Rewrite Once, Validate Anywhere: Producing OWL-Aware SHACL Constraints (Extended Version)

The Shapes Constraint Language (SHACL) is a W3C recommendation to express syntactic constraints, called shapes, on RDF graphs. SHACL validators are used to test whether a given graph adheres to such a shape. However, RDF graphs often come with OWL ontologies, whose implicit knowledge needs to be taken into account. This is classically handled by first applying reasoning and then performing the constraint checking on the results, often using different technologies which makes the process inefficient and vulnerable for mistakes. To overcome this, we propose to internalise the OWL axioms in the SHACL constraints; we construct a rewriting which takes as input both shapes and an OWL EL$^-$ ontology -- a fragment of OWL EL restricting the usage of existential restrictions -- and produces SHACL constraints. This output can then be evaluated by any validator supporting SHACL core regardless of its reasoning support, while yielding the same results as the traditional approach. The implementation of our translation is evaluated both against applying state-of-the-art reasoners and validators consecutively, as against validators with built-in reasoning support. For our benchmark, we show that our approach is in general more efficient in finding violations compared to the sequential approach, thus providing a powerful tool which simplifies combining reasoning with validation.

ARB: A Matched Authorship-Rewriting Benchmark Dataset for AI-Text Detector Evaluation

Standard AI-text detection benchmarks compare human-written text against text generated directly by large language models (LLMs). While prior work has shown that rewriting and paraphrasing can degrade detector performance, it remains unclear whether performance measured on this conventional benchmark predicts detector behavior when human-authored content is rewritten by an LLM. To address this gap, we introduce Authorship-Rewriting Benchmark (ARB), built from 1,800 human source texts (600 each from XSum, WritingPrompts, and OpenWebText) and four open-weight generators (Llama-3.2-3B, Qwen2.5-7B, Mistral-7B, Gemma-2-9B). Each source item yields four matched variants: human-written (HUMAN), direct LLM generation (Free-LLM), LLM-rewritten human text (H2L), and same-generator LLM-rewritten LLM text (LLM2L). We evaluated five detectors (FastDetectGPT, Binoculars-falcon-7b, RADAR, BERT-Defense, RoBERTa-Defense) at a strict 1%-false-positive operating point (TPR@1%FPR). FastDetectGPT and Binoculars-falcon-7b detected 91.2% and 93.5\% of direct LLM text, but only 30.8% and 15.1% of human text an LLM had rewritten, a drop of 60-78 percentage points. The same detectors retained 78.3% and 83.0% recall when LLM text was rewritten by the same model, a much smaller decline of 10-13 points. RADAR followed the same pattern (66.8% to 12.2%), while BERT-Defense and RoBERTa-Defense stayed below 3% recall across all regimes. These results show that detector performance measured on the conventional human-vs-LLM benchmark does not transfer to human-authored text revised by an LLM, even though the same detectors remain largely robust to LLM-only rewriting.