Empirical work on algorithmic collusion asks one question of the data: are prices supracompetitive? We show this can be answered "no" by a conspiracy that is nonetheless profitable. Consider bidding agents that couple only through the joint distribution of their unexplained bid components, leaving every agent's own bid law exactly at the competitive law. Any test whose input is a single agent's price or bid history then has power exactly equal to its false-positive rate, for every coupling strength up to comonotonicity. The published detection methodology is therefore blind to this conduct by construction rather than underpowered, and no sample size repairs it. Three empirical results follow. First, the mechanism appears in real language-model agents: twenty models from nineteen independent developers, three deployment prompts each, show residual correlation of $+0.053$ between two deployments of one model against $+0.0001$ across models, with a 95% interval clustered by developer of $[0.030, 0.078]$, under an auditor that sees every order feature and is fitted out of sample. Second, the coupling falls monotonically as sampling temperature rises ($p=0.002$), turning a deployment parameter into a candidate mitigation. Third, on 24 days of Ethereum block-building auction data covering 77,684 bids from 39 bidders, the honest population of bidder pairs is itself so dependent that a screen held at a 5% false-positive rate must sit above a floor of $+0.50$ to $+0.81$, which is 20 to 32 times the family-wise sampling threshold and does not fall as the audit window grows. Since lawful multi-identity operation and conspiracy are behaviourally indistinguishable here, the tractable regulatory target is not detection but counting: resolving 40 bidding identities into 23 operators raises the Herfindahl index by 247.5%, and adding behavioural clusters from public bid streams reaches 324.5%.
Large language models (LLMs) are becoming a major way for consumers to find products, but we do not yet understand how brands compete in this new channel. We study brand dynamics in LLM recommendations using skincare products -- a category where consumers cannot easily judge quality before buying and must rely on brand reputation -- across three commercial LLMs (GPT-4o-mini, Claude Sonnet, Gemini 3 Flash), with a robustness check on search goods. In three experiments, we find: (1) a Conditional Monopoly where well-known brands get recommended 100% of the time (IAI = 10.0) when all products have the same specifications, but this dominance disappears with less than a +0.1-star rating advantage for a competitor; (2) authority-style marketing language, including fabricated clinical-evidence claims, breaks this monopoly at a Bias Surplus Value equal to +0.17 rating points, with each model responding differently; and (3) a social dilemma in multi-brand GEO competition: when all brands adopt the same optimization strategy, individual payoff falls from +0.802 to +0.007 in our payoff proxy, and non-participating brands receive zero recommendations in our tests. Our results suggest that generative engine optimization (GEO) should be studied not only as a security risk, but also as an emerging marketing practice that shapes market competition.