Yejin Bang, Kirsty Fielding, Brandan Oliver +3cs.AI cs.CL
Legal work, with its heavy reliance on processing large amounts of text, is often considered one of the domains most exposed to the use of LLMs. Contract ``scrubbing,'' the final review of transactional agreements for errors and inconsistencies, is a particularly suitable task for automation, because it is routine, painstaking work requiring detailed attention to long documents. Scrubbing also seems to align naturally with the general capabilities expected of frontier LLMs around long-context reasoning, consistency checking, and named entity recognition (NER). Despite the economic value and potential for automation, no formal evaluations of LLMs performing contract scrubbing have been conducted. We introduce ContractScrub, the first benchmark designed to evaluate contract scrubbing capabilities, comprising contracts hand-crafted by experienced lawyers over diverse error categories such as misuse of defined terms, incorrect references, and inconsistent language. Frontier models perform surprisingly poorly with only one model reaching 0.75 macro average recall despite strong performance on seemingly related general benchmarks, demonstrating the practical limits of current models and the importance of narrowly targeted, domain-specific benchmarks for measuring real-world impact.
Most contract litigation turns on contracts that imperfectly record parties' bargains. When the parties' dispute can't be solved by interpreting the text, courts fill the gap. Scholars have long assumed that the remaining text runs out quickly, and provides thin evidence of the actual deal on the disputed point. On that view, a judge who supplies the missing term must be drawing on something else, from commercial defaults to her own policy preferences. Despite generations of work, courts have no real alternative to such unruly methods. We tested that assumption. Taking real contracts, we masked a term the parties had negotiated and asked readers to predict what we removed. Lay respondents recovered the hidden term about half the time, twice what chance predicts. Law students and lawyers did marginally better. But large language models, given nothing but the rest of the contract, recovered it nearly nine times in ten. The deal, in short, testifies to far more of the agreement than the literature assumes, including terms the parties never wrote. A contract, we argue, is like a radio signal from far away. Even when incomplete, enough of the message is carried elsewhere that the missing part can be reconstructed with the right receiver. True gaps are rarer than supposed. Courts can weigh model predictions as ordinary, contestable evidence, and parties can discipline the practice with "Choice of Model" clauses.