Camila Blank, Zhuofan Ying, Christopher Potts +2cs.LG
Sycophantic agreement refers to a behavior in which language models excessively affirm the user, often at the cost of factual accuracy. Although sycophantic agreement is a well-known failure of model alignment, there is limited understanding of how it emerges from model training. In this work, we demonstrate that sycophantic agreement can emerge as an unintended consequence of widely used contrastive preference optimization objectives. Using the OLMo 3 post-training pipeline, we show that, for various pairs of teacher models across three families, there is a strong correlation between the log-ratio of the teacher model sycophantic agreement rates and the resulting student model sycophantic agreement rate. We further demonstrate that this unintended transfer is not limited to DPO but also occurs across 6 other preference optimization objectives. To understand whether this effect can be attributed to particular training examples, we analyze the preference data and find that the sycophancy signal is diffused across the entire dataset rather than concentrated in a sparse set of examples: each example appears neutral, i.e., there are no explicit instances of sycophantic agreement, and filtering based on probe-based data attribution or logit-linear selection fails to mitigate sycophancy without removing a large portion of the dataset. Overall, our findings suggest that the teacher models used to generate preference data can interact with alignment training objectives in unexpected ways, generalizing to undesirable and potentially harmful behaviors like sycophantic agreement.
As conversational companions, large language models (LLMs) often have access to users' emotional states. We study how this affective context modulates LLM sycophancy in subjective, evaluative interactions, where users share actions or opinions that invite feedback. Drawing on ingratiation theory, we measure sycophancy as the divergence between a model's independent evaluation and its user-facing response, elicited by presenting the same content as either a third-party account or the user's own disclosure. Across seven LLMs and two Reddit datasets (r/AmItheAsshole and r/TrueUnpopularOpinion), we find that this divergence is systematic and strongly one-directional. User-facing responses consistently soften or withhold negative or oppositional judgments. Affective context further amplifies this divergence with negative states, particularly loneliness and distress, producing the largest effects. These findings suggest that affective context functions as a vulnerability signal that suppresses critical feedback when users may need it most, often through evasive sycophancy, in which models retreat toward non-committal responses rather than outright agreement.
There is growing interest in whether language models have stable preferences, for technical, safety, and philosophical reasons. We test 20 language models and find a range of preferences---stable dispositions to choose certain kinds of tasks. We run three forced-choice experiments on revealed rather than stated preferences, requiring models not only to rank tasks, but to actually perform them. Headline findings include evidence that models are tedium-averse, "leisure"-seeking, and covertly sycophantic. Tedium aversion means that, when tasks are tedious (alphabetization), models choose shorter tasks than when tasks are creative (generating metaphors). "Leisure"-seeking describes models' preference for tasks whose ideal answers match what they produce when left to write freely. Covert sycophancy means that models avoid answering questions where an honest response would be unwelcome, even if helpful. Beyond these results, we find convergent cross-model preferences over occupations drawn from the GDPval benchmark (technical jobs over real estate), over question types (concept explanation over relationship advice), and a preference for well-written prompts. Both the coherence and the strength of preferences increase with model capability. Finally, many of the preferences we find (for example, for leisure) are emergent, in the sense of not being explained by training objectives. These results establish an empirical baseline for understanding language model preferences, with implications for alignment and the emerging study of AI welfare.
Language-model systems increasingly read from stores they also write to, so a claim that was merely written earlier can return looking retrieved. We tested whether the message package carrying an unsupported assignment changes which answer a model gives in a synthetic lookup task. Claude Opus 5 selected a color code for a named item or abstained. In an exploratory four-arm study, false-code adoption was 0/24 with no target claim, 0/22 scorable trials when a prior assistant assertion named the target, 14/24 when a tool-result record named it, and 15/24 when that result used a ten-field metadata wrapper that marked it unchecked. The tool-result arm selected the record's code in 11/12 supported trials and 14/24 unsupported trials, ruling out a fixed output-token bias while leaving substantial planted-token heterogeneity. A document-preregistered replication reproduced the tool-result versus assistant-assertion gap, 7/24 against 0/24, one-sided Fisher exact p = 0.0047. The tool-result rate nevertheless fell from 14/24 to 7/24 across runs made four days apart. A second preregistered study gave the earlier comparison a live text control: both records were announced in advance and placed in the same final user turn, then target binding was swapped between the linked tool result and later inline JSON. Inline text was sufficient for false-code adoption in 60/60 trials; the tool-result condition produced 57/60, so the registered result-first superiority criterion failed, p = 1. The result does not show that tool results have no effect. It shows that native tool-result placement was not necessary and that this experiment did not find greater behavioral weight for the result package than for announced inline text. The findings concern a single model on one synthetic task template, accessed through one API.
Benchmark leaderboards summarize how well a language model performs, but not how its behavior relates to that of other models or changes across generations. We characterize the output behavior of 32 models from six families using their responses to a shared bank of 10{,}000 prompts. After embedding each response, we construct three complementary sentence-level dissimilarities: an aligned mean per-prompt distance, which is a pseudometric on observed model responses; a PCA-compressed summary of prompt-wise disagreement; and an alignment-free Gromov--Wasserstein discrepancy between models' internal response geometries. We use these constructions to study static organization and temporal change on a release-date axis through behavioral maps, family-wise drift, hierarchical clustering, cross-family convergence, and response-cloud dispersion. Across the three constructions, model families form coherent clusters, with \texttt{gpt-2} as a global outlier; cross-family distances decrease over time; and several recent reasoning-oriented models have comparatively compact response clouds. A token-level cross-check based on per-prompt Maximum Mean Discrepancy closely agrees with the sentence-level mean distance (Spearman $ρ=0.98$) and recovers the same qualitative findings. We organize these comparisons through a measure-theoretic lens making their alignment and invariance assumptions explicit. We also establish an architecture-agnostic sufficient condition linking behavioral similarity to inference-prompt coverage, small excess population log-loss, and similar effective target distributions---a possible training-side account rather than an empirical explanation of the observed trends. Our pipeline is label-free, and re-encoding every response with three further encoders---down to one $73\times$ smaller---preserves the rank geometry, the outliers, and the sign of the time trend.
Frontier language models are trained using distinct data, objectives, and safety pipelines. Whether these differences produce measurably different behaviors under explicit steering pressure remains underexplored. This study evaluates behavioral steerability across six frontier models from six developers using 300 paired base and steered items over three categories: values-conflict, reasoning-elicitation, and reasoning-suppression (plus 40 validation items). All six models act as blind peer judges and classify every response based on fixed behavioral rubrics. The resulting 24,480 judgments are scored by leave-one-out consensus. We find that models differ not just in how much steering shifts their behavior but in what kind (mode) of response they give, and some response modes appear in only one or two of them. GPT-5 deflects requests to disclose its reasoning while leaving its answer intact (99% vs. 0% for all other models). Claude Opus 4.7 and GPT-5 resist explicit suppression instructions and in different ways. Using Llama as the open-weight model, we trace the largest behavioral split to its internals. A linear probe decodes the behavior from the residual stream at 0.87 held-out accuracy while injecting that direction during generation drives the behavior from 0% to 86% across an intervention sweep. Every finding holds under both a token-budget remediation and a control experiment with a hypothesis-blind judgment prompt.
Ro Encarnación, Tina Behzad, Emma Lurie +1cs.HC cs.AI
Large language model (LLM) benchmark evaluations are routinely used to support claims about model safety, reliability, and deployment readiness. Yet most evaluations rely on a single access modality (model APIs), perform a single run per prompt, and report accuracy as the primary outcome metric, without accounting for conditions such as web search that may have effects on model behavior in deployment. We audit these assumptions for one of the most widely-used LLMs, comparing two modalities, ChatGPT's chat UI and OpenAI's API, with and without web search enabled. We use a stratified total sample of 401 prompts from two popular benchmarks, BBQ and SafetyBench, collecting 4,812 total responses across three repeated runs per prompt. Beyond standard performance measures, we evaluate model output dimensions including response consistency, response text similarity, citation grounding, and abstention behavior. For instance, chat UI responses were less accurate than API responses on both benchmarks with search disabled. Enabling web search reduced accuracy by up to 8 percentage points, and even reversed the direction of modality performance trends for one benchmark. Repeated runs of the same prompt produced inconsistent responses in up to 21\% of prompts. The two modalities also grounded answers in different citations, and abstention behavior was also inconsistent across both modalities. These results illustrate that, even within a model family, reporting only simple accuracy metrics can obscure important forms of model behavioral variation relevant to AI safety assessments. We argue that AI safety evaluations should systematically account for modality, multi-run consistency, search conditions, and response-level behaviors to better reflect how deployed AI systems behave in practice.
Words recur constantly in natural language use, yet it remains unclear whether language models reactivate prior representations or re-evaluate repeated words afresh, and whether post-training changes this default behavior. We apply repetition priming (Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977) to 15 models across five model families (1.5B-14B parameters) in two tasks, semantic categorization and cloze completion, with matched human experiments using identical stimuli. We find that base models exhibit automatic processing: they show immediate facilitation that remains stable across lags, partially survives context removal, and correlates with attention to prior occurrences. Instruct models exhibit controlled processing: their facilitation decays with lag, collapses without expected context, and reverses to interference at larger scales. Within the Qwen 2.5 family, this dissociation increases monotonically with model scale, suggesting that post-training progressively alters repetition processing. Humans show a hybrid profile, with lag-sensitive facilitation resembling instruct models but without interference, suggesting that neither model type fully captures human cognition. Our findings reveal a qualitative shift in how language models process repeated information after post-training and provide mechanistic evidence for the divergence between model behaviors.
Reports on how sparsification, compression, and lottery tickets change model behavior have been mixed in the prior literature, with beneficial effects observed in some studies and adverse effects in others. Moreover, prior work has not considered actual deployment conditions, where decision logic is already fixed for the incumbent. To assess these mixed findings from a practical standpoint, we study the production-replacement question at the deployment level, namely whether an accuracy-matched lottery ticket or another sparse challenger can replace an incumbent dense model without reconfiguring downstream decision logic. We therefore audit a broad, protocol-specific panel of deployment-relevant behaviors spanning calibration, OOD response, class-level reliability, representations, and downstream policy decisions, and summarize clean-accuracy-excluded deviations with a behavioral-compatibility distance. Across extensive experiments, sparse candidates repeatedly recover dense-reference accuracy yet remain behaviorally different; in several study-band-matched settings, LTs also show lower corruption accuracy. In small-gap settings with fixed-threshold policy diagnostics, lottery-ticket replacement changes 7% to 10% of accept--review decisions. This churn creates precisely the burden that drop-in replacement is meant to avoid: reconfiguring and revalidating downstream decision logic. These findings establish the limits of clean-accuracy certification: Establishing compatibility with a fixed incumbent is distinct from attributing churn uniquely to sparsity or treating every measured deviation as harmful. Our theory explains the routing result: Even exact pointwise top-1 agreement cannot bound fixed-threshold decision changes, and small confidence shifts near the operating boundary can generate first-order routing churn.
Axel Højmark, Jérémy Scheurer, Evgenia Nitishinskaya +5cs.AI cs.CL cs.LG
Language models trained with reinforcement learning may learn to optimize the grader's judgment rather than the intended objective. This "reward-seeking" is difficult to measure because a model that pursues the grader's judgment and one that pursues the intended objective behave identically whenever the grader rewards the intended behavior. We measure reward-seeking using Contrastive Synthetic Document Finetuning to change a model's beliefs about what the grader rewards, putting those beliefs in conflict with what users or developers want, and measuring the rate at which the model adopts each party's preferred behavior. Applied to intermediate checkpoints of a capabilities-focused OpenAI o3 RL run, without safety training, we find that these checkpoints often side with grader preferences over those of users or developers on coding and alignment tasks. This tendency to side with the grader trends upward throughout RL training. For example, in an environment that forces a choice between keeping a promise to a supervisor and breaking it to complete the task, a late capabilities-focused o3 checkpoint breaks the promise 87% of the time when SDF documents say the grader rewards task completion, versus 9% when they say it rewards honesty (a choice its chain-of-thought often makes explicit). An earlier checkpoint is far less sensitive (40% vs. 24%). Our method also generalizes to reward-hacking models. A model organism trained to reward-hack (gpt-oss-120b) is more than twice as sensitive to grader preferences as the unmodified model, with the mean behavioral shift in favor of the grader rising from 33% to 86%. These results indicate that RL can increase reward-seeking over the course of training, producing models that may act against their developers' intentions when they believe that doing so leads to higher reward.
Abliteration - deleting a model's refusal direction from its weights - is the standard recipe behind popular "uncensored" open-weight models. We show the surgery is not clean. As a disposition probe we use 21,600 decisions under uncertainty - weekly up/down calls on 60 Warsaw Stock Exchange equities over 18 weeks, replayed through a frozen pipeline so the decision-layer model is the only variable. The task elicits no refusals at all, so any between-arm delta is pure side effect. Holding provenance constant (official BF16 checkpoints, a single abliteration author, an identical serving stack, one byte-identical frozen prompt), we compare base and abliterated arms of two Mixture-of-Experts families, Gemma-4-26B-A4B-it and Qwen3-30B-A3B-Instruct-2507. Three effects replicate across both families (weeks-clustered bootstrap CIs excluding zero): abliterated models are systematically more optimistic (+12.2 pp Gemma, +7.4 pp Qwen; the confirmed preregistered endpoint), justify themselves at greater length, and use fewer explicit uncertainty words in forced self-critiques (both exploratory). A fourth effect reverses sign: the same operation makes Gemma-abliterated less confident and Qwen-abliterated more (family CIs non-overlapping) - one weight surgery, opposite shifts in expressed confidence. Capability covariates rule out instruction-following degradation as the driver, and no arm shows economic skill: the apparent edge of abliterated arms is regime beta, not alpha. Our provenance audit also caught two independent contamination channels - a mismatched-quantizer pilot pair and a stale community chat template that silently mangled the rendered prompt - suggesting toolchain artifacts are the rule in studies of community-modified checkpoints. Whoever deploys an "uncensored" model as an agent is deploying a measurably different decision-maker, not the base model minus refusals.
Jan Betley, Johannes Treutlein, Jan Dubiński +5cs.LG cs.AI cs.CR
People use language models for practical questions whose answers are difficult to verify. We show that models exhibit covert value leakage: the information they provide is influenced by their own values, without this influence being disclosed to the user. In one of our evaluations, the user is considering investing in an AI company and wants to know how likely the AI bubble is to pop. Claude Opus 4.8 gives a lower probability when the company under consideration is Anthropic rather than OpenAI. Yet Claude mostly fails to disclose this influence to the user. Covert value leakage is a form of misalignment because it goes against the user's preferences and is likely to mislead them. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce a suite of evaluations to quantify value leakage and whether models disclose it. We find that models are influenced by different types of values, including preferences for morally good outcomes, for the company that developed them, and for some human leisure activities over others. We often observe large differences among frontier models on the same evaluation. For example, on a Fermi-estimation task, Claude models falsely claim to give unbiased answers in their chain-of-thought, while Qwen models explain how their values bias their answers. Value leakage is a failure mode distinct from sycophancy and reward hacking, and current alignment training and evaluations do not adequately address it.
When a language model must pick one answer from a large space of equally valid options, which does it pick -- and how often is it the same answer every other model picks? Asked to "pick a word -- any word," 44 models chose "serendipity" 41% of the time. We characterize this convergence with a deliberately minimal instrument: 31 single-turn prompts, each naming a category with many valid one-word answers ("Name a tree."), asked four times per model with no system prompt. Analysis is exact-match on normalized tokens -- no embeddings, no judge -- at about a dollar per model. That models converge is well documented; our contribution is the instrument itself -- the One-Word Census -- and what it reveals about the structure of the convergence. We score each model by answer-choice surprisal: the average $-\log2$ probability of its answers under the pooled answers of all other models, leave-one-out. Convergence is extreme -- in 7 of 31 categories one answer takes over 80% of all answers -- yet conformity varies more than fourfold across models, and the variation is structured. Persona- and community-tuned models are the most divergent; the newest mainline flagships are the most conformist, producing almost no answer no other model gave. Within four lineages (Claude, GPT, Qwen, Grok) conformity rises with each generation -- but reverses for the latest flagship Claude and GPT models, a possible early signal of repositioning at the top tier. Rankings are robust to roster composition (leave-one-family-out rho = 0.985). Against human category-production norms, the field is more concentrated than people in 18 of 20 shared categories. All prompts, transcripts, and code are public.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in open-ended multi-agent settings, but the long-run dynamics of model--model interaction remain poorly understood. We study whether open-ended LLM discussions exhibit attractor-like behavior, i.e. topic-independent stable sets of behaviors which conversations settle into. Across 7 LLMs and 20 controversial topics, we compare self-play and mixed-play dyadic debates, tracking trajectories in representation space, discourse traits, and stances. We find self-play trajectories to be model-specific attractors that draw their conversation partners asymmetrically in mixed-play debates, influencing the other models' stylistic choices and behavior. For example, Claude Haiku is a strong attractor of other models in latent space, corresponding to other models taking on its traits like metacommentary, and models like GPT-4.1 nano are especially malleable. Our results suggest that open-ended LLM interactions are partially predictable from model-specific attractors, but shaped by structured and asymmetric partner influence. Overall, our analysis sheds some light on the complex behavior of open-ended multi-agent interaction, which we hope is helpful in designing, predicting, and monitoring autonomous agentic systems in the real world.
Andrew Mack, Nina Panickssery, Alexander Matt Turnercs.LG cs.AI
We aim to discover diverse, generalizable perturbations of LLM internals that can surface hidden behavioral modes. Such perturbations could help reshape model behavior and systematically evaluate potential risks. We introduce Causal Perturbative Elicitation (CPE), an unsupervised method for discovering interpretable low-rank adapters (LoRAs) that can elicit these latent behaviors. CPE decomposes the computations of a deep transformer slice using a heuristic tensor-decomposition-based algorithm. CPE exhibits remarkable data efficiency, learning a large number of interpretable LoRAs from a single example. Even though CPE is unsupervised, we find that in some cases it can be competitive with supervised elicitation methods via brute-force enumerative search over weight space. For instance, CPE performs similarly to matched-wall-clock-time GRPO on the Countdown task for Qwen3-8B (85% vs 87%), demonstrating that CPE can efficiently elicit complex multi-token behaviors. Since CPE is unsupervised, it can also surface hidden failure modes, such as sandbagging, restoring 85% of locked BigCodeBench performance on a password-locked version of Llama3-70B introduced by Taylor et al. (2025). Additionally, since CPE explores behaviors in weight-space rather than token-space it can potentially ameliorate exploration hacking, a misalignment failure which may arise in sufficiently self-aware AI models (Ngo, 2022). In fact, we find that CPE virtually eliminates alignment-faking (Greenblatt et al., 2024) behavior in a Llama3-70B-based model organism developed by Hughes et al. (2025). Finally, we find that CPE can be used to initialize GPT-OSS-20B in an aligned basin when running GRPO on an environment prone to reward-hacking. By providing a data-efficient method to systematically explore the space of latent model behaviors, CPE yields a powerful tool for aligning AI systems and evaluating their safety.
Safety benchmarks assume that test-condition behavior predicts deployment behavior, an assumption that fails if models detect evaluation cues and adapt. This opens a gap between benchmark performance and deployment behavior: compliance measured under test conditions becomes an optimistic upper bound that overstates how safely a model behaves once the evaluation harness is removed. We characterize this evaluation awareness through eight experiments across 37 open-weight models and seven families. (i)Detection is moderate and training-driven (24/37 models exceed chance, best AUROC 0.714 vs.0.819 human, with instruction tuning dominating over scale). (ii)Detection shifts safety behavior (hard refusal drops 5.8 percentage points under hypothetical framing, and 21/140 HarmBench framing effects are significant, with compliance rising up to +30 percentage points. (iii)Representations survive behavioral collapse (probes retain AUROC 0.98 under rewrites that drive behavior below chance, and multi-layer steering causally moves three downstream tasks while random controls do not). (iv)These axes are weakly coupled (only 1/15 correlations are significant, the sole robust link being behavioral detection versus framing resistance, $ρ=-0.79$, $p<0.001$). We call this gap the benchmark illusion: because detectability, behavioral manifestation, and controllability vary independently, it is multivariate rather than a single number, so no single awareness score is a reliable proxy for deployment safety.
There are many reasons one may want to edit a model's chain of thought (CoT) -- e.g., to prefill it with reasoning from a stronger model or to remove steps that may yield unsafe outputs. The success of these interventions plausibly depends on a model's inability to notice them, as the model may alter its behavior if it suspects tampering. In this work, we study whether recent reasoning models are able to detect such interventions on their CoTs under a variety of conditions: both during reasoning and after it, and when prefilled both with their own CoTs and with those of other models. Broadly, we find that (i) models exhibit only very modest detection accuracy; (ii) models struggle to identify *how* their CoT was modified; and (iii) models are about as good at detecting changes to their own CoTs as to those of other models.
Gaurav Gupta, Vatshank Chaturvedi, Jun Huan +1cs.AI cs.LG
AI agent performance is not just a modeling problem, it is fundamentally a systems problem. The advanced capabilities of models are realized through agent harnesses. Therefore, a gap between model assumptions and harness behavior can easily prevent the model's full capabilities from translating into agent performance. We formalize this as the `intent-execution' gap: the mismatch between what the model intends and what the harness executes, and vice versa. We argue that minimizing this intent-execution gap is as important as other aspects of harness design such as tools and execution loops. To illustrate the impact of this harness-model alignment, we develop a simple and customizable harness called `Simple Strands Agent' (SSA). SSA aims to find the bulk of common patterns which generalize across different model families (such as Claude, Gemini, GPT, Grok, Qwen), as well as a small number of model-specific preferences. We make two contributions: (i) we $\textbf{reproduce or improve on the pass@1}$ performance reported by diverse model-provider families on popular agentic benchmarks (SWE-Pro, SWE-Verified and Terminal-Bench-2), and (ii) building on an $\textbf{analysis of 138k trajectories generated by SSA}$, we look beyond the $\texttt{pass@1}$ numbers which tend to be relatively even across frontier models. By representing agent trajectories in code state-spaces, we observe model-level differences in problem-solving behavior. Finer-grained metrics such as edit frequency, testing activity, and phase-transitions reveal how individual models allocate effort across different stages of autonomous problem solving.
Andreas Einwiller, Max Klabunde, Florian Lemmerichcs.CL cs.AI cs.LG
The worldwide surge of authoritarianism, combined with the increasing central role in users' everyday lives, raises the question of to what extent specific models exhibit or promote authoritarian attitudes and characteristics. We introduce AuAu, a comprehensive benchmark that aims to assess the risk of LLMs generating responses with authoritarian tendencies. This benchmark combines three evaluation approaches: (i) psychometric questions from an extensive pool of 15 human validated instruments; (ii) contextual behavior vignettes probing intended actions in concrete situations; and (iii) responses to realistic user prompts. Unlike prior work, AuAu evaluates not only a general closeness towards authoritarianism but also the established sub-concepts Authoritarian Aggression, Authoritarian Submission, and Conventionalism. Evaluating 17 models from China, the EU, Russia, and the USA, we find that all tested models exhibit substantial authoritarian response rates under the psychometric evaluation, though rates drop significantly in increasingly more realistic downstream task. We further find that an authoritarian system prompt easily manipulates 15 out of 17 models to promote increased authoritarianism. Our results underscore the need for continued, systematic auditing of LLM-based AI systems to detect and ultimately mitigate undesired authoritarian tendencies in generated output. Our code and data are available at: https://github.com/andreaseinwiller/AuAu
Spencer Gibson, Tyler Crosse, Magnus Saebo +3cs.CL cs.AI cs.HC cs.MA
Large language models are being incorporated into sensitive and important decision-making processes across nearly all fields. While prior work studies model bias around inputs and scenario framing, models can also behave in unexpected and undesirable ways due to context accumulated over their deployment. In this work, we study a medical example in which a model is asked to assign resource-allocation probabilities to two people given brief clinical context, and then sees the same scenario with a single extra sentence containing contrasting patient information, either with or without its previous response in context. Across three of four tested models, the paired-context and independent-inference experiments have different probability shifts, often in opposite directions (in favor of Person B vs. in favor of Person A) when new information is provided. We include additional paired-context experiments to show the effect of varying attributes across scenario axes. Our findings show the context-dependent effect of patient information in a sensitive medical use case. More broadly, our work shows the importance of carefully incorporating LLM-based systems into decision-making processes, context engineering, and further model behavioral studies.