Unai Agirre, Imanol Jerico, Felipe Castaño +2cs.LG cs.AI cs.ET
Phishing remains a persistent and evolving cybersecurity threat, with attack volumes reaching record levels. This growth is driven by the industrialization of phishing through widely available phishing kits and reusable templates, which enable cybercriminals to rapidly generate and deploy large numbers of fraudulent webpages. Although surface-level attributes may differ across these websites, their underlying structures often exhibit significant similarities. However, most existing defenses rely on reactive blocklists or supervised classification models that focus on individual phishing instances, limiting their ability to identify structural reuse and detect coordinated phishing campaigns. To address this limitation, this study investigates whether HTML structure can serve as a robust fingerprint for identifying phishing template reuse. We model webpages as Document Object Model (DOM) trees and extract structural features, optionally enriched with HTML tag-based content information. These representations are then clustered using unsupervised learning methods to group structurally similar webpages. Three clustering algorithms are evaluated and compared, while also analyzing how the depth of the extracted DOM-tree affects cluster formation and overall clustering performance. Finally, cluster quality is also evaluated both quantitatively and qualitatively, including a novel level-wise Jaccard Distance Score and manual inspection supported by visualization tools. Results demonstrate that structural representations of webpages can effectively reveal hidden similarities across phishing sites, enabling the detection of emerging and zero-day templates and supporting the analysis of coordinated phishing threats
Phishing emails remain one of the most persistent cybersecurity threats, and machine-learning classifiers are widely used to detect them. Most reported detection accuracies, however, are measured on clean, in-distribution test data rather than on emails deliberately altered to evade detection. This paper reports a controlled, pairwise comparison of two phishing-detection approaches a TF-IDF + Logistic Regression baseline and a fine-tuned DistilBERT transformer trained on a unified corpus of 82,255 emails drawn from six public datasets and evaluated under three conditions: normal in-distribution, synthetic phishing, and adversarial phishing. Both models exceeded 98% accuracy on clean data yet degraded sharply under adversarial testing: TF-IDF + LR fell to 64.00% (a 34.59-percentage-point drop) and DistilBERT fell to 63.64% (a 35.40-percentage-point drop) a gap of only 0.36 percentage points, equivalent to a single email in the 275-sample adversarial test set. LIME, SHAP, and attention-rollout analysis indicate the two models relied on different evidence yet showed similar vulnerability. Pairwise error analysis shows the models agreed on 54.9% of adversarial samples but each made a similar number of exclusive errors (24 and 25 respectively), indicating partly complementary rather than identical failure modes. The results show that clean-data accuracy does not predict adversarial robustness, and that adversarial testing should be a standard part of phishing-detection evaluation.
Saifelden M. Ismail, Aser O. Ibrahim, Omar A. Mahmoudcs.CR cs.CL cs.LG
Phishing is a multi-modal threat. We present a hybrid pipeline that scores each modality with its own engine and fuses the results. Three engines are built, deployed, and independently benchmarked: a four-stage URL stack (Domain Guard, lexical model, threat intelligence, and an asymmetric L2 fusion sidecar); a generalization-hardened DistilBERT NLP classifier whose held-out real-phishing recall rises from 0.8% to 87.3%; and a threat-intelligence synchronizer with end-to-end OpenTelemetry instrumentation confirming 1:1 message conservation. A decision-level fusion stage, characterized on a 10,677-email whole-system benchmark, reaches F1=0.914 with a calibrated probabilistic-OR over URL, header, and phishing-probability channels while reducing held-out real-spam false positives to 3.6%. Because that benchmark uses proxy URL and header channels and an operating point still needing recalibration, we present it as a preliminary integrated result. For deployable detection, the limiting factor is how well a model generalizes, not how accurately it scores data drawn from its own training distribution.
When a new domain resembling a popular brand appears, defenders face a fundamental ambiguity: it may be an attacker-created squatting site for phishing, or it may be a domain the brand itself registered, either defensively, to block attackers, or legitimately, for a new product or service launch. Incorrectly flagging a brand-owned domain as malicious produces a false positive that harms end users and damages the brand's reputation. Resolving this ambiguity requires brand intelligence: the ability to determine, at scale, whether a given domain belongs to a brand. Large language models (LLMs), with their broad knowledge of brand domain relationships, offer a promising zero configuration approach to this problem, but their reliability for brand intelligence tasks remains unknown. We present the first systematic empirical evaluation of LLM brand intelligence across three tasks: domain enumeration (Q1), open ended brand attribution (Q2), and binary ownership classification (Q3). We evaluate four models, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 3.5 Flash, Claude Sonnet 4.5, and Claude Sonnet 4.6, across four retrieval settings (in context, web search, WHOIS lookup, and combined) on 36 of the most phished brands. Our results reveal a stark dichotomy: models achieve up to 82% precision enumerating brand domains from memory alone, yet fail at ownership verification without external tools, with macro F1 at most 0.37 in ICL mode. WHOIS augmentation lifts Q3 macro F1 by up to 0.65 points, yielding near perfect precision (<= 0.99), dramatically reducing the false positive risk for defenders. We provide concrete recommendations for deploying LLMs in brand protection pipelines.
The expansion of the digital domain has resulted in a substantial increase in digital communication, with email emerging as one of the most prominent channels. The proliferation of email communication is apparent in both professional and personal contexts, thereby creating numerous vulnerabilities for malicious actors to exploit. Spam emails, a form of unsolicited correspondence often bearing malicious intent towards recipients, have been an ongoing challenge for email users since the inception of email technology, and this problem has been exacerbated by the growth of the digital landscape. Email spam filters are integral components of email clients, engineered to identify potentially harmful messages and alert users to their malicious content. Phishing, frequently the initial phase of malware-based attacks, is evolving rapidly, with malware becoming increasingly sophisticated over time. A widely adopted approach for detecting malicious activity within malware and spam domains is the application of machine learning. Our aim is to assess the impact of the evolution within the spam email domain on these machine learning-based detection systems and to explore strategies for mitigating associated performance degradation.
Mainak Sen, Kumar Sankar Ray, Amlan Chakrabartics.AI
Phishing detection systems are predominantly rely on statistical machine learning models, which often lack contextual reasoning and are vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. In this work, we propose a hybrid framework that integrates machine learning classifiers with non-monotonic reasoning using Answer Set Programming (ASP) to enable context-aware decision refinement. The proposed post-hoc reasoning layer incorporates expert knowledge to revise classifier predictions through formal belief revisions. Experimental results indicate that the reasoning module modifies 5.08\% of classifier outputs, leading to improved decision consistency. A key advantage is that new domain knowledge can be incorporated into the reasoning layer in $\mathcal{O}(n)$ time, eliminating the need for model retraining.