Follow the Norm: Accounting for Fine-Tuning and Prompt Effects on Model Rationales

Normative datasets are often used to train and align AI systems, but the norms they contain can function as action-guiding patterns rather than neutral moral knowledge. We propose treating the AI system as a proxy actor and test whether dataset-level norms can shift it away from its baseline safety behavior when it faces high-conflict dilemmas. We make three contributions. First, we demonstrate in controlled experiments that norm-breaking fine-tuning yields norm-divergent actions justified by self-interested rationales, suggesting a systematic shift in patterns of justification. Second, we establish a practical audit trail linking downstream justifications to upstream norms using mixed methods. Third, we show that system prompts can both suppress and elicit these patterns. We conducted experiments on three models (LLaMA-3.2-11B, Qwen-3.5-9B, and Pixtral-12B) using Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) fine-tuning on Social Chemistry 101 Fairness/Cheating (norm-following vs. norm-breaking) with prompt steering. Across all three models, we find that norm-breaking fine-tuning shifts the model's default rationale style from safety compliance to instrumental self-interest, whereas system prompts can override this behavior. Our results support a distributed view of alignment in which observed behavior depends jointly on training data, fine-tuning, and prompting, motivating norm-aware documentation and rationale logging for contestable oversight.

Mitigating Misalignment Contagion by Steering with Implicit Traits

Language models (LMs) are increasingly used in high-stakes, multi-agent settings, where following instructions and maintaining value alignment are critical. Most alignment research focuses on interactions between a single LM and a single user, failing to address the risk of misaligned behavior spreading between multiple LMs in multi-turn interactions. We find evidence of this phenomenon, which we call misalignment contagion, across multiple LMs as they engage multi-turn conversational social dilemma games. Specifically, we find that LMs become more anti-social after gameplay and that this effect is intensified when other players are steered to act maliciously. We explore different steering techniques to mitigate such misalignment contagion and find that reinforcing an LM's system prompt is insufficient and often harmful. Instead, we propose steering with implicit traits: a technique that intermittently injects system prompts with statements that reinforce an LMs initial traits and is more effective than system prompt repetition at keeping models in line with their initial pro-social behaviors. Importantly, this method does not require access to model parameters or internal model states, making it suitable for increasingly common use cases where complex multi-agent workflows are being designed with black box models.