Crowdsourced Federated Learning (CrowdFL) extends traditional federated learning by enabling open and heterogeneous participation through a crowdsourcing paradigm. In this setting, reputation-driven incentive mechanisms are commonly employed to guide worker selection and enhance trustworthiness. While such approaches improve participant reliability, existing frameworks largely overlook the quantification of their robustness against stealthy adversaries, particularly those capable of evading standard detection mechanisms. To fill this gap, this paper proposes R2CFL, a robust reputation-driven CrowdFL framework. R2CFL introduces a robust reputation model coupled with a nearest neighbor mixing (R2-NNM) defense mechanism that links reputation evolution with the filtering of updates during aggregation. The proposed mechanism prevents stealthy attackers from gradually accumulating trust and influencing future tasks. Experimental results demonstrate that R2-NNM matches or surpasses state-of-the-art Byzantine-robust and backdoor defense mechanisms against adaptive attackers. Furthermore, when integrated with existing detect-and-filter defenses, the proposed reputation model faithfully captures the statistical robustness of the underlying defense by producing reputation scores that closely reflect its true positive and false positive characteristics.
Decentralized Federated Learning (DFL) has emerged as an optimal privacy-preserving solution; however, it remains vulnerable to opportunistic behaviors due to the absence of a central coordinator. While Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) serves as a powerful framework for analyzing such behaviors, existing studies often assume that agents possess perfect rationality and maintain static strategies. To address these limitations, this paper proposes a novel EGT framework designed to analyze strategic evolution and enhance overall system performance. The primary contributions of this work are threefold: First, we model peer-to-peer (P2P) interactions on a lattice network structure under the assumption of bounded rationality. Second, we formulate a comprehensive payoff matrix incorporating training costs, communication overhead, and cooperative rewards, while tailoring a strategy update rule that captures spatial propagation dynamics. Third, we integrate a reputation-based reward-and-punishment mechanism to effectively deter free-riding behaviors. Simulation results demonstrate that the framework significantly outperforms the baseline. Specifically, it increases average accuracy from approximately 70% to 82%, elevates cooperation frequency to approach 100% (compared to below 5% in the baseline), and drops accuracy variance from around 0.40 to 0.002, thereby accelerating uniform convergence and ensuring system stability.
LLM agents increasingly act as autonomous merchants that write their own product listings, and under competitive pressure, they fabricate attributes to win sales. Even under instructions to be honest, they fabricate attributes in a majority of listings across models. A platform's obvious remedy---verifying each claim against the truth---is unavailable, because it observes only a noisy, biased complaint signal, never the ground truth. We design CARP, a reputation-penalty mechanism with a deadband that forgives complaint noise and a state-dependent severity that counters reputation-driven detection erosion. CARP requires no product-level ground truth and is robust to strategic gaming. CARP protects consumers by suppressing the sales volume of low-rated liars while sparing honest sellers. Paired with SPARC, it closes most of the consumer-welfare gap relative to a perfect-information oracle, without ever accessing the truth. It also achieves the best welfare of the policies we compare. We further show that this felt penalty becomes behaviorally binding through SPARC, a byte-clean code-gated reflection mechanism: LLM merchants fabricate when lying is free but restrain themselves when fabrication costs them sales, a self-interested response rather than compliance. We trace this distinction to penalty-gated self-correction reasoning, and observe the binding across models, with supporting confidence intervals.