As people adopt transformer-based language models (e.g., ChatGPT and Gemini) for an increasing number of use-cases, it is important to know how such models learn and represent the meaning of the language, and to be more informed about what language is. This document is an attempt to help the reader understand how linguistic meaning (i.e., semantics) is approached from different fields of scientific and philosophical examination. I also explain three primary semantic theories: formal semantics, grounded semantics, and distributional semantics then compare how transformer-based language models differ from how humans learn language.
This paper investigates whether the postmodern claim of unrestricted semantic indeterminacy, and its foundational Saussurean axiom of the arbitrary sign, are compatible with the structural architecture of Classical Arabic. We develop a formal mathematical model of Arabic non concatenative morphology in which lexical meaning is determined by the interaction between an invariant root and a morphosyntactic pattern. Within this framework, we establish a Morphological Correspondence Theorem, demonstrating that every lexical item is uniquely generated by a root pattern pair, and a Semantic Localization Theorem, proving that lexical meaning is determined at the derivational level prior to surface realization. To address Saussurean weaker notion of relative arbitrariness, we formalize it via conditional Kolmogorov complexity, defining arbitrariness algorithmically as the no rule property. We prove that general relative arbitrariness is formally undecidable, while Arabic relative arbitrariness is decidable and provably less than 1 for its motivated signifiers (Levels W and M), establishing a strict system complexity asymmetry over Indo-European languages.
The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has intensified debates about their significance for linguistic theory. These debates are commonly divided into three positions: insulationism, which regards LLMs as irrelevant to human language; eliminativism, which claims that LLMs can replace traditional linguistic theories; and conciliationism, which views them as useful tools for linguistic research. To clarify these positions, this paper applies the framework of modal modeling from the philosophy of science. We argue that LLMs possess genuine epistemic value as minimal models, even without structural correspondence to human cognition. In particular, they can provide how-possibly explanations (HPEs) by testing modal claims about language acquisition and linguistic competence. We then examine the conditions under which LLMs could qualify as how-actually explanations (HAEs) of human language, drawing on the mechanistic account of scientific explanation. We argue that current LLMs do not yet satisfy these requirements. On the basis of this analysis, we propose understanding the explanatory power of LLMs as lying on a continuum between HPEs and HAEs. This framework avoids both overstating and understating their explanatory significance and offers a more precise basis for evaluating the role of LLMs in the scientific study of language.