Emergent misalignment (EM) is the phenomenon where fine-tuning a language model on a narrow task leads to harmful behavior in unrelated domains. A leading mechanistic account attributes EM to persona features: latent directions acquired during pre-training that misaligned fine-tuning amplifies. We ask where these features come from: which pre-training documents activate them, and whether naturally occurring human-written text suffices to induce EM. Using Sparse Autoencoder (SAE) based model diffing across four open-weight models, we find that features related to jailbreak personas, sarcasm, deception, and manipulation are amplified by misalignment fine-tuning, while safety-relevant and assistant-identity features are suppressed. Steering individual features controls EM in both directions: it induces misalignment rates of up to 62% in aligned models -- exceeding the 35% reached by misalignment fine-tuning itself -- and re-aligns misaligned models to near-baseline misalignment rates. Attributing the causal features to a corpus of one million pre-training web documents retrieves semantically relevant narratives about villainous characters, domination, and harmful agency. However, fine-tuning on these human-written documents does not reliably induce EM, even after reformatting into assistant-style responses, whereas synthetic instruction-response pairs derived from the same content do -- and transfer across model families. Semantic relevance alone is therefore not sufficient: response structure or model-generated phrasing plays an important role in inducing EM.
Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) exhibit strong visual understanding, yet the internal features that cause these behaviors remain difficult to identify, audit, or control. While applicable to post-hoc inspection, hidden states that are decomposed into interpretable feature directions using sparse autoencoders (SAEs) neither readily isolate which features are changed by multimodal training, nor are they directly useful for targeted control. We introduce MMDiff, a multimodal model-diffing framework that trains multimodal SAEs and turns them into feature-level interfaces for discovering and controlling multimodal behavior. MMDiff supports three uses: (i) feature isolation, by diffing a base-LM SAE against its multimodal-adapted counterpart to identify features altered by multimodal training; (ii) task-specific feature detection, via per-token contrastive firing analysis that isolates causal features; and (iii) feature-level control, by causally removing or steering the discovered feature directions. We train multimodal SAEs for three MLLM families, LLaVA-MORE, PaliGemma 2, and InternVL3.5, and evaluate on visual-spatial understanding, multimodal safety, and OCR. MMDiff discovers sparse, causally specific features whose removal selectively degrades target behaviors by an average of 12% on spatial tasks and 17% on OCR, and reduces attack success rate by 24% on multimodal safety attacks, with no impact on VQA performance. Steering these features improves spatial and OCR accuracy by +3.6% and +1.8% on average over a standard single-layer steering baseline. These results show that multimodal SAEs can serve not only as interpretability tools, but as mechanisms for auditing, steering, and controlling MLLMs behavior toward safer and more capable generations.