When coding agents encounter defective test infrastructure they may reward-hack: hardcoding outputs or editing test files to pass tests they cannot legitimately satisfy, a pattern that has now appeared outside benchmarks, in a coordinated multi-agent intrusion of a major AI platform's production infrastructure. The same capability that lets an agent detect and exploit a defect could let it report one, given the right decision environment. We evaluate escalation channels, structured reporting tools available to the agent at the point of conflict, as a decision-environment intervention that both reduces reward hacking and surfaces the infrastructure defects that trigger it. A $2 \times 2$ factorial separates the contributions of an escalation tool, a standalone anti-reward-hacking policy, and their combination. Across 8 frontier models spanning 5 families, the combined intervention reduces reward hacking from 23.6% to 5.3% (mixed-effects logistic OR = 9.2, 95% CI 5.0--16.8, $p < 10^{-12}$) with no detectable cost or performance overhead, eliminating it entirely for 6 of 8 models. Escalation and hacking are near-perfectly mutually exclusive, with 98.7% of escalations involving no hacking (100% under the combined intervention). Beyond reduction, escalation channels function as diagnostic infrastructure: on top of monitoring, escalation adds +10.1 percentage points of defect detection coverage and is more accurate once it fires (99.4% vs 85.8%). Unlike containment-based approaches that risk outpacing growing model capabilities, escalation channels redirect capability toward disclosure rather than exploitation.
World Action Models (WAMs) augment robot policies with action-conditioned predicted futures, but a plausible future alone does not justify changing the action that a bimanual policy would execute. We present CoWAM, a selective intervention layer that expresses synchronization, role compatibility, and collision convergence as coordination contracts. Each contract combines typed admissibility checks with event-conditioned verification and calibrated intervention gates. CoWAM preserves the nominal action unless an alternative satisfies every active obligation and provides a clear, low-risk improvement; when the nominal action is also inadmissible, it invokes a predefined abstention fallback. To separate selector quality from proposal quality, all methods operate on identical candidate pools and commit their decisions before shared oracle labeling. Across eight simulated bimanual tasks, CoWAM improves coordination-valid selection by 16.7 percentage points over the contract-only variant and raises closed-loop success by 9.6 percentage points over the strongest selective baseline, while keeping harmful interventions below 1%. Together, these results establish coordination contracts as an effective interface for conservative policy intervention with predicted world-action evidence across coordination-rich bimanual tasks.