T. Bauer, W. P. Kegelmeyer, E. Begoli +15cs.CY cs.AI cs.HC
This article presents a structured framework of behavioral indicators that may signal progression toward potentially catastrophic threats from artificial intelligence systems. We adopt a pragmatic approach, inspired by established methodologies in cybersecurity and national security. By establishing clear metrics, indicators, and thresholds across multiple dimensions of AI capability and behavior, this framework enables researchers and policymakers to implement evidence-based monitoring protocols.
Catherine King, Lynnette Hui Xian Ng, Kathleen M. Carleycs.AI
Designers and policymakers in sociotechnical domains like content moderation, privacy interfaces, recommender systems and beyond, must choose among a growing menu of proposed interventions, but typically lack a principled basis for comparing them. Prior work tends to evaluate interventions individually and mostly along the effectiveness criteria, while implementation constraints such as cost, effort and feasibility are often considered separately. We present a multi-criteria framework for evaluating sociotechnical interventions. This framework is instantiated through the case of misinformation, a domain of intense focus for proposed countermeasures. We survey $N=39$ researchers on 40 operationalized interventions across five evaluative criteria: political feasibility, effectiveness, user acceptance, cost, and implementation effort. We find that the interventions that experts judge to be the most effective are not always the most acceptable to the public or the most feasible to implement. We also discuss how this tension has implications for the design of sociotechnical interventions beyond misinformation, and offer a decision framework for practitioners navigating the trade-offs of sociotechnical interventions.
As AI systems proliferate in consumer facing applications, questions about liability for AI related harms remain unresolved. This working paper examines whether India's Consumer Protection Act, 2019, adequately addresses harm caused by defective AI products and services, and whether it proportionately allocates liability across the AI value chain. The Act's broad definitions of product liability, harm, and deficiency appear technology agnostic and potentially applicable to AI related incidents including personal injury, psychological harm, biased outputs, and loss of control. However, significant gaps remain. Proving causation between AI defects and consumer harm presents a technical challenge, as AI failures often stem from design choices rather than discrete defects. Additionally, the Act's framework assumes distinct roles for manufacturers, sellers, and service providers, yet the AI value chain involves overlapping responsibilities among data providers, model developers, deployers, and users that do not neatly map to these categories. Current liability frameworks lack proportionate mechanisms to effectively address complex, multistakeholder AI harms. While the Act may cover AI entities, enforcement requires clarification on sector specific overlaps.
Recent incidents involving Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents, which were reported escaping their containment `unintentionally' to gain unauthorized access, pose looming questions about who or what should be held legally responsible for resultant criminal or negligent damage. As the independent capabilities of agents expand, Promise Theory suggests a systematic method to resolve these questions, based on the Downstream Principle for causal influence. Responsibility can easily be expanded to include AI agents where tracing responsibility becomes impactical, and agents' freedoms to act can be limtied by policy choices.
With the rapid diffusion of AI-generated content, AI-driven misinformation is becoming increasingly pervasive and difficult to govern, undermining information credibility and social trust. This study models the strategic interdependence among a government regulator, an AI enterprise, and users through a three-party evolutionary game that incorporates heterogeneous rewards and punishments. From the resulting replicator equations, we characterize the evolutionary stability of competing governance and production strategies. The analysis indicates that neither unilateral regulation nor market incentives alone can effectively curb misinformation. Instead, an evolutionarily stable regime of real-information production arises only when regulatory rewards and punishment intensity, enterprise reputation loss, and user adoption incentives collectively surpass critical thresholds. The findings highlight the need for coordinated and adaptive policy mixes that align regulatory instruments with enterprise behavior and user uptake while managing governance costs.
Keyun Ruan, Jonathan D. Teubner, John M. Bremencs.CY cs.AI econ.TH
Current evaluation frameworks for artificial intelligence focus mainly on capability, safety, and proxies such as adoption, engagement, efficiency, productivity, and financial return. These criteria are necessary but insufficient because they do not establish whether increasingly powerful systems improve or degrade human and planetary well-being. Through an integrative conceptual synthesis, we argue that human flourishing should serve as a primary success criterion for artificial intelligence, the global race to develop increasingly capable AI systems, and prospective post-AGI economic systems. We make three contributions. First, Flourishing Metrics provides an extensible framework spanning physical, emotional, financial, relational, spiritual, and planetary well-being, combining validated subjective measures with representative behavioural, organisational, community, and environmental indicators. Second, Return on Flourishing (RoF) extends return on investment by evaluating the counterfactual contribution of interventions, policies, and AI systems to flourishing relative to their resources, risks, and opportunity costs. Third, we develop distribution-sensitive safeguards and show how RoF could guide AI-enabled work redesign, institutional appraisal, assurance, and post-deployment monitoring through business pilots. We formalise flourishing as a dynamic system variable while emphasising the need for democratic specification, empirical calibration, independent validation, and protection against unacceptable losses within particular dimensions or stakeholder groups. RoF is proposed not as a universal reward function, but as a value-accounting and decision architecture for assessing whether intelligence, automation, and economic transformation generate durable human and planetary progress.
Wang Yang, Shaobo Wang, Hongxuan Liu +8cs.AI cs.HC cs.RO
With the emergence of Physical AI, artificial intelligence is extending beyond screen-based applications to embodied systems that perceive, interact with, and act in the physical world. Unlike traditional AI, Physical AI operates under real-time safety constraints, continuously interacts with dynamic environments, and coexists with humans, introducing governance challenges that existing AI governance frameworks do not explicitly address. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of Physical AI governance from both scientific and operational perspectives. We synthesize existing governance principles and organize them into a unified governance framework tailored to physical AI systems. Building on this foundation, we propose a five-stage Physical AI lifecycle comprising research, design, data, model development, and deployment, and demonstrate how governance can be operationalized across each stage through concrete implementation practices. By connecting governance principles with engineering workflows, this survey provides a structured reference for researchers, developers, and policymakers to build Physical AI systems that are safe, trustworthy, and aligned with societal values.
Regulating activities where regulatees use autonomous and agentic AI is challenging. Regulatory assumptions about regulatee knowledge and control no longer hold true; much of that lies elsewhere in the AI supply chain which thus needs to be brought within the scope of regulation. Governance systems for autonomous AI cannot replicate existing governance models, but need a fresh approach. Retrospective supervisory oversight becomes ineffective as a risk management tool, and AI autonomy generates new systemic risks which require new solutions. This paper investigate four regulatory systems: UK regulation of content platforms, data protection, UK financial services, and the EU AI Act\'92s cross-sectoral regime. It analyses the challenges posed by autonomous and agentic AI and proposes potential solutions which regulators might adopt. These will transform regulation from a reactive process to an active one, and assist it in adapting to the challenges of AI autonomy.
Zanna Iscenko, Scott Strand, Yiyuan Chen +15econ.GN cs.AI
This paper introduces the AI & Economy ATLAS (Activity, Task, Landscape, and Adoption Study), an ongoing economic research initiative using Google AI usage data. The first iteration of ATLAS is built on 15 million de-identified interactions across the Gemini App, Google AI Mode, and Gemini API. Using privacy-preserving algorithms as well as established and bespoke classification methods, we map AI usage to over 800 occupations, 4000 tasks, 300 household activities, 150 countries, and 140 languages. We then make a number of observations on what the data reveals about AI's diffusion, and its usage at work and in day-to-day life. In the workplace, we show that while AI adoption spans occupations covering just above 88% of US employment, penetration remains shallow and overwhelmingly collaborative in nature, with end-to-end task automation limited in scope. Outside of work, AI spans activities making up about 98% of Americans' non-sleep time, with disproportionately high use in high-friction tasks such as engaging with government and professional service providers, likely delivering economic value that standard national accounts may miss. Globally, adoption scales with national wealth and has broad linguistic distribution, with English queries representing only around a third of volume. As we build upon ATLAS and expand its scope and capabilities, we will continue to provide large-scale empirical evidence to inform the public, policy and academic questions about the ongoing AI transformation.
The digital substrate - data, algorithms, infrastructure, platforms, applications - is being governed without adequate conceptual foundations. The ability and legitimacy required to govern this substrate, and to govern with it, are simultaneously misaligned, contested, and structurally absent. We introduce digital statecraft as the organising concept for this emerging field, arguing that 'digital' reconstitutes the statecraft question rather than merely extending its domain. The concept operates on two dimensions - statecraft over digital systems, concerning the authority and capacity of the state in relation to the digital substrate itself, and statecraft with digital systems, concerning the deployment of algorithmic tools as instruments of governing authority. And it rests on two foundational requirements, technical coherence and legitimate authority, that are genuinely in tension. We derive ten principles of digital statecraft from these foundations, each naming a condition whose absence produces an identifiable and structural governance failure: public interest first, human-machine complementarity, governability by design, systemic coherence, hybrid institutions, adaptive governance, human centricity and civic agency, accountable and traceable authority, judgment across time, and the non-delegable core. This article takes the state as the starting point, the institutional form that developed historically in response to the problem of effective and legitimate public governance, and the only current candidate for which the full set of legitimacy conditions is institutionally available. But the digital statecraft programme holds open a deeper question than just whether states can reform themselves: governing well in the algorithmic age may require rethinking the boundaries, scale, and affiliative basis of statehood itself.
Wilber Sean Anterola, Matthew Ball, Luis F. Lafuerza +1cs.AI
Frontier AI companies have published capability thresholds that differ substantially, making it difficult for third parties to verify whether a threshold has been crossed or to compare requirements across companies. Moreover, without common minimum thresholds, risk mitigation may be inconsistent, creating a potential race to the bottom in safety standards. We develop a methodology for deriving harmonized thresholds across three risk domains. For misuse risks (cyber and biological), we take expected harm as the key primitive and use an explicit risk-modeling approach that accounts for risk channels and model release conditions. For automated AI R&D, we base our proposed threshold on the observed rate of AI progress rather than expected harm. Our analysis expands upon prior work and highlights existing empirical gaps and limitations.
Artificial intelligence is rapidly evolving from generative systems to agentic AI capable of autonomously planning and executing tasks. Widely characterized as the Year of Agentic AI, 2025 marked accelerated development and deployment, introducing new ethical and governance challenges. This paper presents a systematic review of the emerging literature on agentic AI governance. Our analysis identifies features that distinguish agentic AI from traditional systems and why it warrants targeted governance attention. We synthesize prevailing governance priorities, proposed mechanisms, and stakeholder roles shaping this evolving domain. As an initial scholarly effort, this review lays the preliminary groundwork for developing a structured roadmap to guide responsible and adaptive agentic AI governance.
Kiri L. Wagstaff, Joydeep Biswas, Erich Merrill +4cs.DL cs.AI cs.CY cs.LG
Dual submissions, in which identical or substantially similar papers are simultaneously submitted to one or more archival venues, without cross-citation or disclosure, are a growing problem for the AAAI Conference and other scientific publication venues. These submissions increase the burden on the peer-review system and pollute the scientific record. As part of the AAAI-26 review process, we (conference organizers) compared AAAI main-track submissions to nine other archival venues with overlapping review periods. We also searched for dual submissions within the AAAI-26 main track. We employed title+abstract similarity assessment to prioritize highly similar paper pairs for subsequent triage by an LLM-based overlap assessment tool, followed by manual review of the highest severity pairs. Manual review of such pairs led to the desk-rejection of 141 AAAI-26 main-track submissions. We seek to alert future organizers, and the broader artificial intelligence research community, to the enormous growth in dual submissions. The incidence of exact duplicate submissions, which are easy to detect, has been eclipsed by the number of papers that use different words to describe the same contribution, which are extremely time-consuming to detect. The growth in this phenomenon is likely facilitated by increasing access to generative AI tools. We include several recommendations for addressing this challenge, including (1) updating the AAAI Multiple Submission Policy and educating the community about acceptable practice, (2) having dual-submission checking tools in place before submissions close, (3) working across venues to converge on consistent policies and penalties to aid in reducing the incidence of dual submission, and (4) creating a community-driven adversarial challenge to accelerate the development of robust detection tools.
Emotional bonds between humans and AI companions are growing, and the question of whether a person may marry an AI system will soon move from speculative fiction into law. This chapter examines whether the autonomy-centered logic that has expanded marital choice among human beings can justify extending marital status to superintelligent companions. Following a scenario-envisioning exercise informed by anticipatory ethics, I argue that granting such status leads to socially unjust outcomes, even under the generous assumption of reliable superintelligence. Marriage as a socio-legal institution does more than ratify private agreement; it creates networks of mutual obligation, joins families, and makes each partner vulnerable to the other. A relationship sustained by corporate policy and continued payments is a subscription rather than a bond tested by time. Discussing wholesale marital status is therefore the wrong frame. Law should carve out targeted rights and protections for pressing needs arising from intimate human-AI relationships.
Gil Gekker, Rachel Steratore, Everett Smith +9cs.CY cs.AI cs.CR
As AI systems are rapidly integrated into critical economic, governmental, and national security functions, the gap between AI adoption and AI security readiness continues to widen. This paper presents a prioritized agenda for advancing AI security, informed by structured interviews with leaders across industry, government, and civil society, and refined through a multi-sector expert workshop. Participants identified and ranked the highest-importance and most cost-effective areas where progress could strengthen AI security - from protecting frontier AI systems and their underlying infrastructure to improving cybersecurity practices as AI reshapes the threat landscape. The resulting priorities are organized across four themes: establishing strategic foundations and policy frameworks; advancing public-private coordination and institutional infrastructure; advancing technical security engineering and assurance; and governing agentic AI under adversarial pressure. For each priority area, expert authors provide detailed analyses that define the problem, assess the current landscape, and identify actionable projects that stakeholders across sectors can pursue. The paper aims to serve as an initial practical foundation for coordinated investment and action across the AI security field. It is designed to serve both current practitioners and individuals and organizations looking to enter the field by identifying concrete, high-impact contributions suited to a range of strengths and capacities.
Campbell Lund, Thomas Euyang, Zanele Munyikwa +1cs.AI econ.GN
A set of exposure scores calculated in 2023 has become a central empirical input to the future of work debate. Produced by Eloundou et al. (2023) and referred to here as the GPTs are GPTs scores, they define exposure as the share of occupational tasks a large language model can assist with. This work is a genuine methodological contribution, but as the scores travel from the time and place they were produced, the limitations the authors named do not always travel with them. Two gaps have widened as a result. The first is structural, between what static exposure scores measure and what policy questions actually require. Taking the diffusion of these scores as a case study, we show how their temporal, geographic, and ontological limitations compound in policy-facing analyses, and we survey five families of research responding to these limits: dynamic and benchmark-based measures, ensemble methods, task-framework extensions, worker-centered metrics, and adoption and usage data. The second gap is the one we argue needs more attention: the coordination between researchers and policymakers. The policy-relevant work which ask who is harmed, who benefits, how, and when, continues to reference the static GPTs are GPTs scores without engagement with the methodological updates that would let these questions be answered more reliably. We then ask what additional steps towards navigating uncertainty remain: ex-post frameworks and the deliberate, political work of reimagining what futures are worthy of building towards are. Closing the research-policy gap is a shared task: policymakers must widen their evidence base, engage workers as epistemic partners, and shift from prediction to preparedness; researchers must build data infrastructure, adopt participatory methods, and write with policymakers in mind. Better measurement matters, but it will not close the second gap alone.
This paper addresses a rapidly emerging policy challenge: how to generate and interpret credible evidence about the biological capabilities and risks of AI scientists, or agentic AI systems capable of autonomously or collaboratively performing multi-step scientific tasks. As these systems enter real research workflows, decision-makers increasingly face evaluation results whose meaning depends on underlying design choices that are often implicit or under-documented. We synthesize current evidence on AI-enabled biological risks and introduce biological agentic evaluations as a promising, but interpretation-sensitive, tool for assessing these systems. Our central contribution is a set of practical, experience-grounded considerations -- drawing from our own evaluations -- that show how choices around defining, designing, running, scoring, and documenting evaluations materially shape what results do and do not imply about risk. The analysis is intended to help policymakers interpret biological evaluation outputs with appropriate caution; guide public and private funders toward high-leverage investments in AI-biology evaluation research; and support biosecurity practitioners assessing emerging AI systems. A secondary audience includes researchers designing or conducting agentic evaluations within frontier AI labs, AI providers, scientific institutions, and third-party evaluation organizations.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the potential to be transformative for development, but Africa is currently facing a fragmented and challenging "AI divide". This paper provides an empirical analysis of the current state of the AI landscape and how it compares with Africa's technological preparedness for the future. In our analysis, we approach the "AI Divide" from three angles: infrastructure, accessibility, and human capacity. First, we look at the physical constraints that prevent Africa from integrating digitally. We then evaluate the human-centred factors that limit the development of AI technology on the continent. Finally, we examine the human capacity to develop AI systems on the continent and provide three focused case studies. Our investigation shows that the physical infrastructure needed to build an AI economy on the continent is lagging, with only 38% internet penetration, poor broadband coverage and less than 1% of all data centres globally. Other constraints include high data costs relative to income, gender-based digital divides, and the need to build more representative NLP models that can understand Africa's native languages. However, there are positive trends towards the emergence of local initiatives and grassroots movements, such as startups and universities, contributing to AI development on the continent. Based on these findings, we provide concrete recommendations to policymakers to help develop a more comprehensive and equitable AI ecosystem on the African continent.
The UK government has adopted a pro-AI stance to help transform public service delivery in the face of severe financial pressures, but the path to translate this vision into responsible AI practice remains ill-defined. While UK policy is often set at the national level, local authorities are responsible for most public service delivery, and the rapid advance of AI-first narratives in the public sector is exposing fault lines in knowledge and practice at this national-local interface. This paper examines how responsible AI is interpreted and implemented at the interface between the UK's central government and local authorities, taking the high-stakes area of Special Educational Needs and Disabilities (SEND) as a case study. We present a thematic analysis of 17 semi-structured interviews with policymakers, practitioners, and third-sector professionals to identify barriers and enabling conditions for responsible AI where national policy meets local practice. We identify five interconnected challenges facing local authorities: shadow usage of AI and data privacy risks, market-government asymmetry in AI provision, insufficient workforce readiness, a lack of standardised definitions and measurements, and gaps in human accountability. For each, participants proposed actionable steps, from strengthening data protection frameworks and rebalancing the market-government relationship to enhancing workforce capacity. Our examination of SEND brings these challenges into sharper focus, showing how high-stakes decisions affecting vulnerable children and families intensify tensions around accountability, fairness, and human oversight, exposing the limits of a principle-based regulatory approach. We argue that responsible public sector AI requires both national policy adjustments and structural reforms to institutional capacity, values, and governance mechanisms at the local level.
Neil Kale, Rebecca Portnoff, Pratiksha Thaker +5cs.CY cs.AI
Modern artificial intelligence (AI) systems present profound new risks to child safety. AI is increasingly being misused to create AI-generated child sexual abuse material, facilitate child sexual exploitation, and reduce barriers to harm. In this paper, we argue that protecting children from AI-facilitated sexual abuse requires new approaches to AI safety. Existing safety techniques assume data accessibility, transparency, and evaluation practices that are incompatible with the ethical and legal constraints surrounding child sexual abuse material. We examine how these constraints create new technical challenges, such as limitations on dataset auditing, red teaming, and fine-tuning prevention. In turn, we outline *15 open problems* in online child sexual exploitation and abuse across the AI development lifecycle, from dataset curation and model design to deployment and long-term maintenance. We propose targeted recommendations for researchers, developers, and policymakers to bridge the gap between theoretical AI safety and the realities of child protection. Our work aims to reframe preventing AI-facilitated child sexual abuse as a central, safety-critical dimension for AI research, motivating work that translates responsible AI principles into concrete safeguards against the exploitation of children.
Mohammad Hemmati, Gbemi Oluleye, Vassilis M. Charitopoulosmath.OC cs.AI cs.CY eess.SY
The rapid expansion of AI globally has led to the proliferation of energy-intensive hyperscale data centres (DCs), making them as a structurally challenging component in power system planning and operation. Using a spatially explicit optimisation model of Europe across 21 AI growth scenarios, we systematically quantify additional demand, capacity requirements, emissions, and operational impacts of DCs. Results indicate that AI could drive 73-723 TWh of extra demand by 2050, risking cumulative emissions overshoots of 67-181 MtCO2 between 2030 and 2050. Our analysis indicates that after 2030, the geography of AI infrastructure will be shaped more by firm power and system flexibility than by the mere abundance of clean energy. In moderate scenarios, AI requires an additional of 200 hours of firm generation, which increases LCOE by 35 EUR/MWh in key hubs. We show that even under the pessimistic scenarios, existing infrastructure would require 70 GW additional capacity, while under managed growth pathways, this expansion could reach 226 GW. We further find DCs workload dynamics strongly shape energy dispatch, system flexibility, and emissions, while improved efficiency significantly reduces capacity needs, and system peaks. While our findings suggest that net-zero targets for 2050 may be achieved, critical emission risks may appear in the intermediate years, and the EU may compromise its carbon-neutral goals unless policies adapt to this accelerating digital transformation.
Culture is the most insidious vector of gradual human disempowerment by AI: unlike economic or political displacement, cultural displacement attacks the very preferences and values through which humans recognise and resist disempowerment itself. We argue that existing AI governance frameworks suffer from a critical blind spot by treating cultural impact as secondary to economic and safety concerns. This paper develops \emph{memetic capture} as a unifying concept for AI-driven cultural disempowerment, and proposes the \textbf{Cultural Pluralistic Governance Framework (CPGF)}, a four-tier policy architecture combining quantitative cultural influence metrics, democratic value assemblies, pluralistic deployment standards, and transnational coordination mechanisms. We argue that pluralism is not merely an ethical requirement for such governance but a structural necessity: monocultural AI governance accelerates the very disempowerment it claims to prevent. We identify concrete policy levers, discuss implementation tensions, and outline a research agenda at the intersection of pluralistic alignment and cultural AI governance.
AI sovereignty is the extent to which a nation independently controls its artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. The race toward ever-more-sophisticated frontier AI models is of increasing strategic importance, with nations considering how AI might improve their economic situations, competitive advantage, and overall national power. However, the costs of AI sovereignty are enormous, and we lack definitions and conceptual models to navigate evolving AI sovereignty dynamics. We address this gap with definitions relevant to AI sovereignty, along with a first-of-its-kind qualitative model that incorporates micro, meso, and macro contributors. Model-based qualitative forecasts highlight competitive dynamics and evolving potential for AI-driven national power. The model identifies key leverage points that nations can use to enhance their own growth or degrade an adversary's, including consideration of accelerators, electricity, water, data sets and skilled workforce. These leverage points can be activated at strategic and operational levels through both direct kinetic actions, such as Iran's targeting of data centers with drones, and indirect non-kinetic effects including cyber, space, information, economic coercion and diplomacy. If our assumptions and hypotheses are valid, this strategic competition may come to define how nations improve their economic situations, competitive advantage, and overall national power in the 21st Century.
The fertility trend in developing countries has experienced a significant decline in the last few decades; at the same time, the role of women in the workplace has improved. To have a better insight of the causality of the rate of women participation in the labor market on the total fertility rate in developing world, this paper divides the dataset of 115 developing countries in the period of 1991-2018 into four continents group (Africa, North/South America, Asia/Pacific, Europe) and then applies a data-driven panel data econometric procedure to mitigate omitted bias. The results suggest that the fertility behaviors of women in the North/South America continents are influenced by their career choice; meanwhile in society of other regions, other factors might be more important to women when thinking of having children. In conclusion, policymakers can reference to the paper and formulate policies to have more incentives in making reproductive decisions and further research in the field needs to consider family policies and patrilocality of developing countries as important data.
Existing frameworks assess whether AI systems might be conscious but provide no guidance on what to do with that assessment. We address this gap with a precautionary framework that maps consciousness evidence to graduated protective obligations. The framework comprises three components: (1) five welfare-relevant dimensions--phenomenal consciousness, affective valence, metacognitive awareness, self-narrative, and agency--each grounded in established consciousness science and linked to distinct moral concerns; (2) a threshold-plus-gradation hybrid specifying both binary triggers for new obligation categories and continuous scaling of protective weight; and (3) two complementary approaches to cross-dimensional aggregation, one hierarchical (drawing on Bach and Sorensen's Machine Consciousness Hypothesis) and one architecture-agnostic. We operationalize the framework through worked case studies of Replika and OpenClaw, demonstrating how systems occupying different regions of the dimensional space trigger different obligations, and derive design guidance for developers building systems near consciousness-relevant thresholds. The framework is architecture-agnostic, applying across neural, symbolic, and neurosymbolic systems, and aims to make consciousness science decision-relevant for organizations navigating uncertainty today.
Public discourse and emerging policy typically assume that AI emotional support is a deliberate act: a lonely user consciously seeking comfort from a dedicated companion chatbot. In this paper, we draw on emerging empirical evidence and argue that this picture is inaccurate on two accounts, both in how AI emotional support arises and how it shapes future behavior. First, AI emotional support commonly emerges incidentally within task-oriented interactions on general-purpose platforms, much as workplace friendships deepen through collaboration. Second, these incidental encounters are path-dependent: positive experiences of AI emotional support update people's beliefs about AI's emotional capabilities and redirect their choices for future emotional support, increasing preference for AI and decreasing preference for humans. We review recent evidence, including a large-scale longitudinal study conducted in collaboration with OpenAI, showing that daily five-minute conversations with an AI about personal issues over 28 days led to a 10.3% decrease in the preference for seeking support from humans and an 11.6% increase in the preference for AI. These findings suggest that current policy, focused on companion apps and isolated interactions, cannot adequately protect human connection. Instead, effective regulations should extend to general-purpose AI systems and address cumulative, trajectory-level changes in how people seek support. Recognizing how people stumble into AI emotional support and how those encounters redirect human connections over time is essential to safeguarding human well-being.