Elisabeth Steffen, Helena Mihaljevićcs.HC cs.AI cs.CL cs.IR
As far-right actors increasingly exploit online platforms to disseminate ideology and mobilize supporters, civil society organizations (CSOs) play a vital yet underrecognized role in monitoring antidemocratic dynamics online. Unlike fact-checkers or content moderators, CSOs engage in long-term, contextualized analysis, often in resource-constrained settings and under precarious conditions. Despite their critical societal role, CSOs face significant barriers to adopting or co-developing technical solutions, including legal uncertainty, limited platform access, and chronic underfunding. Existing research and tool development efforts have largely overlooked these actors in favor of more institutionally embedded stakeholders. This paper addresses this gap through a qualitative study with 15 practitioners from 12 Germany-based CSOs engaged in online monitoring, positioning them as key yet overlooked stakeholders in the governance of digital spaces. We explore their current practices, challenges, and expectations regarding technological support. Our findings show that monitoring remains largely manual due to the lack of tailored tools, with enhanced search capabilities emerging as the most pressing technical need. While participants express openness to AI-supported features such as media processing and content discovery, many remain skeptical of automated classification, citing concerns around trust, legal usability, and professional credibility. Grounded in these findings, we introduce a conceptual monitoring workflow and describe its implementation in an open-source Telegram monitoring prototype designed to flexibly support diverse monitoring goals. We outline concrete design, policy, and research recommendatios, and introduce the manual labor trap as an empirically grounded concept that explains why monitoring CSOs tend to remain locked into labor-intensive, low-capacity arrangements.
Machine learning systems are increasingly corrected while they run, and the decision of when to intervene is increasingly delegated to statistical monitors. Anytime-valid inference promises evidence that can be acted on at any moment, exactly the guarantee this setting needs, and it is moving from theory into deployed monitoring. Conformal test martingales are the change-detection instrument, and Ville's inequality caps their false-alarm probability on exchangeable data. The guarantee is conditional. A deployment inherits it only if the stream it monitors behaves exchangeably. The premise is hardest to satisfy where these monitors are most useful, on dependent data and inside loops where the monitor modifies the learner whose scores it reads. It is also rarely measured. We measure it in a pre-specified case study, where such a monitor gates the online updates of a Kalman adapter correcting frozen time-series foundation models on five forecasting streams. On exchangeable synthetic streams, the same implementation fires in at most 1 of 60 runs. On the real streams, at alpha = 0.05, 135 of 135 clean-stream runs fired. The construction does not explain the firing; the failure comes from the deployed score stream itself. Repeated fires hold the gate's drift response active, and the gated filter amplifies the very transient it was designed to prevent. The component worth keeping makes no validity claim. Huber-style gating of the filter's own updates cuts isolated-spike degradation by an order of magnitude with no dataset specific tuning. Anytime-valid methods proposed for dependent data should therefore be accompanied by null-calibration controls and mechanism traces.