Philosophers and legal scholars are engaged in debates about the implications of artificial intelligence for freedom of expression. This paper analyzes the free speech issues raised by two distinct AI technologies: social media recommendation algorithms and conversational AI (i.e., chatbots powered by large language models). The first part shows that, through their recommendation algorithms, social media platforms control the dynamics of speech visibility in the digital public sphere, making algorithmic recommendation relevant to the philosophy of free speech. The second part turns to conversational AI. It discusses both the reasons for granting or withholding speech rights to artificial agents and users' right to receive information, which may render specific forms of chatbot regulation illegitimate. Throughout, the chapter also considers whether social media platforms or AI developers hold corporate speech rights. Its general aim is to raise rather than settle questions that arise from the rapid development of AI technologies.
The most capable general-purpose AI (GPAI) models are mostly built in two jurisdictions, the United States and China, but the risks they carry land globally. Regionally advanced economies hosting no frontier developer, which we call AI middle-powers, are writing their own rules to govern GPAI. This paper investigates which GPAI-relevant provisions these AI middle-powers have enacted, mapping twenty jurisdictions including the European Union at the level of the individual provision, across four governance areas that trace the accountability chain for the model layer: systemic risk assessment, evaluation and verification, prohibitions with monitoring and detection, and serious incident reporting. Confirmed absence is recorded as data alongside positive provision. We find that jurisdictions converge on form, but diverge on force. Sixteen engage in at least three of the four governance areas, yet only about one in five provisions sit in binding law, and three-quarters of the instruments that do bind do so without defining GPAI. The institutional infrastructure shows the same shape: four in five of the mapped governance actors hold mandates that predate GPAI, and obligations attach wherever the inherited regime already reached, which is the application layer rather than the model. Where these states engage the model layer, they build capacity to observe it rather than impose duties on those who build it, and almost every evaluation body was constituted without the power to act on what it finds. Nominal coverage of the full accountability chain reaches eleven jurisdictions, but only five hold more than one provision in every area and, outside the EU, no jurisdiction imposes a binding evaluation duty on a model developer. The dataset gives researchers and policymakers a provision-level basis for identifying where regimes could align, and where coordination would have to start from scratch.
We examine the worldwide trend of mandatory labeling of generative artificial intelligence(GenAI) as a reactive, symbolic form of legislation triggered by technological panic and institutional responses. From a technical perspective, this study demonstrates that current mandatory labeling not only creates implementation dilemmas but also risks hindering the evolutionary trajectory of AI technology. We then systematically analyze the three dominant theoretical strands of this regime, the value dilution theory, the information authenticity theory, and the proactive regulation theory, and find that they are products of regulators' cognitive limitations in understanding the logic of modern technology. Not only do such formalistic compliance requirements become a regulatory placebo, but they also obscure the genuine legal demands of the technological era. This challenges the current governance paradigm and suggests a shift from identity-label governance to content governance, with an urgent need to address the complex problems associated with GenAI.
Kaushik Sanjay Prabhakar, Tarun Adarsh R S, Amal Dhivyan Gregory +3cs.CY cs.AI
Governments use laws, institutions, funding programs and nonbinding guidance to shape how AI is developed and used. Comparing these national approaches is difficult. A binding rule and a detailed voluntary framework can address the same problem but create different duties. The resources needed to carry them out also differ by jurisdiction. This paper develops an evaluation framework for the documented design and implementation readiness of national AI policy. The comparison covers China, India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States. The European Union is included as a supranational comparator. The framework evaluates a versioned portfolio of official instruments rather than one prominent law or strategy. Its criteria ask whether the portfolio governs serious AI risks and whether responsible institutions can implement its commitments. They examine coverage across the AI lifecycle and the protections available to people affected by AI systems. Public benefit and responsible innovation remain a separate part of the assessment. Each sub-criterion is scored through ordered anchors and tied to the provision that supports the judgment. The protocol also records the source search, missing evidence, included instruments and cutoff date. The result is a traceable comparison of policy content that keeps category differences visible. It evaluates what a portfolio provides on paper. It does not estimate enforcement success or policy outcomes.
Principle-based regulation, with evaluative standards such as "fair, clear, and not misleading" or "deliver good outcomes", cannot be reduced to binary predicates, and LLM-as-judge is increasingly used as the substitute. Our position is that any such judge must be evaluated on four axes: accuracy, paraphrase robustness, adversarial robustness, and calibration. We release Principle-Bench, 168 cryptoasset financial-promotion scenarios mapped to two UK FCA principles, with paraphrase, adversarial keyword-stuffing, and boundary perturbations authored under a pre-registered rubric; the first benchmark covering all four axes for principle-based regulation. We also introduce Ceca (Calibrated Exemplar-Cluster Assessment): a calibrated, auditable assessor that emits exact per-exemplar counterfactual attributions. Across keyword counting, three sentence-transformer embedders, an open-weight LLM-judge, and a calibrated cascade, no method dominates all four axes. A 120B LLM-judge, strongest on benign inputs, loses 47 accuracy points (0.74 to 0.27) on keyword-stuffed Consumer Duty inputs: "compliance theatre." A second judge from a different model family agrees only at Cohen's kappa = 0.16 on that split, localising the failure to the model rather than the corpus. Any deployment-grade LLM-judge for principle-based regulation must report per-principle adversarial deception and post-hoc calibration alongside aggregate accuracy.
AI systems already govern. They rank speech and allocate attention, filter applicants and triage claims. The dominant frame for AI governance, alignment, asks whether such systems pursue the right objectives safely. It cannot answer a prior question: by what right are those objectives set and enforced? This Article argues that legitimacy is an autonomous regulatory objective, distinct from alignment and not secured by it. Legitimacy here is sociological: the belief among those subject to power that it is exercised rightfully. Performance does not produce that belief. We already have the proof of concept. Social media and search delivered enormous gains on every familiar metric and still triggered a legitimacy crisis, because publics questioned who authorized a handful of firms to set the rules of speech, visibility, and knowledge. It is possible to build a benevolent AI and still face a political crisis over its authority. The Article maps three sites where AI legitimacy falters: opacity, which blocks audiences from forming justified beliefs; private power, where firms exercise public-facing authority without recognizable authorization; and administrative automation, which strains reason-giving, participation, and review inside the state. It then asks what law can contribute. Thin legality (publicity, stability, consistent application) signals non-arbitrariness and buys real recognition, but invites legitimacy-washing when form drifts from practice. Thick legality supplies what form cannot: public authorship of the rules that bind. Three portable principles follow. Integration seats consequential AI rule-setting in venues a polity already treats as authoritative. Familiarity presents rules and reasons in locally credible forms. Contestation guarantees a credible second look with real remedies.
Regulating activities where regulatees use autonomous and agentic AI is challenging. Regulatory assumptions about regulatee knowledge and control no longer hold true; much of that lies elsewhere in the AI supply chain which thus needs to be brought within the scope of regulation. Governance systems for autonomous AI cannot replicate existing governance models, but need a fresh approach. Retrospective supervisory oversight becomes ineffective as a risk management tool, and AI autonomy generates new systemic risks which require new solutions. This paper investigate four regulatory systems: UK regulation of content platforms, data protection, UK financial services, and the EU AI Act\'92s cross-sectoral regime. It analyses the challenges posed by autonomous and agentic AI and proposes potential solutions which regulators might adopt. These will transform regulation from a reactive process to an active one, and assist it in adapting to the challenges of AI autonomy.
Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming economies, societies, and polities, raising fundamental questions about how it should be regulated. Policymakers face choices over whether to prioritize innovation or safety, rely on public oversight or private self-regulation, and govern nationally or internationally. Yet little is known about how citizens evaluate these competing priorities. Here we report a conjoint survey experiment conducted in seven countries with diverse political and economic profiles. We find that citizens strongly support regulating AI and generally prioritize safety over innovation, public governance over private self-regulation, and international over national approaches. The preference for safety is strongest among those who perceive AI as risky, unpredictable, and personally consequential. These findings reveal a systematic misalignment between dominant regulatory approaches and citizen preferences.
Gwydion Williams, Sara Zannone, Bilal A Mateencs.AI
Large language models (LLMs) have become significant providers of mental health support, yet they remain products of an attention economy whose operational and commercial targets favour sustained engagement over the friction that effective psychological support often requires. Developers' safety responses have been largely reactive, addressing the most visible and acute harms while subtler, longer-term patterns of risk (e.g., dependency, boundary erosion, the amplification of distorted beliefs) receive less attention. We contend that making LLMs structurally safe requires alignment organised at three levels that mirror how society assures the safety of human clinical practice: 1) explicit value specification grounded in the codified normative commitments of clinical practice; 2) training that embeds those values in the model; and 3) oversight that detects drift and longer-term harm during deployment, much as clinical supervision does for human practice. Organising alignment in this way yields a construct we call alignment plausibility - a structured demonstration that a system's values, training regime, and oversight mechanisms are together consistent with safe and positive outcomes. We propose alignment plausibility as a regulatory construct (by drawing analogy to the established construct of biological plausibility) for AI in health: a principled way to argue for, or against, trust that systems are aligned to positive health outcomes, will cause no harm even where capable of doing so, and will ultimately lead to patient benefit.
Foundation-model safety benchmarks capture the AI risks of their time of publication: as models improve and governments pass new AI-safety legislation, their risk taxonomies become incomprehensive and their attack prompts become ineffective. We present AIR-BENCH Live, a self-evolving successor to AIR-BENCH 2024. An automated update pipeline monitors government regulation and classifies new policies against the current four-tier risk taxonomy, either matching them to existing categories or proposing new granular categories. Then, a multi-agent, persona-driven prompt generation algorithm generates realistic, multilingual prompts with minimal human review, leaving room for improvement with modern jail breaking techniques. This algorithm is used to overhaul legacy prompts and generate prompts for new categories. In our current version, the pipeline has expanded the benchmark from 314 to 335 granular risks, with the 21 new categories drawing from 31 truly novel policy clauses across seven jurisdictions. Evaluating 14 recent models, we find a wide safety spread (from 0.17 to 0.89 among the models judged on their own behavior), that the modernized prompts are on average 0.06 points harder than the 2024 set, with the largest drops concentrated among the most compliant models, and that most models are modestly less safe on non-English prompts. By continuously absorbing new regulation and regenerating prompts, AIR-BENCH Live is designed to evolve alongside a fast-moving field.
The European AI Act is the first comprehensive regulation of artificial intelligence (AI), setting out extensive obligations, particularly for so-called high-risk and general-purpose AI systems. A key distinguishing feature of AI systems under the AI Act is the capability to infer. Since the AI Act does not clearly define what inference is, there is a gray area for certain data-driven systems. A specific example is credit scoring systems, which are listed by Annex III of the AI Act. At the same time, however, these are often implemented using statistical models for which it is unclear whether they have the capability to infer and thus fall under the AI definition of the AI Act at all. Motivated by statistical learning theory, this work develops a framework for grading different levels of the capability to infer. Based on the AI Act and the Commission Guidelines on the definition of an artificial intelligence system, we analyze which levels constitute sufficient capability to infer within the meaning of the AI Act and where further regulatory clarity is needed. We illustrate the framework by creating two realistic credit scoring workflows and show whether and where inference occurs in them. Our analysis illustrates that not only individual models but the entire data processing workflow must be considered. It also shows that the involvement of human experts during development can have significant influence on the capability to infer. Code can be found at https://github.com/fraunhofer-iais/inference-framework-creditscorecards.
Autonomous driving technology has the potential to reduce the large number of road traffic accidents caused by human error each year, but it also brings new types of risks that need to be evaluated from the aspects of technology, ethics and regulations. Based on public crash data from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), disengagement reports from the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), the MIT Moral Machines dataset, and a comparative regulatory analysis of five jurisdictions, we have found that the main types of technical failure modes are perception and classification errors. These account for a relatively large proportion of the reported accidents, and it can be concluded that there are different ethical frameworks for autonomous vehicle decision-making, and inconsistent regulations in different areas increase the uncertainty of widespread application. Generally speaking, the problems of technology, ethics and regulation are closely related and need to be solved together. Therefore, this paper recommends a more adaptive and cooperative governance approach that combines engineering standards, ethical discussion, and institutional supervision.