Proprietary text-to-image diffusion models are increasingly distributed as hosted services and downloadable checkpoints, making their intellectual property (IP) protection an increasingly critical concern when model leakage, copying, or unauthorized fine-tuning is disputed. In this work, we present a non-invasive model fingerprinting framework based on \emph{collapsed generation}, a phenomenon where certain input conditions produce highly consistent images across multiple stochastic seeds. We show that collapsed generation is an intrinsic, model-dependent property of the learned generation process. These collapse-prone conditions therefore expose model-specific behavioral signatures, enabling reliable ownership verification without embedding invasive watermarks. After preparing conditions on the source model, the framework verifies a suspect model under two access settings: (1) white-box pipeline access, where optimized continuous embeddings can be injected into the generation process, and (2) black-box API-only access, where natural language prompts are queried through the service interface. In both cases, ownership evidence is measured by whether the suspect model reproduces the source model's collapse behavior across stochastic samplings. Extensive experiments across UNet- and transformer-based diffusion models show that collapsed generation fingerprints can distinguish different source models with low confusion. These fingerprints remain verifiable in fine-tuned derivatives and under common and adaptive model- or query-level obfuscations, while requiring only a modest verification query budget. Together, these results establish collapsed generation as a reliable intrinsic evidence source for non-invasive diffusion model ownership verification.
Keyu Zhang, Vadim Safronov, Andrew Martincs.CR cs.AI cs.CL
LLM provenance testing asks whether a suspect LLM belongs to the same lineage as a source. Existing black-box methods largely infer this relationship from response-level characteristics, but these characteristics may shift under adaptation or deployment even when the underlying meaning remains unchanged, weakening the reliability of provenance evidence. To address this limitation, we introduce induced decision regions by mapping open-ended outputs into a finite decision space, thereby abstracting away surface-form variation and reframing provenance testing as measuring the inheritance of decision regions. Empirical analysis shows that the source's induced regions are preserved more strongly in related models than in unrelated models. Building on this signal, we propose Stemma, a practical black-box LLM fingerprinting method that operationalises stability, robustness, and specificity as complementary probe-selection principles for reliably estimating induced decision region inheritance. Across 770 source-suspect pairs drawn from 56 public checkpoints and spanning diverse model-weight transformations, Stemma achieves 0.967 AUC and 87.8% TPR at 1% FPR, substantially outperforming four representative baselines. It further achieves 0.995 AUC and 93.5% TPR at 1% FPR on 1,260 pairs covering 91 deployment instances, demonstrating robustness to diverse inference-time deployment settings.
Federated Learning (FL) over 5G cellular networks protects raw data but remains vulnerable to side-channel leakage. Prior fingerprinting attacks assume packet-level network visibility, an assumption that does not hold at the 5G Physical (PHY) layer, where user payloads are encrypted and Radio Network Temporary Identifiers (RNTIs) may change over time. However, we demonstrate that PHY-layer scheduling metadata broadcast over the Physical Downlink Control Channel (PDCCH) preserves architecture-associated temporal patterns. We introduce FLINT, a novel black-box fingerprinting framework that infers FL model architecture families, including CNNs, RNNs, and Transformers, using only coarse PHY-layer observations. FLINT overcomes the lack of network-layer visibility by decoding PDCCH scheduling information, mapping changing RNTIs to physical user devices, and applying multi-view temporal modeling to distinguish architecture-specific training behavior. This leakage is security-critical because knowledge of a client's model architecture can transform passive reconnaissance into targeted downstream exploitation. Extensive experiments on an over-the-air srsRAN-based 5G testbed demonstrate that FLINT achieves a macro F1-score of 0.930 for architecture-family classification. To our knowledge, FLINT is the first work to fingerprint AI/ML model architectures using lower-layer 5G side-channel information obtainable by any protocol-aware adversary.
We develop a framework for the information discarded by machine learning models whose inputs carry a Lie group action. Given a representation $π$ of a Lie group $G$ on a space $V$ and a learned function $f\colon V \to \mathbb{R}$, we define two objects measuring the symmetry invisible to $f$. The null fiber at a point $x \in V$ is the set $N_G(f,x) = \{g \in G : f(π(g^{-1}) \cdot x) = f(x)\}$ of group elements whose inverse action on $x$ is undetectable by $f$. When $N_G(f,x)$ is independent of $x$, it coincides with the stabilizer $\mathrm{Stab}_G(f)$, the largest subgroup of $G$ under which $f$ is invariant. For smooth maps to $\mathbb{R}$, the preimage theorem guarantees that null fibers have dimension at least $\dim G - 1$ at generic inputs, regardless of architecture. For compact groups acting on themselves, the Peter--Weyl theorem yields a spectral characterization of both objects in terms of the Fourier coefficient matrices of $f$. We show that null fiber elements can be computed efficiently via Newton iteration on the orbit map, at a cost comparable to a few gradient evaluations. Applications to data masking, model fingerprinting, and privacy-preserving computation are developed and tested experimentally on molecular property prediction under $\mathrm{SO}(3)$ and spherical image classification under the Möbius group $\mathrm{PSL}(2, \mathbb{C})$. The framework applies uniformly to classical neural networks and variational quantum circuits.
Model fingerprinting, embedding user-specific identifiers (fingerprints) into generated outputs, has recently emerged as a popular solution to protect the intellectual property rights (IPR) of generative text-to-image (T2I) models and prevent unauthorized redistribution. In this work, we reveal a previously unexplored systematic vulnerability in existing generative model fingerprinting methods: they lack robustness against collusion attacks, where multiple attackers combine their models to remove or obscure the fingerprints. To address this issue, we take the first step towards a robust fingerprinting method for T2I models with anti-collusion capabilities. The proposed method encodes strings of bits, namely fingerprints, into the coefficients of a personalized normalization module (PNM) incorporated into T2I models, so that fingerprints can be reliably recovered from any generated image. To defend against collusion attacks and prevent unauthorized model redistribution, we introduce an anti-collusion mechanism based on lossless function-invariant parameter transformations. This mechanism significantly degrades the image generation quality of colluded models, making them effectively unusable. Moreover, our method allows developers to efficiently create multiple copies of fingerprinted T2I models by reparameterizing the PNM without the need for retraining. We also introduce a worst-case optimization strategy to improve robustness against model-level attacks. Our experiments demonstrate that the proposed method achieves high fidelity and robustness across multiple T2I image generation and editing tasks, with fingerprint extraction accuracy exceeding 99.5%. Compared with existing methods, our method demonstrates, for the first time, a notable proactive robustness to collusion attacks by significantly increasing the FID of colluded models.
We study six production image-to-image AI systems (gpt-image-1, Gemini 2.5 Flash Image, Flux Kontext, SDXL img2img, SD3 img2img, and Qwen Image Edit) under a content-adaptive sub-JND adversarial perturbation pipeline, scoring all outputs by frozen DINOv2 ViT-B/14 token distances against clean references. Across a 3,588-call corpus spanning COCO photographs, CelebA-HQ portraits, and AI-generated inputs, the six systems partition into two image-invariant behavioral bands on a 2D (patch_mean, ssim_clean) plane: edit-trained models (Flux Kontext, Qwen Edit, Gemini) cluster in a tight band, while T2I-base models adapted at sampling time (SDXL, SD3, gpt-image-1) cluster in a drift band.
Gurvan Richardeau, Gohar Dashyan, Erwan Le Merrer +1cs.LG cs.AI cs.CR
Literature reveals that a Large Language Model's (LLM) behavior is not only conditioned by its original weights but also its instance-level parameters, such as instructional prompt, sampling configuration or quantization. A model that generates safe outputs under one configuration may produce toxic content under another. However, current LLM identification techniques (such as fingerprinting) focus on intellectual property protection, and their design favors robustness to changes in these instance-level parameters. This poses a critical challenge for AI regulation in which compliance assessments target actual deployed behaviors, not model provenance. In this paper, we introduce instance-level fingerprinting, a regulator-oriented paradigm that distinguishes configurations of the same LLM. Our method FLIPS, exploits biases in generated binary random sequences to reach 96% (closed-set) and 90% (open-set, where some targets are unknown) identification accuracy across 237 model instances, versus 35% for the adapted LLMmap baseline. This shows that instance-level fingerprinting is both necessary for regulation and practically feasible. Code available at https://github.com/GurvanR/FLIPS-LLM-Instance-Fingerprinting.
We report a striking statistical regularity in frontier LLM outputs that enables a CPU-only scoring primitive running at 2.6 microseconds per token, with estimated latency up to 100,000$\times$ (five orders of magnitude) below existing sampling-based detectors. Across six contemporary models from five independent vendors, two generation sizes, and five held-out domains, token rank-frequency distributions converge to the same two-parameter Mandelbrot ranking distribution, with 34 of 36 model-by-domain fits exceeding $R^{2} = 0.94$ and 35 of 36 favoring Mandelbrot over Zipf by AIC. The shared family does not collapse the models into statistical duplicates. Fitted Mandelbrot parameters remain cleanly separable between models: the cross-model spread in $q$ (1.63 to 3.69) exceeds its per-model bootstrap standard deviation (0.03 to 0.10) by more than an order of magnitude, yielding tens of standard deviations of separation per few thousand output tokens. Two capabilities follow. First, statistical model fingerprinting: text from a vendor-delivered LLM can be tested against its claimed model family without cryptographic watermarks or access to model internals, supporting provenance verification and silent-substitution audits. Second, a model-agnostic reference distribution for black-box output assessment, from which we derive a single-pass scoring primitive that composes with model log probabilities when available and degrades to a rank-only mode usable on closed APIs. Pilot results on FRANK, TruthfulQA, and HaluEval map where the primitive helps (lexical anomalies, unsupported entities) and where it structurally cannot (reasoning errors in domain-appropriate vocabulary). We position the primitive as a first-pass triage layer in compound evaluation stacks, not as a replacement for sampling-based or source-conditioned verifiers.