 25.08M tweets from seven government-attributed campaigns in the Twitter Information Operations archive (8,275 accounts), we separate hate from the other forms of divisiveness. We first validate a two-prompt LLM-based detector, matching human labels at Cohen's $κ=0.82$, to identify the broader hostility; we then develop an auditable rule, agreeing with an expert at $κ=0.52$, to further classify this content (5,457 posts) into three sub-categories. About 50.1% are identity-based attacks on people, whereas 30.4% are partisan attacks and 19.5% invective against states and their foreign policy. Reporting all of it as hate therefore overstates hate roughly twofold; only 18.7% is both identity-based and dehumanizing or inciting. Six of seven campaigns sort into three regimes that a single ``hate'' rate flattens, namely identity hate (RU-op and IRA, both Russia-attributed), geopolitical invective (both Iran operations), and partisan divisiveness (both Venezuela operations). We call the shared product $manufactured divisiveness$. The line to separate these constructs itself remains unsettled: on the hardest cases three independent human experts agree only moderately (pairwise $κ=0.37$--$0.50$), and the best of nineteen LLM models tops out at $κ=0.601$ against the experts' majority. Our findings can help redefine the study of hate in the context of influence campaigns and broader online discourse.

Cross-National Information Attacks: A Two-Decade Analysis of Troll Behavior in Korea

Coordinated foreign influence operations pose a growing threat to online platforms, but detecting state-linked troll activity and tracking its evolution remain challenging. This paper presents an explainable machine learning framework for theory-guided detection and longitudinal analysis of suspected trolling within Korean online news comment sections. Our hierarchical model classifies comments along three dimensions central to influence campaigns: foreign origin, moral-emotional framing, and target country. To support explainability, it also extracts brief span-level textual evidence that provides human-interpretable rationales. We apply the approach to 112M South Korean news comments authored by 4M users over nearly 20 years, identifying 23,998 accounts exhibiting behavior consistent with coordinated manipulation. Analyzing these accounts, we find that they predominantly rely on morally condemning rhetoric rather than direct promotion of foreign-aligned narratives; this rhetoric receives significantly higher user engagement. Among the highest-engagement comments, the moral condemnation most frequently targets domestic political figures (e.g., presidents or party leaders) on both the left and the right, potentially amplifying polarization. Our framework supports transparent platform governance through explainable, evidence-based moderation. These observed rhetorical and engagement patterns can inform how platforms and observatories prioritize defenses and intervene before harmful narrative-target combinations achieve widespread reach.