Indirect speech acts (ISAs) require pragmatic reasoning over context, as directive intent can- not be inferred from surface form alone. Prior text-based studies and existing multimodal benchmarks largely overlook this requirement, focusing instead on explicitly encoded context or perceptual recognition, and thus underex- plore context-dependent pragmatic understand- ing, particularly in high-context languages such as Korean. We introduce READI, a multimodal benchmark for evaluating ISA understanding through integrated reasoning over visual con- text and dialogue. READI models graded in- directness grounded in pragmatic theory and formulates the task as vision-based pragmatic question answering (V-PQA), supporting cross- lingual evaluation in English and Korean. Ex- periments show that even state-of-the-art multi- modal models struggle with visually grounded indirect speech acts, with performance declin- ing as indirectness increases, underscoring the need for benchmarks that explicitly target con- textual pragmatic reasoning.
Alvin Wei Ming Tan, Ben Prystawski, Veronica Boycecs.CL
Flexible adaptation to context and shared pragmatic intuitions contribute to smooth human conversation. Iterated reference games---in which players repeatedly pick out novel referents using language---present a test case for agents' ability to perform context-sensitive pragmatic reasoning in multi-turn linguistic environments. We tested humans and vision--language models on their ability to identify the intended meaning of descriptions produced in iterated reference games, varying the provided context in terms of amount, order, and relevance. While humans performed well consistently, the models we evaluated could make use of prior context to interpret humans' referring expressions, but they struggled to build up the relevant context to interpret those expressions effectively. Our results suggest that the models we evaluated lack core skills needed for efficient linguistic collaboration.
Large language models work well on English and behave in poorly understood ways on languages typologically far from it. Japanese is a clean example, where evaluation still leans on translation quality and JGLUE-style benchmarks, which roll lexical, syntactic and pragmatic competence into a single score. The phenomena on which general-purpose models fail Japanese users are pragmatic: honorifics, in-group and out-group reference, context-sensitive politeness, zero anaphora. I introduce J-PragEval-v0, a minimal-pair benchmark isolating four such phenomena from surface fluency, and combine it with linear probes and teacher-forced log-probability evaluation to ask where inside TinySwallow-1.5B (28 layers, hidden size 1536) the corresponding contrasts live. The four features split three ways. Honorific register sits cleanly in the residual stream: 0.96 balanced accuracy at layer 15, and the model flips its preferred continuation with the scenario on 93 percent of items. Implicit subject and in-group reference are not linearly decodable at the final prompt token (0.48 and 0.38), yet flip rates are 0.77 and 0.79, so the contrast is worked out during generation rather than stored at the prompt. Indirect refusal is the negative case: 0.95 probe accuracy collapsing to a 0.43 flip rate under length-normalised teacher forcing, because the current minimal pairs conflate politeness with continuation length. I also specify Pragmatic Representation Steering, a parameter-free inference-time method that edits residual-stream activations along the class-mean-difference directions probing identifies. Feasibility is argued indirectly rather than demonstrated: the contrastive activation addition baseline, the same geometry the method would inject, recovers probe accuracy within one to two points of logistic regression wherever a linear signal exists. Scaling to Llama-3.1-Swallow-8B is the next step.
Zhanna Mukhametsharip, Vera Demberg, Varsha Sureshcs.CL
Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have demonstrated strong performance on multimodal benchmarks, yet it remains unclear whether they genuinely reason about relationships between images and text or rely on superficial correlations, known as shortcut learning. This question is particularly important for multimodal sarcasm detection, where successful prediction depends on recognizing pragmatic incongruity rather than treating sarcasm as simple image-text mismatch. We introduce PragMatch, a controlled benchmark of 3,000 image-text pairs derived from MMSD2.0, including original sarcastic examples and constructed literal and hard-negative pairs. We identify influential shortcut cues through systematic masking and evaluate their impact through targeted injection experiments. Our results show that LVLM predictions are sensitive to lexical, OCR-derived and stylistic cues, with injected surface signals causing substantial changes in model predictions despite unchanged underlying image-text relationships. Our findings reveal limitations in current LVLMs while PragMatch provides a systematic testbed for evaluating multimodal pragmatic reasoning beyond surface-level image-text alignment.
Natural language understanding often depends on meanings that are implied rather than explicitly stated, requiring pragmatic reasoning. Despite strong performance on math and logical reasoning, large language models (LLMs) still struggle with making pragmatic inferences, often choosing literal interpretations. To improve LLM pragmatic reasoning, we introduce PragReST, a self-supervised framework that constructs pragmatic QA data, generates counterfactual reasoning traces, and trains models to internalize them through supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning, without human-labeled training data or distillation from a stronger teacher. Across four pragmatic benchmarks (PragMega, Ludwig, MetoQA, and AltPrag), PragReST improves over backbone models, task-specific pragmatic tuning baselines, and non-counterfactual variants of the same pipeline. On accuracy-based benchmarks, PragReST improves over the instruct backbone by 5.37 and 5.50% (absolute) for Qwen3-8B and Qwen3-14B, respectively. Our error analysis and ablations underscore the importance of counterfactual reasoning: PragReST primarily reduces errors caused by failures to contrast observed utterances with plausible alternatives, and removing counterfactual reasoning substantially reduces performance. Moreover, our training preserves out-of-domain performance on general-knowledge and mathematical reasoning benchmarks.
When asked what a meme or sarcastic post means, Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs) tend to describe what the image shows rather than what the author is trying to communicate. Standard instruction tuning entangles a post's literal content with its pragmatic meaning, letting surface-level details contaminate the final response. We reframe meme understanding as a problem of literal-pragmatic decomposition and propose \textbf{Intent Projection}, a framework that separates the two signals at the representation, output, and objective levels within a single LVLM backbone. At the representation level, an orthogonal projection module removes dominant unimodal directions from the fused image-text representation, retaining only the pragmatic residual, while a surface-real affect classifier anchors the decoder with a discrete tag that names the polarity gap. At the output level, the model externalizes a structured reasoning chain, and at the objective level a contrastive reward explicitly penalizes answers that restate the literal description. Across six multimodal benchmarks, Intent Projection consistently outperforms open-source baselines and narrows the gap to proprietary models, with the largest gains on high-divergence posts where literal collapse is most damaging.
Paolo Morosi, Nikoleta Pantelidou, Fritz Günther +2cs.CL cs.AI
Humans effortlessly go beyond literal meanings: If you mow the lawn, I will give you fifty dollars, is typically understood as implying that the speaker will pay only if the lawn is mowed, whereas If you are hungry, there is pizza in the oven implies that pizza is available regardless of the hearers hunger. Large Language Models - LLMs - show human-like performance on many tasks, yet it remains unclear whether they reason like humans. To address this, we conducted a population-matching experiment assessing how twentyfive LLMs compute conditional inferences across four languages, compared to an equal number of humans per language. We find that humans enrich logical reasoning through pragmatic inferences across languages. Model behavior is more variable. Some LLMs perfectly follow the truth-table of conditionals but they ignore pragmatic inferences, while others deviate from the truth-table, adhering to a single interpretation across the board, thus reflecting accurate rule-based processing but not human-like reasoning. Overall, LLMs are accurate semantic operators, but fail to capture the pragmatic enrichments characteristic of human reasoning. Crucially, LLM accuracy is neither predicted nor boosted by open vs. closed status, training orientation, or architecture type, suggesting that pragmatic reasoning is still an emerging ability in the cognitive toolkit of artificial systems.