LLM agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent social settings where they must cooperate, negotiate, and adapt to other agents. Measuring and improving these social skills is hard because, unlike math or logic, social interaction offers no objective ground truth: evaluations fall back on LLM judges, which are costly, subjective, and noisy, and models get no reliable signal to learn from. To address both, we first introduce Social Gym, an environment of 21 multi-agent social games (e.g., Werewolves, Resistance, Spyfall) whose rule-decided outcomes make agent performance verifiable and objective, with an Elo tournament that produces a cross-game leaderboard. Benchmarking experiments show that while GPT-5-mini tops the leaderboard, no model excels at all games uniformly or in all game roles, pointing to limitations of social reasoning. Motivated by this, we additionally propose SPaRTan (Self-Play and Reflect-Transfer), a training-free self-improvement loop: a model plays a game, reflects on its trajectories and their outcomes to produce a transferable playbook, and applies that playbook in subsequent games. Our results show that SPaRTan playbooks help GPT-5-mini agents level their performance on weaker roles, but largely do not improve Qwen3-32B's performance. Together, Social Gym and SPaRTan offer a reproducible, verifiable foundation for measuring and improving LLM social reasoning without weight updates.
Jerick Shi, Terry Jingcheng Zhang, Bernhard Schölkopf +2cs.CY cs.CL
As large language models are deployed as autonomous agents that communicate intentions before acting, a critical safety question is whether agents that publicly commit to actions will honor those commitments. We place LLM agents in repeated $n$-player games with a three-stage protocol that separates private intent, public announcement, and final action, allowing us to identify whether each deviation from a stated announcement was already planned during private deliberation. Evaluating three frontier models across six games in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups over 10 rounds, we report two findings. First, when agents deviate from their announcements, the deviation is predominantly already stated in their private plan (exceeding 90% in the highest-deception conditions), yet this is not a fixed model property: the same model ranges from perfect honesty to near-total deviation across games. Second, different models interpret announcements incompatibly, some as binding commitments and others as cheap talk, producing payoff gaps that emerge in Round~0 and persist across all 10 rounds. Systems that combine models from different providers therefore cannot assume shared announcement semantics and require empirical testing of model interactions before deployment.
While Large Language Models (LLMs) excel in certain reasoning tasks, they struggle in multi-agent games where the final outcome depends on the joint strategies of all agents. In multi-agent games, the non-stationarity of other agents brings significant challenges on the evaluation of the reasoning process and the credit assignment over multiple reasoning steps. Existing single-agent reinforcement learning (RL) approaches and their multi-agent extensions fail to address these challenges as they do not incorporate other agents in the reasoning process. In this work, we propose Strat-Reasoner, a novel RL-based framework that improves LLMs' strategic reasoning ability in multi-agent games. We introduce a novel recursive reasoning paradigm where an agent's reasoning also integrates other agents' reasoning processes. To provide effective reward signals for the intermediate reasoning sequences, we employ a centralized Chain-of-Thought (CoT) comparison module to evaluate the reasoning quality. Finally, we compute an accurate hybrid advantage and develop a group-relative RL approach to optimize the LLM policy. Experimental results show that Strat-Reasoner substantially improves strategic abilities of underlying LLMs, achieving 22.1\% average performance improvements across various multi-agent games.