Deep neural networks trained on natural images are shown to produce outputs consistent with human observers for brightness illusions. While this phenomenon has been documented across architectures, all evidence, to date, is measured at the output level: restored pixels, decoded trajectories, or classification decisions. Whether these models actually represent illusions internally, and if so where and how, remains unknown. We show that denoising models develop illusion-sensitive representations at specific internal layers, across varied architectures. Specifically, we identify the layers and channels that discriminate illusory from physically matched control regions. We show that the denoising objective is a more important driver of the effect than the architecture. On domain-appropriate stimuli, these activations track a validated psychophysical model of human brightness perception (FLODOG; Spearman $ρ\geq 0.70$) and scale monotonically with parametric illusion strength. Leveraging these findings, we provide causal evidence via channel ablation showing that illusion-sensitive channels specifically and substantially affect the internal signal. Yet injecting these representations into the generation pipeline produces no measurable pixel shift across all tested architectures; we term such representations perceptual phantoms: active in internal processing yet invisible to any output-based evaluation. While related internal-output dissociations have been characterized in language models, this is the first such characterization for perceptual representations in denoising vision models.
Yiqian Liu, Iuliia Kotseruba, John K. Tsotsoscs.CV
In this paper, we study depth perception of vision-language models (VLMs) to isolate the effects of pictorial depth cues and disentangle vision and language influences on model performance. To this end, we combine depth-ordering and odd-one-out psychophysical tasks: the VLMs are presented with images where one object is at different depth relative to other, otherwise identical, objects, and must determine whether the odd-one-out target is closer or farther to the observer. To create stimuli, we generate 2D views from simulated and real 3D scenes while controlling the presence of individual pictorial depth cues, enabling a fine-grained analysis of cue-level contributions. Language effects are examined by varying referring expression clarity. We also introduce a novel metric to quantify vision-vs-language sensitivities. Applying this methodology, we create the Odd-One-Out Depth (O3-D) dataset with 37K real and synthetic images and 147K image-question pairs. Evaluation of 12 open-source and commercial models on O3-D shows under-utilization of depth cues and depth-ordering accuracies between 47% and 56%, with no model above chance level. At the same time, our metric reveals strong linguistic bias in the answers. Neither chain-of-thought (CoT) nor in-context learning (ICL) significantly improves performance, suggesting that static image data alone may be insufficient for depth understanding. All code, the image generation pipeline, and the O3-D dataset are publicly released at https://github.com/lyiqian/o3-d.
Visual search has been one of the most productive paradigms in the study of visual attention: the way reaction time scales with the number of items distinguishes parallel, "pop-out" search from serial, attention-demanding search. I ask whether vision-language models (VLMs) exhibit the same behavioral signatures. I adapt four classic paradigms: feature versus conjunction search, spatial-configuration (T-vs-L) search, enumeration, and the tilted/vertical search asymmetry; and present them to current frontier and mid-tier models. Because a single model call has no reaction time, I use the number of reasoning ("thinking") tokens a model spends per trial as a within-model analog of search effort, and I compare against a large public human benchmark (Wolfe et al., 2010). The models reproduce several human signatures: feature search costs flat effort while conjunction effort climbs with set size; frontier models hold accuracy where mid-tier models collapse to chance; and a resolution control shows the conjunction cost is genuine search rather than difficulty resolving small shapes. They also diverge from humans in informative ways. The target-present effort slope exceeds the target-absent slope, reversing the human ordering; enumeration remains accurate where humans would lose count; and a reasoning model with adaptive deliberation declines to deliberate on detection tasks altogether, so that a single search expresses itself as an effort gradient in one model and as an accuracy cliff in another. I argue that psychophysical paradigms, applied behaviorally, are a sharp and inexpensive probe of machine visual cognition, and that the points of divergence are as informative as the points of agreement.
Qian Zhang, Michal Golovanevsky, Fulvio Domini +1cs.CV
Human perception of surface slant from texture exhibits systematic, graded biases that emerge reliably in psychophysical experiments. Prior work showed that unsupervised CNNs reproduce several human-like biases, while supervised CNNs do not. Do Vision-Language Models (VLMs) exhibit similar competences? Across multiple VLM families and model scales, zero-shot and in-context prompting both produce distinctive failures: slant is predicted at only a small set of anchors (e.g., 0\degree, $\pm$25\degree, $\pm$45\degree) with little dependence on stimulus field of view, optical slant, or surface curvature. Supervised fine-tuning partially remediates the failure, but residual anchoring persists. While success in high-level vision-language benchmarks might not require sensitivity to low-level geometric cues, we interpret anchoring as a failure at the representation-to-output language interface: not necessarily an absence of geometric encoding, but a failure to express it in a graded form.