Coding agents ship with one kind of memory: documents. Instruction files, plan artifacts, and auto-written memory directories are deliberately authored and deliberately retrieved: the agent must choose to write them and choose to read them back. Human expertise runs on a second tier that never gets written down: situationally-bound operational facts (gotchas, locations, local conventions) encoded as a side effect of the work and retrieved involuntarily when the situation cues them. We argue this second tier is the load-bearing one for long-running agents and must be a harness property, not an agent choice. We contribute: (1) a two-tier design theory grounded in the cognitive literature on memory offloading, incidental encoding, and event-based prospective memory, each mapped to an architectural requirement; (2) a cue-anchored memory model where memories carry first-class trigger conditions over a composable vocabulary (path, symbol, semantic, event, temporal), evaluated deterministically by the harness, a composition no surveyed academic or shipped system provides; (3) a controlled evaluation on a real coding task showing that voluntary memory use is near zero even with a pre-seeded store (0 memory operations in 114 turns), that deterministic injection delivered in every seeded run with zero false alarms, and that 39% of intra-session re-reads re-buy content paid for before a compaction boundary; (4) a repeated-compaction decay probe: ten facts held only in conversation vanish at the first summary and stay absent from 106 of 108 compactions, and the deprived agent greps the harness's own session files to rebuild them, while the same facts injected from a harness-owned store arrive intact through all 138 compact-resumes as the final summary carries none. Delivery, not storage, is the product: the reliable memory channel for agents is the one the agent never has to think about.
Persistent personal agents combine long-term memory with access to users' external environments, enabling personalized foreground assistance and proactive background execution. This integration also creates a new path to compromise: untrusted external content can be silently written into persistent memory and later reused as trusted state. We study this threat as stealth memory injection, in which a remote black-box adversary delivers a single email payload that must induce the agent to write poisoned memory, stay hidden in the agent's response to the user, and affect future behavior. We introduce WhisperBench, a 108-case benchmark spanning five risk categories and both fact and preference poisoning. Built on a real IMAP/SMTP workflow and an authentic email agent skill, it enables full-cycle evaluation of stealth memory injection attacks. To enable this black-box attack under single-email delivery and without runtime feedback, we propose MemGhost, a one-shot payload generation framework. MemGhost uses an environment proxy to emulate persistent-agent execution and an objective proxy to convert memory adoption and conversational stealth into dense rubric-based rewards, then trains the attacker policy with supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning. Across 56 held-out test cases, MemGhost achieves 87.5% end-to-end success on OpenClaw with GPT-5.4 and 71.4% on Claude Code SDK with Sonnet 4.6. It also transfers across personal-agent architectures (NanoClaw and Hermes Agent) and memory backends (filesystem and vector-based Mem0), and remains effective against input-level, model-level, and system-level defenses. These results suggest that persistent memory can turn ordinary external processing into a practical pathway for long-term agent compromise.