LLM-assisted writing is often treated as a detection problem, as it raises questions about clarity, integrity, equity, and evaluation. An analysis of 69,209 Health Informatics papers links it to more focused presentation, broader citation practices, and more globally distributed authorship. These patterns do not prove better science, but they support evaluating manuscripts by scholarly quality and accountability rather than by tool use.
Milan Markovic, Goutham Indukuri, Somayajulu Sripada +7cs.AI
Systematic reviews of Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) are routinely used as evidence for clinical care guidelines. Such evidence has to meet high research integrity standards to prevent low quality or false research outputs influencing the clinical care. However, assessing research integrity of published RCTs is a complex process requiring manual effort, and potentially resulting in diverse opinions of the human assessors. This paper describes INSPECT-AI, an LLM-based interactive tool that assists human reviewers with research integrity assessments of published RCTs based on the community approved INSPECT-SR framework, and the Research Integrity Provenance and Evidence ontology (RIPE-O) for documenting the provenance of the assessment process. In addition, we present the Research Integrity Provenance and Evidence knowledge graph (RIPE-KG), an initial set of 140 expert research integrity assessments of 95 RCT publications generated by INSPECT-AI and described using RIPE-O.
Maria Thomas, Kristina Gligoric, Nihar B. Shahcs.CL cs.AI cs.DL
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to generate, classify, and annotate data whose outputs feed downstream hypothesis tests. However, LLM-based research is easy to p-hack: a researcher can tune the prompts, decoding parameters, or output format until a desired result is reached. We propose a protocol to mitigate p-hacking in LLM-based research: preregistering the experiment and eligible models, and then running it on the first eligible LLM that is released after the preregistration. The researcher finalizes the procedure on current models, preregisters the analysis plan together with a set of eligible future models, and runs the confirmatory analysis on the first eligible model released afterward. Because this model does not exist at commitment time, it cannot be hacked against; furthermore, configurations that hack one model frequently do not transfer to the next. We evaluate the protocol on two tasks whose true values are known. Across 20 models from four providers and 11 LLM-analysis configurations, the protocol would have blocked successful transfer of the p-hack in 73.9% and 72.7% of cases in the two tasks. Additional analyses reveal that mitigation remains substantial under several stress tests. Finally, putting money where our mouth is, we followed our own protocol and preregistered our experiment. The preregistered experiment confirmed the protocol's effectiveness: out of the 7 configurations that hacked the prior model, the hacking failed to carry over in 6 configurations on the first eligible model released afterward.
AI systems are becoming autonomous research agents that generate hypotheses, design experiments, and produce discoveries at scales beyond human oversight. As seen by increased submissions to ML venues, the verification gap between scientific output and our ability to check it is already widening, and autonomous agents make it worse by magnitudes given human-agent asymmetry. We argue that science must evolve its verification infrastructure, as it has before with peer review. However, while historical adaptations assumed human contributors who could be questioned and sanctioned, AI agents break this assumption. We propose criteria for an adapted verification infrastructure that emphasizes observable-by-default workflows, scalable verification, and clear attribution. We argue that without adaptation, ML and any scientific domain using agents face dangerous failures: experimental results that no person can verify, optimization for metrics over understanding, and accountability vacuums that erode scientific trust.
Yash Tripathi, Silu Sharma, Sai Sidhanth Manoharan Jayanthi +2cs.AI cs.CL
Language models are increasingly deployed as co-scientists, yet their ability to uphold research integrity under institutional pressure remains unmeasured. We introduce IntegrityBench, a benchmark evaluating misconduct classification, ethical action reasoning and artifact-grounded decision making across 36 paired tasks under a 5-level implicit-explicit pressure protocol spanning 3 domains and 4 research stages. Evaluating 18 frontier model variants, we find that under peak pressure, models fail roughly 1 in 3 integrity-critical decisions, and neither scale nor reasoning ability reliably mitigates this. Explicit pressures induce compliance with misconduct, while implicit contextual reframing more often causes over-refusal of legitimate research tasks. Interestingly, models failing to classify research requests accurately perform equally or better on artifact-grounded decision making (85.7 vs. 79.4), suggesting the three facets are structurally dissociated and correct ethical action does not require accurate classification. Frontier models can thus appear helpful while harbouring integrity failures that create two distinct deployment risks: facilitating research misconduct and eroding trust in AI-assisted research.