When do prophets profit in prediction markets?

Prediction markets aggregate dispersed beliefs into prices that act as probabilistic forecasts of uncertain events. Classical theory establishes a clean equivalence between forecasting accuracy and trading profit, but only for the specific automated market maker (AMM) design. However, the largest exchanges today are based on central limit order books in which informed forecasters routinely lose money while uninformed strategies can profit on simple heuristics. We resolve this discrepancy by establishing a formal equivalence between predictive accuracy and profitability. For any strictly proper scoring rule $S$, we exhibit a "proper" betting strategy that depends only on the forecaster's prediction $\mathbf{p}$ and the market price $\mathbf{q}$, and earns positive expected profit whenever $\mathbf{p}$ outperforms $\mathbf{q}$ under $S$ and the market has sufficient liquidity. Moreover, this proper betting is essentially the only strategy with such robust profitability guarantee. The proof rests on a decomposition of expected profit that strictly generalizes the classical AMM guarantee and also explains how strategies can profit without an accuracy edge. Empirically, across thousands of forecasts by AI models, proper betting is the only strategy that reliably converts accuracy into profit, and we further identify systematic forecasting personas and show how the optimal proper strategy varies across them. A month-long live deployment on Kalshi achieves $+80.33\%$ return on investment with a Sharpe ratio of $3.35$.

Beyond Forecasting: The Belief-to-Trade Layer in Prediction-Market Agents

Forecasting future events has attracted growing attention as a testbed for general-purpose AI. A natural way to ground this evaluation is let the models trade in the prediction markets. Trading, however, requires more than forecasting. Moreover, recent benchmarks report a substantial gap between calibrated probability scores and the trading results. We propose Raven-Agent, to the best of our knowledge, the first autonomous trading agent for prediction markets. On a controlled replay over an archived decision set, our architecture achieves the only positive return and the only positive risk-adjusted return among all tested policies. We have released our code in https://github.com/Alchemist-X/predict-raven .

Nous: An Attempt to Extract and Inject the Cognition Behind Prediction-Market Behavior

As LLM agents proliferate in prediction markets and collective decision-making, they risk a cognitive monoculture: agents built on shared foundation models produce correlated forecasts, and recent measurement finds frontier-model errors correlated at r ~ 0.77. We ask whether human cognitive diversity can be recovered from behavior and transferred to LLM agents. Nous extracts a structured eight-dimension behavioral profile from real Polymarket trading activity and injects it into agents through prompts. Our central finding is a dissociation between the two halves of that pipeline. Extraction works, partially: across 100 wallets, 8 of 14 parameters are temporally stable (split-half ICC >= 0.5, bootstrap CI lower bound > 0.3; contrarian score reaches ICC ~ 0.9); wallets are identifiable from their profiles well above chance (top-1 retrieval 17-22% vs. 1% chance); and two of four pre-specified dimensions rank-correlate with future realized profit out-of-sample, though the correlations do not survive behavioral-confound controls. Prompt-level injection does not measurably transmit it: on a semantic embedding metric, structured injection shows no significant advantage over a length-matched control on any model, and the diversity it induces neither reduces ensemble error correlation nor improves Brier score -- a null that persists across exploratory checks on sampling temperature, profile diversity, and question difficulty. Measuring the prompts themselves locates the compression before the model: the structure-to-narrative translator emits near-uniform prompts whose spread does not track profile spread. We position Nous as measuring the cognitive-monoculture problem and the limits of a prompt-level remedy, motivating deeper, below-the-prompt injection (fine-tuning, activation steering). Code, frozen profiles, prompts, and model outputs: https://github.com/WillChienT/nous-paper

Building Social World Models with Large Language Models

Understanding and predicting how social beliefs evolve in response to events -- from policy changes to scientific breakthroughs -- remains a fundamental challenge in social science. Given LLMs' commonsense knowledge and social intelligence, we ask: Can LLMs model the dynamics of social beliefs following social events? In this work, we introduce the concept of the Social World Model (SWM), a general framework designed to capture how social beliefs evolve in response to major events. SWM learns state-transition functions for social beliefs by mining temporal patterns in social data and optimizing the evidence lower bound, without the need for explicit human annotations linking events to belief shifts, or for expensive census data. To evaluate SWM, we introduce a benchmark, SWM-bench, derived from real-world prediction markets, specifically Kalshi and Polymarket. SWM-bench includes over 12k data points for social belief prediction tasks spanning diverse domains such as politics, finance, and cryptocurrency. Our experimental results show that SWM significantly outperforms time-series foundation models, achieving state-of-the-art results on Kalshi data and demonstrating competitive performance on Polymarket data, while offering interpretable insights into the underlying mechanisms of social belief dynamics.