How Organizations Use AI: Evidence from ChatGPT

We study how organizations use frontier generative AI by linking ChatGPT Enterprise account records to usage, worker roles, task classifications, and public-company financial data through March 2026. These linked data enable a privacy-preserving analysis of adoption, worker roles, and message-level tasks at scale: for instance, the worker-level sample we analyze at the six-month adoption horizon includes over 1,500 organizations and over 17 million messages. We document four facts about enterprise AI adoption and use. First, ChatGPT Enterprise usage has grown rapidly due to a combination of new firm adoption and growing intensity among existing adopters. Second, U.S.-based public company adoption is concentrated among larger, more valuable, and more R&D- and SG&A-intensive firms. Third, active use within adopting firms spans job functions and seniority levels, with especially high usage intensity among early-career workers. Fourth, ChatGPT Enterprise usage encompasses a broad range of knowledge work tasks, including writing, technical work, communication, and information synthesis. In aggregate, these results suggest that firms differ widely in the speed, breadth and purpose of their enterprise AI adoption, and that they are still actively learning how to integrate AI into organizational workflows.

Managing the Human Fallback: Skill Investment Under Improving AI and Worker Mobility

When firms deploy autonomous AI, they must decide how much work to leave to the system and how much to keep workers engaged. This decision affects current output and future human capital. We develop a parsimonious two-period model in which AI may outperform the worker when it functions, but may fail with positive probability. A firm chooses worker engagement; engagement lowers current output for below-benchmark workers, but changes future skill through learning and erosion. We distinguish two dimensions of AI progress: capability, the system's output when it works, and reliability, the probability that it works. In a single-firm benchmark, engagement is valuable only as fallback investment. The firm engages the least-skilled workers most, because they have the largest skill gaps and are least costly to bring toward a useful fallback level. With worker mobility, engagement also affects labor-market sorting: workers prefer jobs that build more valuable skill trajectories. This sorting motive targets higher-skill workers near the AI frontier, where skill gains are more valuable and engagement is less costly. Mobility can therefore reverse the engagement pattern, shifting investment from the least-skilled toward the most-skilled workers below the AI benchmark. Mobility also reshapes how AI progress affects engagement: greater capability raises engagement by increasing the value of the skill trajectory a firm offers, whereas greater reliability can raise or lower it because it reduces fallback need while also changing learning opportunities. Under worker mobility, human-AI work design becomes a problem of human-capital investment, in which allocating work today shapes future skill.

Estimating time spent on work tasks

The task-based framework in economics models occupations as bundles of tasks. It is the standard lens for understanding how technology affects work: a new technology changes the cost or time each task requires and these task-level effects aggregate to occupation-level effects. We study how tasks should be weighted in this aggregation. Prior work has relied on idiosyncratic or ill-justified choices for task weights. While recent work suggests weighting tasks by time spent, existing time shares are either based on coarse ONET data not intended for this purpose or estimated via black-box language models. We address this gap by proposing a principled method for estimating time shares for nearly 18,000 tasks that constitute nearly all U.S. jobs. Our estimates factor a task's time into (i) the expected frequency of the task, derived from ONET, and (ii) the time to complete a single instance of it. To estimate the latter, we solve a constraint satisfaction problem based on pairwise comparisons elicited from language models about which tasks are longer per instance. We validate our estimates by characterizing the solution space of the constraint satisfaction problem and collecting data from workers for multiple occupations. We apply our time shares to analyze how AI exposes U.S. occupations and find that some prior results are sensitive to time weights. Accounting for the share of working time exposed to AI, rather than the share of tasks like prior work, widens the gap between the least and most exposed jobs: it lowers measured exposure for most occupations but raises it for the most exposed. Re-weighting by time also reshuffles 11 of the 25 occupations widely reported as most exposed to AI, shifting the top of the list away from clerical work and toward analytical roles. Time shares can serve as a general primitive for research and policy on the labor economy and the economics of technology.