Pawel Struski, Jakub Swistak, Inez Okulska +1cs.MA cs.AI econ.GN
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as economic agents, yet there is little evidence whether LLM agents are suited for participating in market mechanisms designed for humans, and whether these mechanisms deliver desired outcomes when faced with LLM agents. We address this question by replicating seminal economic experiments, replacing human subjects with LLM agents. We place agents in a double auction environment, which is a widely-used market mechanism. We check whether such a market is able to deliver an efficient allocation of resources, thereby testing a novel dimension of alignment of LLM agents -- their compatibility with a fundamental market mechanism. We find that markets populated by LLM agents exhibit slower or no convergence towards market equilibrium, thus providing less efficient allocations than markets populated by humans. We then analyze agents' individual trading decisions and find substantial heterogeneity both across model families and market roles. We also run a lexical analysis of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) traces generated by the agents. We find that the decision to execute a trade rather than continue incrementally adjusting prices is associated with a shift from strategic considerations toward urgency. We publicly release our testing framework, which can be used for future evaluations.
Two old market sayings hold that news is already priced in by the time it is published, and that the rumor is bought while the news is sold. Both place the price move associated with a piece of news before and at publication rather than after it. Whether the claims hold, for which kinds of news, and by how much are basic questions about how fast markets absorb public information. We test them on 4.57 million financial news articles covering roughly 3,000 US stocks (2023-2026). A large language model teacher, distilled into a compact classifier through active learning, assigns each article one of 17 event tags and five attributes; articles are clustered into stories to separate first reports from follow-up coverage; and beta-adjusted abnormal returns are measured around the resulting 1.68 million stock-day events, with 364,405 neutral-sentiment events as a placebo group. Three results follow. First, the price move associated with news concentrates before and at publication: pooled across all signed events, the cumulative move in the news direction by the close of publication day is 2.8 times its value 20 days later, and for rumor-flagged events the rumor day captures the entire move while the subsequent confirmation contributes nothing. Second, measured against the placebo of comparable stocks, markets underreact to numbers and overreact to stories: quantified fundamental news (earnings, dividends, guidance, analyst actions) keeps drifting in the direction of the news for weeks, while soft story-driven news (launches, macro commentary, leadership) gives back its move. Third, news carries width as well as direction: publicity raises volatility before the publication day, and volatility declines once the news is out, because publication resolves uncertainty. The study also produces a table of measured drift for each event tag, usable as a prior in news-conditioned forecasting models.