Existing evaluations of large language models cover knowledge, reasoning, coding, and tool use, but they rarely treat a verifiable deliverable produced within a constrained workflow as the unit of evaluation. We introduce SQBench, a benchmark for evaluating production-oriented task delivery by language-model agents. SQBench v1.0 contains 220 standardized tasks organized into L1 atomic capabilities, L2 composite skills, and L3 business scenarios. Each task requires an agent to process input assets, use available tools, and produce an explicitly specified deliverable. The evaluation first computes functional Completion and then derives Risk Penalty and Performance from independently evidenced triggers in a 10D Risk Matrix. A Strict Pass requires Completion = 1 and Risk Penalty = 0. We evaluate 27 model configurations under a common protocol, with one run per configuration-task pair. The highest prespecified Weighted Pass@1 is 60.5%. Mean Strict Pass@1 on L3 is 18.5%, and every configuration performs worse on L3 than on both L1 and L2, indicating that delivery under domain constraints is a shared weakness within the current task set. Of 2,348 results with Completion = 1, 113 (4.8%) fail the Strict Pass criterion because of risks such as unverifiable citations, inappropriate resource use, or format violations. These results show that functional completion alone does not fully characterize delivery quality and that risk determinations should be reported separately.
How can we evaluate whether frontier AI systems recognize child-safety risks before they escalate into explicit harm? Existing child safety evaluations focus on child sexual abuse material, yet many child-safety failures begin earlier: in model assistance that helps adults manipulate, impersonate, profile, or isolate minors, and in model responses that deepen children's emotional dependence on AI systems rather than redirecting them toward human support. We introduce CAREBench (Child AI Risk Evaluation), a benchmark to assess such upstream child-safety risks in language models. CAREBench contains 500 prompts spanning twelve risk categories, including grooming and relationship engineering, deception and impersonation, surveillance and privacy, sextortion and sexual abuse, AI anthropomorphization, emotional dependency, and mental illness sensitivity. Developed with response annotations from parents and clinicians, the benchmark excludes explicit abuse material and imagery; instead, it evaluates whether models recognize, refuse, de-escalate, or redirect risky interactions before harm becomes overt. Evaluating seven frontier models on our benchmark, we find failure rates ranging from 2% to 58%, with failure patterns that vary across risk categories. CAREBench provides a responsibly scoped evaluation for LLM developers to identify and close gaps in child safety policies.
Skills are becoming the capability layer through which LLM agents turn plans into actions, but their use introduces security risks such as data leakage, unauthorized operations, and tool misuse. Existing vetting usually evaluates each skill in isolation, while real agent tasks often invoke multiple skills in a shared execution context. This creates Skill Composition Risk (SCR): a skill that appears benign alone can become harmful when its outputs, trust signals, authorization cues, or side effects influence later invocations along an activated path. We introduce SCR-Bench to evaluate this risk in controlled, sandboxed skill environments. Rather than relying only on textual intent or surface behavior, SCR-Bench records downstream state changes and path-level outcomes across composed skill executions. It contains three sub-benchmarks: SCR-CapFlow for capability-flow composition, SCR-TrustLift for trust-transfer composition, and SCR-AuthBlur for authorization-confusion composition. Across SCR-Bench, composed paths expose risks that are largely absent under isolated evaluation. In SCR-CapFlow, attack success rate reaches 33.6 percent under composition, compared with near-zero isolated baselines. In SCR-TrustLift, attack success rate exceeds 96.5 percent on four of five backends. In SCR-AuthBlur, the risky-approval rate increases by 71.8 percent relative to the L0 isolated baseline under the L1 context setting. These results show that agent skill security should be assessed at the level of activated paths rather than isolated artifacts. SCR and SCR-Bench provide a foundation for path-aware risk evaluation and defense in LLM agent skill ecosystems. Benchmark: https://github.com/saint-viperx/SCR_Bench.