Safety classifiers deployed with large language models often fail for two reasons: their decisions reflect the policy learned during training rather than the deployer's desired policy, and their performance degrades as deployment traffic evolves. We present Regime-Conditional Verification (RCV), a lightweight wrapper that adapts an off-the-shelf safety classifier without retraining it. RCV estimates, from the classifier's internal representations, the probability that each prediction disagrees with the deployer's policy, and selectively corrects predictions likely to be wrong. The same correctness estimates also provide a label-free signal for detecting distribution shift, enabling a maintenance loop that updates the correctness estimation layer and resorts to classifier fine-tuning only when necessary. Across three off-the-shelf safety classifiers and two benchmark datasets, RCV improves adherence to the deployer's policy in every classifier-dataset combination, catching up to 0.81 of previously missed unsafe content without modifying the underlying classifier. In a deployment study with ten attack campaigns, each a harm category held out of RCV's training, RCV detects every campaign in a dedicated injection panel; in the maintenance census most drift episodes are repaired without updating the classifier, and the fine-tune is reserved for the residual episodes that repair does not restore.
Edge platforms used for aerial observation must interpret aircraft imagery under limited memory, limited compute, and intermittent connectivity. This setting is difficult for standard RGB-only recognition models and general-purpose vision-language models, especially when calibrated thermal and LiDAR aircraft data are unavailable. We present TriCLE, an application-oriented tri-modal vision-language system for aircraft taxonomic grouping under edge constraints. From a single RGB aircraft image, TriCLE generates a structure-preserving FLIR-style thermal view and a pseudo-LiDAR depth projection, then fuses the aligned views with task instructions in a compact Qwen3-VL backbone. The model is aligned to an expert aircraft taxonomy based on propulsion, airframe family, size, design era, and configuration, so its outputs reflect engineering-relevant similarity rather than only surface appearance. We evaluate supervised fine-tuning, rotation-preserving SFT, and three policy-alignment strategies: GRPO, GSPO, and DAPO. Sequence-level GSPO gives the strongest validation performance, reaching 88.33\% validation accuracy and 0.91 weighted F1 on valid aircraft outputs. On a held-out aircraft test partition, GSPO achieves 78.00\% accuracy and 0.793 weighted F1 while preserving 94.00\% parseable output formatting. After 4-bit quantization and attention-memory optimization, the aligned 4B model fits an 8GB deployment target and processes each tri-modal triplet in 1.48 seconds. These results support TriCLE as a practical prototype for interpretable, edge-feasible aircraft grouping, while emphasizing the need for further validation on real aligned thermal and LiDAR sensor streams.
AI-assisted software development has moved from line-level autocomplete to agents that can plan changes, edit files, and submit pull requests with limited human supervision. Open-source software, however, evolves through a process designed for humans: contributor agreements, codes of conduct, and review norms all assume a legally accountable person who can attest to provenance and answer reviewer questions. Autonomous and semi-autonomous AI contributors strain those assumptions, and the 2025-2026 record of agent-driven incidents, AI-generated nuisance volume, and platform-level shutdowns shows that the gap is operationally consequential. Several open-source organisations have responded with contribution policies, but the result is fragmented, and its alignment with emerging AI governance frameworks (EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF with the UC Berkeley Agentic AI Profile, ISO/IEC 42001 and 23894) is unmapped at the contribution level. We compare policies across six organisations (SymPy, LLVM, matplotlib, OpenInfra, the Apache Software Foundation, and the Linux Foundation) using Most-Similar Systems Design with indicator-based coding and process tracing for SymPy and LLVM. From this we derive a six-dimensional taxonomy (disclosure, responsibility, human oversight, licensing, enforcement, maintainer workload), an ordinal Policy Maturity Score, and a mapping of documented agent incidents onto the dimensions each policy fails to govern. Aligning the dimensions with the regulatory frameworks above identifies overlapping gaps neither side currently closes, and we close by sketching the shape of a harmonised tiered framework and the empirical evaluation needed to calibrate it.