Taking the Whys Seriously: Limitations of Counterfactual Explanations in Justification and Recourse

Counterfactual explanations (CEs) are widely used in explainable artificial intelligence (AI) to show how a model's outputs would change if the input features were manipulated. This technique is used for a range of tasks such as debugging models, explaining predictions, justifying decisions, and providing algorithmic recourse. In this paper, we explore the normative legitimacy of employing counterfactuals in real-life model deployment settings. We discuss the different stakes involved in these different purposes for which CEs are commonly employed, and find stricter requirements for justification and recourse. In particular, we find that naive application of CEs for justification and recourse can lead to ignoring contestable choices made throughout the machine learning (ML) pipeline, thus obfuscating that decisions and counterfactuals for those decisions are also artifacts of an organization's materialized design and governance choices. We demonstrate this with four empirical experiments involving interventions at stages of the ML pipeline ``upstream" of the explanation itself, and show that these affect the generated counterfactuals. We find that an organization's choices on measurement models for feature and labels, business requirements, model validation, and the metric of model success have as much or more impact on the generated counterfactuals as the specifics of the generating method. Our findings underline the need to account for such choices upon providing justification and recourse, providing a stark reminder of the relational nature of these tasks. As putative justifications or recourse recommendations, CEs do not provide adequate answers to some important "why"-questions because they preclude consideration of whether the decision-maker ought to have acted differently.

Who Built This Model? Tracing LLM Lineage via Spectral Fingerprints in Weight Space

Open-weight large language models (LLMs) are increasingly developed through complex, multi-stage pipelines, leading to intricate lineage relationships that reflect model origin, ownership, and evolution. Understanding these relationships is important for model provenance, governance, and supply-chain integrity. In this work, we investigate the notion of LLM "biometrics" (analogous to human biometrics) to ask whether LLMs exhibit intrinsic fingerprints in weight space alone, without access to input data, that reveal their origin and lineage. We formulate this as a lineage discrimination problem, distinguishing among independent-origin, same-series, and shared-base models. To characterize these relationships, we propose a unified geometric fingerprinting framework that analyzes weight matrices from two complementary perspectives: (i) spectral energy, captured by singular value distributions to encode global magnitude patterns, and (ii) subspace alignment, quantified via subspace deviations to capture directional geometry. Our analysis uncovers a clear hierarchy of structural similarity in weight space: spectral energy reliably distinguishes independently trained models and different model families, while subspace alignment enables fine-grained discrimination among closely related models, including variations in dataset scale and post-training procedures. Extensive experiments on over 110 diverse open-weight LLM pairs demonstrate that weight-space geometry provides a robust and interpretable signal for model lineage, enabling coarse-grained regime separation and fine-grained discrimination within shared-base models.

Bounded Sovereignty and the Control Tax: Pricing AI Oversight When the Deployer Does Not Own the Model

AI control research asks how to deploy models safely even when they may be misaligned, but many control protocols assume that the deployer can instrument the model and its surrounding pipeline. That assumption often fails for regulated organisations using frontier models through APIs or managed endpoints, where the deployer may control the business process but not the model weights, serving infrastructure, internal traces, update process, or full interaction logs. This paper introduces bounded sovereignty: partial technical and contractual access across the data, model, infrastructure, and interaction layers of the AI stack. It argues that these access conditions determine which control protocols can be executed in practice. The paper contributes a four-layer access typology, a protocol-by-layer requirements matrix, and the concept of sovereignty discount cost: the part of the control tax spent substituting for missing access through contracts, architecture, audit, vendor assurance, residual risk, or reduced system scope. It also reports a synthetic access-ablation experiment over 1.35 million synthetic case simulations and interprets the findings through an anonymised national-payments-infrastructure scenario. The experiment is not real-world payment-system evidence; it is a construct-validity exercise. The results show that complete logs improve diagnosis, a pre-execution gateway enables intervention, trace access and model-version control strengthen post-incident explanation, and scope restriction can improve safety while reducing usefulness. Control protocols proposed as general safety solutions should therefore state their access assumptions explicitly.

Sequential Fairness Auditing with Limited Output Access

External evaluations are becoming increasingly central to the governance of AI systems. In practice, however, independent auditors often have limited access to deployed models and must rely on query-based interactions. Most existing fairness evaluation methods assume static datasets and fixed-sample statistical tests, making them poorly suited to real-world auditing scenarios in which evidence must be collected sequentially under query constraints. In this work, we formulate fairness auditing as a tolerance-aware sequential hypothesis-testing problem under limited model output access. We develop a sequential generalized likelihood-ratio framework that allows auditors to accumulate evidence from a finite audit pool and stop once sufficient support for compliance or violation has been obtained. The framework is instantiated for decision-based Statistical Parity and Equal Opportunity audits, and extended to score- and logit-based proxy audits when richer observables are available. Our results show that both the fairness metric and the level of model access significantly affect audit efficiency, and that the benefits of richer output information are not uniform across auditing settings. In particular, richer outputs can substantially reduce the number of queries required for some fairness metrics and operating regimes, while offering limited gains in near-threshold cases. This work provides a practical statistical framework for sequential fairness auditing under realistic deployment constraints.

Position: Current Model Cards Are Insufficient for Downstream Governance of Open-Weight Foundation Models

The growth of open-weight foundation models (OWFMs) has prompted the AI community to re-evaluate strategies for effective downstream governance. Although model cards have been widely adopted as transparency artifacts in model repositories, existing frameworks often fail to adequately inform downstream developers and users about the distinct safety challenges posed by OWFMs. This position paper analyzes 500 model cards hosted on Hugging Face and argues that effective governance of OWFMs requires a multi-layered approach integrating three complementary components: (i) model cards, (ii) acceptable use policies (AUPs), and (iii) licenses. To motivate this claim, we identify a safety gap left by existing regulatory approaches, including model heritage, alignment provenance, and empirically observed behaviors, through an analysis of model cards with safety-critical information. We further argue that standard open-source licenses (OSLs) are not well suited for OWFMs and may weaken the enforceability of AUPs. Building on these observations, we outline directions for evolving model cards, AUPs, and licenses into integrated safety artifacts to enable a more comprehensive governance framework that coherently integrates informational, normative, and legal dimensions.