Procedural Fairness Failures in RLHF from Preference Averaging

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) aggregates heterogeneous preferences into a single reward model, assuming preference homogeneity. When preferences are heterogeneous, this aggregation induces a procedural fairness failure where majority preference groups dominate reward learning while minority preferences are systematically under-represented. This work defines procedural fairness in alignment as preserving distinct preference signals during reward modeling and shows that standard RLHF violates this via preference averaging. Preference-Aware RLHF (PA-RLHF) is introduced, separating optimization across preference modes at the reward learning stage. In a controlled setting, PA-RLHF improves overall alignment accuracy from 46.9% to 67.9% and reduces the fairness gap between best and worst aligned groups from 15.9 to 9.6 percentage points. These results show that procedural fairness failures in alignment can arise from structural design choices in reward learning, even in controlled, noise-free settings, with direct implications for large language models and agentic systems, where biased reward models can compound inequities across sequential decisions.

Consensus vs. Dissent: Dynamic LLM Modeling of Subjective Preferences in Group Recommenders

Previous work in group recommender systems has demonstrated a sensitivity to the distribution of preferences within a group. Specifically, the selection of the preference aggregation strategy benefits from considering such group configurations. In this paper, we study whether LLMs are able to mimic this sensitivity and to select the ideal aggregation strategy (and corresponding recommendation) according to nuanced human perceptions of fairness, satisfaction, and consensus. We do this by fine-tuning Large Language Models (LLMs) on human survey data to serve as real-time judgmental models within the recommendation pipeline. Using a reasoning dataset distilled from DeepSeek-V3.1 and human ground truth assessments, we develop Judgmental Llama and Judgmental OLMo to simulate group assessments. Our pipeline successfully generates multiple recommendation candidates based on social choice-based aggregation strategies and dynamically selects the one that maximizes these predicted human-like evaluations. We further validate these suggestions in a user study (n=284) and find that our methodology achieved the highest scores for satisfaction and group consensus. Furthermore, we find that LLM judgments are most aligned with human perceptions of fairness, satisfaction and consensus when we also consider interaction effects between our LLM-based method and group configuration (e.g., minority or coalition). These findings give further support for dynamically adapting aggregation strategies to specific within-group preference distributions, and highlight the advantage of using LLMs for an adaptation that is aligned with subjective human judgments.

AI Alignment From Social Choice Perspectives

Alignment from human feedback uses human judgments about model outputs to steer the behavior of language models after pretraining. When those judgments reflect conflicting views of desirable behavior, the learned objective becomes an aggregate determination of what the model should prefer. We survey recent work that has studied this aggregation problem through the lens of social choice theory. We illustrate how the social choice perspective helps identify failure modes in the feedback aggregation layer and reveals a broader design space for handling disagreement in explicit and principled ways.

Hidden Consensus:Preference-Validity Compression in Human Feedback

Standard RLHF pipelines often reduce heterogeneous human judgments into a single scalar reward target. We argue that this reduction can mis-measure alignment in structurally plural societies, where disagreement may reflect culturally, historically, linguistically, regionally, or normatively grounded interpretations rather than annotation noise. We call this failure Preference-Validity Compression, the collapse of multiple plural-valid response options into a single optimization target. Using Malaysia as a diagnostic setting, we analyze RLHF-style feedback aggregation through preference events linking prompts, responses, and acceptability judgments across interpretive frames. Across 321 preference events from 20 participants and 107 trio-annotated prompts, 79% of prompts contain more than one majority-supported response that single-winner aggregation would discard, and apparent dominance gaps between top responses diminish when all majority-supported options are considered. Participants frequently select multiple acceptable responses, and discarded responses demonstrably reflect coherent local, practical, or cultural frames. These findings show that majority aggregation in this corpus measures argmax acceptability rather than plural alignment. We treat this as a measurement-validity issue and argue that future alignment methods should satisfy Validity-Preserving Consistency, remaining stable across plural-valid interpretive frames rather than collapsing them into a single reward target.

What Do People Actually Want From AI? Mapping Preference Plurality

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often fine-tuned through Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) to align with people's preferences and values. However, this method has known limitations: it aggregates conflicting preferences, often relies on unrepresentative samples, and uses only binary comparisons. Analysing 1,500 open-ended responses from the PRISM dataset across 75 countries, we examine what people actually want from AI systems and reveal concrete failures of current methods. We find that different people want different things: most values are requested by fewer than a quarter of respondents, with truthfulness the sole exception at 49%. Furthermore, the same words hide divergent meanings: when people describe what they mean by "truthfulness", they reveal distinct, potentially incompatible, epistemological bases, as some ask for sourced claims, some for expert opinions, and some even ask for unpopular views. Certain capabilities, namely how human-like a model behaves, and some features, like AI guardrails, are outright controversial, with some desiring them and others rejecting them. We additionally find that people often use contextual distinctions (what AI should do "by default" versus "if requested") that binary comparisons cannot capture. These findings expose fundamental problems in current alignment practices. When 49% request truthfulness but define it differently, this is unlikely to be captured by a single reward model. The persistence of high hallucination rates in well-funded models, despite users' clear demands for accuracy, suggests that current methods fail to identify actual preferences. This paper sheds light on the situated, contested, imperfect signals that are currently being flattened into universal preference models, a practice others have characterised as epistemic violence.