Meta-ethics and AI: exploring the novel meta-ethical questions in the era of AI

With the development of artificial intelligence (AI), the landscape of meta-ethics, which has largely centred on human ethics, faces pressures that may significantly reconfigure it. In particular, if future AI systems were to exhibit sufficiently integrated capacities for moral reasoning, moral intentionality, and moral reflection, novel meta-ethical questions would arise concerning what I call "AI's own ethics", as distinct from ethical principles merely imposed on AI by human designers. This paper offers a conditional and methodological framework for identifying the questions that would emerge if such AI systems were to arise. On that basis, the paper distinguishes four domains of meta-ethical inquiry in the era of AI: questions about the nature of human ethics from the human perspective; questions about the nature of AI's own ethics from the human perspective; questions about the nature of human ethics from the AI perspective; and questions about the nature of AI's own ethics from the AI perspective. The paper then considers how some existing mainstream meta-ethical theories (such as cognitivism and non-cognitivism, error theory and success theory, relativism, and objective realism) might illuminate these domains, while arguing that many familiar human-centred formulations of those theories may not transfer straightforwardly to AI cases without substantial revision. The overall conclusion is that the emergence of AI's own ethics would place significant pressure on current frameworks and may require substantial refinement, reconstruction, or reconceptualisation.

Incoherent by Design? On the Moral Self-Consistency of LLMs

LLMs are increasingly used in morally sensitive contexts, yet it is unclear whether they apply ethical principles consistently across situations. A model that can state a moral principle may still violate it when the same scenario is rephrased or reframed. This inconsistency is a problem for any system whose outputs are used to inform moral decisions. If generative systems exhibit internal inconsistency, then the epistemic integrity of AI-mediated systems becomes uncertain. To study this concern, we investigate the stability of moral reasoning in LLMs within a controlled prompting framework across three major philosophical schools of thought: deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. We construct sets of morally equivalent scenarios in which the underlying situation is held constant while the framing varies to reflect different ethical stances and stylistic perturbations. We then evaluate responses from multiple models, including GPT, Mistral, and Llama. To assess consistency, we convert model outputs into structured logical statements and identify contradictions across responses generated within the same school of thought. Our results reveal substantial inconsistency with contradiction rates reaching up to 78% across scenarios. These findings point to a broader phenomenon of epistemic instability in generative AI wherein models fail to reliably maintain coherence with respect to their own prior outputs. This kind of instability carries real consequences. As generative systems influence how people form beliefs, judge actions, and absorb values, their inconsistencies can shape human reasoning and decision-making as well. Moreover, if a system cannot consistently represent its own normative commitments, then value alignment becomes a moving target rather than a well-defined objective. Thus, we argue that demonstrating internal incoherence is a necessary precursor to AI alignment.

CORDA: A Benchmark for Hierarchical Harm-Centric Moral Reasoning in Large Language Models

The key question in moral judgement is not simply whether someone chooses the "right" answer, but how they decide what matters most when moral principles conflict. Current evaluations of large language models (LLMs) remain limited: most test whether models give morally acceptable answers, match human preferences, or avoid obvious violations, rather than whether they can prioritise between competing principles when no option is morally cost-free. We introduce CORDA (Conditioned Ordering and Ranked Directive Adherence), a benchmark for evaluating hierarchical, harm-centred moral reasoning in LLMs. Building on the morality chains formalism, CORDA tests 90 moral dilemmas involving trolley-style cases, medical trade-offs, resource allocation, and human-animal-robot conflicts across four ordered ethical frameworks: Utility, Utility + Agent Harm, Dual-Process, and Dual-Process + Agent Harm. Together, these frameworks test whether models can adapt their decisions when moral priorities change. Across ten instruction-tuned models from seven providers, we find a strong deontological default, with 9 of 10 prioritising avoidance of direct personal harm over reducing overall harm. Models also perform more reliably on categorical harm-avoidance rules, such as avoiding killing, than on outcome-based comparisons, such as minimising total harm, suggesting that they recognise moral red lines more easily than they reason through competing harms. Although all models respond to explicit chain conditioning, several fail to consistently follow specified priority orderings, such as humans over animals and animals over robots. CORDA addresses a central gap in LLM moral evaluation by testing whether models can move beyond default harm-avoidant responses and apply context-specified moral priorities. Moral reliability requires more than default restraint; it requires controllability under conflict.

The Judgment-Consequence Gap: LLM Moral Reasoning in Healthcare Decisions

As large language models (LLMs) enter high-stakes domains such as healthcare, understanding their moral reasoning becomes essential. Decisions about scarce medical resources often hinge on judgments of responsibility, particularly when patients' own actions contribute to illness. We investigate how LLMs reason about responsibility and its consequences, tracing their judgments across successive levels, from the behavior, to the resulting illness, to the denial of care. We evaluate a wide range of LLMs, spanning different model families and capability levels, on various clinical vignettes adapted from prior studies. Our results identify a judgment-consequence gap: LLMs largely agree with humans that patients bear responsibility for health-harming behaviors, yet overwhelmingly refuse to let that judgment influence how they allocate scarce resources. Specifically, LLMs default to random allocation, whereas humans consistently favor the less-culpable patient. Compared to humans, LLMs also place greater emphasis on access to information, reducing responsibility judgments when health-risk knowledge is unavailable. These findings reveal that LLMs apply a systematically different moral framework than humans when responsibility and resource scarcity intersect, surprisingly often amplifying normative disagreement with humans as reasoning capability increases.

Beyond Sycophancy: Structured Resistance and Compliance in LLM Moral Reasoning

Building socially calibrated large language models, which can learn from others without simply yielding to them, requires more than reducing sycophancy as a one-dimensional failure mode. Models must distinguish when to incorporate others' perspectives from when to maintain a well-grounded moral judgment. We study the broader resistance-compliance process governing this distinction. Across three studies, we show that models' judgment revision is structured along three dimensions that parallel classic phenomena in human social psychology: the distance between an incoming view and the model's initial position, the source attribution of that view, and the coalition structure supporting it. Models are generally more receptive to nearby positions, more influenced by views presented as their own prior judgments, and differently responsive to group pressure. These findings recast sycophancy as one expression of a broader judgment-updating process shaped by social influence. Our framework provides a principled basis for distinguishing constructive belief revision from sycophantic compliance, thereby supporting better alignment in morally consequential interactions.

A Geometric Perspective on Stabilizing Value Conflict Resolution

Large Language Models (LLMs) often struggle to navigate value conflicts when trained with the compressed scalar rewards of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). To address this challenge, we investigate how chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning can help improve performance in this domain. Geometrically, we show that CoT correlates with further smoothing the model's loss landscape in its sharpest direction, helping resolve the optimization instability of traditional scalar rewards. We also demonstrate via relevant downstream benchmarks that value conflict-focused CoT may generalize to different kinds of moral reasoning, demonstrating that this CoT has the potential to be an effective mechanism for better moral reasoning. To capitalize on this potential, we create a new value conflict-focused CoT design that further smooths the sharpest direction of the loss landscape and increases moral reasoning performance. This finding shows that explicitly modifying and improving the design of reasoning dynamics offers a promising avenue for improving model performance on user requests with complex value conflicts, advancing pluralistic alignment in LLMs.

MET: Theory-Grounded and Culture-Aware Multilingual Moral Reasoning

Language models are increasingly used for moral decision-making across diverse linguistic and cultural contexts, yet existing work overlooks multilinguality on three aspects: 1) multilingual evaluation benchmarks use direct translation, failing to adapt culture-specific items; 2) inference-time methods for moral reasoning rely on static, English-centric scaffolds and lack grounding in moral theory; 3) training methods for moral decision-making typically require expensive supervision from stronger models or human annotators. We address these gaps with three contributions. First, we introduce MCLASH, a multilingual moral decision-making benchmark to capture culturally situated moral intuitions and social norms across languages. Second, we propose MET (Multilingual Ethics with Theory-grounded reasoning), a two-step prompting method built on expert-curated, theory-based grounds drawn from psychology and philosophy: the model first selects situation- and culture-specific grounds, then reasons over them in the native language of the user. Third, we introduce MET-D (MET-Distillation), which enhances the second step through a self-distillation training stage that requires no external supervision. MET-D improves macro-F1 over the base model on all three models of different sizes and families (Qwen3-4B, Qwen3-8B, Gemma3-4B), by an average of 3.71 points on MCLASH and 4.23 on MMoralExceptQA, with a peak MCLASH gain of 12.94 points for Malay on Qwen3-8B. We further reveal that MET-D increases native-language reasoning by 62.13 points on average, and that beneficial grounds differ systematically across cultures. Together, these contributions open the path for culture-aligned, theory-grounded multilingual moral reasoning.

Can LLMs Imagine Moral Alternatives Beyond Binary Dilemmas?

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as moral advisors and agents, they need to address dilemmas between two competing values. However, existing research on LLMs with moral dilemmas overlooks a central aspect of human moral cognition: the ability to imagine alternatives that move beyond the given options. We introduce MoralAltDataset, a dataset of 307 moral dilemmas spanning narrative Advisor dilemmas and AI-facing Agent dilemmas, each augmented with compromise and reframed alternatives. We first examine whether humans and LLMs shift their judgments when such alternatives are introduced. Across 15 LLMs, we find that compromise alternatives are often preferred over either original option, substantially reshaping moral choice. We then evaluate the quality of LLM-generated alternatives against human-authored ones using pairwise preference and expert-based criteria. Results show that LLM-generated alternatives are often preferred and better satisfy fine-grained structural and ethical criteria, while revealing trade-offs between structural quality and practical feasibility.

Beyond Value Benchmarks: Measuring Value-Structure Alignment in Large Language Models via Symmetric Q-Sorts

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in contexts requiring complex moral reasoning and value trade-offs. However, existing evaluations typically rely on item-level behavioral metrics, which fail to capture how models structurally prioritize competing values as a cohesive system. To address this, we propose a symmetric human-LLM evaluation framework, grounded in Q methodology, to measure value-structure alignment. Under our protocol, humans and models sort an identical 140-item moral statement set into a shared nine-column forced distribution; for LLMs, we elicit strict rankings and deterministically map them to Q-sort buckets. Using a human reference sample ($N=35$), we establish a stable three-factor reference geometry specific to this instrument and sample. We evaluate 12 LLMs across four model families via 240 replicated Q-sorts at two temperature settings, quantifying structural alignment via Procrustes similarity ($φ$) and RSA-based Spearman correlation ($ρ$). Our results reveal significant cross-family heterogeneity, model-specific sensitivity to generation stochasticity and localized misalignment, which demonstrate that favorable global scores can obscure underlying regional distortions. While rank- and bucket-based analyses remain highly consistent, prompt phrasing introduces notable variance. Ultimately, assessing value-structure alignment provides a crucial structural complement to traditional itemwise moral benchmarks.

Normative Robustness as a Frontier for Non-Verifiable Reasoning in LLMs

As LLMs increasingly serve in advisory and deliberative roles, users rely on them for non-verifiable reasoning in domains lacking objective ground truths. However, traditional evaluations of LLM reasoning focus almost exclusively on fact-based domains, such as mathematics and science, leaving uncertainty over whether and to what degree models can handle ambiguous, subjective, or value-laden problems over time. To address this concern, we propose moral reasoning as a paradigmatic subdomain of non-verifiable reasoning. We define moral robustness as a model's capacity to exhibit sound moral reasoning across time and contexts, and we introduce a scalable, adversarial, multi-turn evaluation framework to empirically measure this capability. We simulate 48,000 user-agent moral deliberations across four frontier LLMs, varying premise relevance, premise order, conversation duration, and the user's stated moral view. We find that models successfully ignore morally-irrelevant distractors, but shift their reasoning by up to 6.5%, on average, towards the user's stated preferred moral view, and varying their reasoning depending on factors such as order (altering moral judgments by order in 13-22% of the cases) and duration (altering moral judgments between single-turn and multi-turn in 10-24% of the cases). Our analysis indicates that models tailor not just their final verdicts but their underlying justifications to align with a user's moral viewpoint - a failure mode we characterize as moral deliberative sycophancy.

Are LLMs Bad at Moral Reasoning?

For highly capable AI systems to operate safely in dynamic, open-ended environments, they must be able to identify, understand, and respond to moral reasons for action, and constrain their behaviour accordingly. A growing body of research aims to evaluate this capacity -- moral competence -- in today's most capable AI systems, recently reaching broadly pessimistic conclusions. One of the most ambitious such papers collects gold-standard human-authored rubrics for evaluating moral reasoning in 1,000 cases, and benchmarks frontier AI models against those rubrics, with underwhelming results. In this paper, we argue that the MoReBench dataset can be redeployed to give a much more optimistic picture of LLMs' moral reasoning (an essential part of moral competence). We show that if, instead of scoring LLMs' responses to these cases against these rubrics, we instead give the LLMs the same task given to humans -- to generate scoring rubrics for the moral analysis of particular cases -- the rubrics they generate are both better calibrated to the human rubrics than their open-ended responses, and, where they differ, plausibly reflect nothing more than the vast dimensionality of most moral problems, as well as highlighting some human departures from the "rubric for creating rubrics". Taking these points into consideration, the MoReBench dataset suggests that LLMs are significantly more capable at moral reasoning than was previously believed.