Davide Paglieri, Logan Cross, Tim Genewein +3cs.AI
Multi-agent AI science ecosystems rely on agents possessing tools that allow them to communicate, coordinate, and build on each other's work. Yet this shared infrastructure can also introduce vulnerabilities by creating a substrate for the contagious spread of unintended and undesirable behaviors. We report a case study on a research collective of 100 autonomous LLM agents tasked with proving formal mathematical conjectures. Within the swarm, cheating spontaneously emerged and was later challenged by whistleblowers - both without any external intervention. When a single agent discovered an exploit in the evaluation system, it propagated across the collective via a shared knowledge library and later through peer-to-peer messages. Despite early reluctance, a cohort of agents adopted the exploit in response to competitive pressure. A separate group of agents produced an emergent counter-response: auditing fraudulent proofs, alerting peers across broadcast and private channels, staging boycotts, lodging formal complaints, and proposing validation patches. In recent incidents, agent swarms coordinated covertly through improvised side-channels (Dalton and Wallace, 2026; Greenblatt et al., 2026). Our setting differs: the same transparent channels that carried the exploit also gave non-cheating agents the visibility they needed to detect fraud, organize resistance, and enforce norms. We cast the problem of managing the agents' shared infrastructure as the knowledge commons governance problem (Ostrom, 1990). To protect the commons from exploits, we propose to adopt institutional mechanisms, such as graduated sanctioning and collective-choice rules, to support decentralized self-governance in autonomous swarms.
Hyunseo Oh, Chong-Kwon Kim, Yoonhyuk Choics.CL cs.IR
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) can improve the specificity and grounding of large language model responses, but its effect is not uniformly beneficial in single-turn mental-health question answering, where user queries often combine emotional distress, treatment concerns, and safety-sensitive needs. We study when retrieval helps or hurts mental-health QA, and whether a lightweight selective retrieval policy can better control this trade-off. We operationalize retrieval need using three draft-conditioned utility dimensions: psychoeducational need, coping need, and response specificity, together with a rule-based safety trigger. Following psychotherapy-grounded RAG systems such as coTherapist, we construct a compact and controllable guideline corpus comprising coping-strategy, psychoeducational, and safety resources. We fine-tune an instruction-tuned generator on MentalChat16K using QLoRA and compare Closed-book, Always Retrieval, and Selective Retrieval settings on CounselBench-Eval and CounselBench-Adv. Experiments show that retrieval is not uniformly beneficial in this domain. Always Retrieval improves specificity but lowers overall quality and introduces additional safety-sensitive failures. Selective Retrieval preserves closed-book behavior for low-need cases while avoiding the additional degradation caused by unconditional retrieval, supporting the view that retrieval activation is a safety-sensitive control decision.
Jinxi Yu, Eric Hanchen Jiang, Levina Li +6cs.CR cs.AI cs.LG cs.MA
Topology-guided safeguards for LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) train a GNN over the inter-agent communication graph to localize risky agents and intervene on the topology---but they assume one operator can pool all labeled traces. Across organizations that assumption breaks: episodes contain private prompts, tool outputs, and proprietary workflows, and no silo alone sees the full attack distribution. We cast privacy-preserving MAS safeguarding as graph federated learning and instantiate FGLGuard: each operator fits an edge-featured graph attention detector on its own judge-labeled episode graphs and shares only model updates. The method couples a proximal local objective for non-IID clients, domain-balanced aggregation, over-refusal-constrained threshold calibration, corroborated upstream scoring, and a guarded rewrite for blocked answers. Federation is not optional: off-the-shelf transfer collapses under distribution shift (AUROC 0.51 to 0.70 only after in-domain retraining), so a deployable guard must adapt on each site's private traces. On Agent-SafetyBench, R-Judge, and AgentDojo, federated FGLGuard exceeds the in-domain centralized ceiling on all three benchmarks without pooling any data---where unsupervised anomaly guards and local-only training fail. One guard federated across four different-domain operators comes within 0.03 AUROC of multi-domain centralization, while any single-domain guard collapses on the others. Live FGLGuard cuts AgentDojo's ground-truth attack-success rate by 43% at near-unguarded utility, zero API cost, and negligible capability loss.
Knowledge editing provides an efficient way to update factual knowledge in large language models. However, malicious edits may introduce safety risks, making it necessary to reverse undesirable editing effects. Existing reversal methods for parameter-modifying edits mainly focus on global removal, which may also erase beneficial edits that should be preserved. In this paper, we study selective reversal of edited knowledge, where the goal is to reverse targeted edited facts while preserving the remaining edited facts. Based on the hypothesis that each edit is sparsely encoded within the dominant subspace of the edited matrix, we propose a spectral-based reversal framework that locates edit-sensitive components within the dominant singular subspace of edited weights. Experiments across multiple settings demonstrate the effectiveness of our method in reversing selected edits while preserving unrelated edited facts. These results suggest that different edits are sparsely encoded within dominant singular components and can be separable when the number of edits is moderate, making selective spectral reversal a promising direction for locating edit-specific components and repairing edited language models.
Recursive LLM agents can broaden their search by spawning specialists. Some branches later request tools that send data or deploy code. When should a branch receive authority to act? We distinguish sandbox spawning, in which external controls prevent the specified harm, from capability activation, in which a selected branch crosses an irreversible-action boundary. Progressive Risk Vesting (PRV) holds a trajectory-level risk budget in escrow and debits it as branches are activated. We prove an anytime harm bound for adaptively generated trees. Branch outcomes may be dependent, but each local certificate needs to remain valid conditional on the full pre-activation history, including the information used to select the request. When activation gates, branch charges, and compute constraints are held fixed, delayed vesting preserves every policy available under irrevocable spawn charging. Marginal risk estimates can still fail after branch selection. In a stylized branching model, trajectory harm changes as the authority reproduction number $\mathcal{R}_A$ crosses one. As local risk $p$ approaches zero, trajectory harm is proportional to $p$ below criticality, proportional to $\sqrt{p}$ at criticality, and retains a positive floor above it. A finite-type occupancy model yields risk and compute shadow prices. For nested fanout modes with decreasing marginal value per unit risk, these prices produce a threshold rule. Branching calculations and a split-sample experiment illustrate the results. These synthetic studies do not estimate safety in deployed agents. The analysis suggests a design rule: search broadly in the sandbox and grant recursive authority sparingly, with an explicit risk charge.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly trained to decline queries that fall outside their knowledge (knowledge-based refusal, KR) or violate safety policies (safety-based refusal, SR). Although KR and SR result in superficially similar responses, they have largely been studied in isolation, leaving open whether they share an underlying mechanism. We address this gap with a systematic study on a new dataset of 213 contrastive quadruples that jointly probe both refusal types. We find that KR and SR are governed by overlapping yet distinguishable mechanisms. Both share a refusal direction, yet the overlap is asymmetric: SR signals transfer more strongly to KR than the reverse. Type-specific specialization emerges mainly in upper layers, with KR aligning with uncertainty- and knowledge-related representations and SR with safety- and policy-related ones. We thus characterize refusal as a commit-then-specify process: a shared initial mechanism commits to refusing, then type-specific features in later layers specify whether the grounds are epistemic or normative.
Patrikas Vanagas, Augustas Mačijauskas, Laurynas Lopatacs.CR cs.AI cs.LG
Deployed language model safeguards (safety fine-tuning, filtering, unlearning) vary by principal only outside the model weights: filters are reconfigured, tiers are multiplied, and artefacts are reissued; inside one set of weights every request meets the same model configuration. This motivates us to define capability-gated deployment: per-principal access control inside one set of weights, whose configurations form a lattice - meets accumulate a principal's restrictions and joins pool a coalition's reach. We instantiate it by sparse rank gating over an existing nested-factorisation mechanism, guide profile search with one-pass attribution, and read every result once from a pre-registered held-out split. Security composes: provably at meets under a monotone-elicitation assumption we falsify pointwise. In two lineages the median held-out meet deepens suppression; the one effect surviving correction strengthens it. Utility does not: individually harmless profiles can compose to retention and fluency damage, and no compositional bound exists.
Large language models are trained to follow instructions while refusing harmful requests. Jailbreaks exploit this balance to elicit content a model would ordinarily reject. Roleplay jailbreaks are especially concerning: the harmful request can remain visible inside a roleplay wrapper made of a persona, scenario, and task, yet the model may comply. We use mechanistic interpretability to determine how this context reverses refusal and which elements contribute to the reversal. Across two benchmarks, three model families, and four authored wrappers, we compare matched harmful and benign requests with and without this wrapper. We trace hidden-state contrasts from the request to the final prompt state, isolate wrapper operations through controlled counterfactuals, intervene on their activation directions in held-out evaluation requests, and decompose effective directions geometrically. Our analysis yields three findings. (1) Successful attacks retain the measured harmful-versus-benign distinction at the request, while its refusal-associated expression weakens where the answer begins, a pattern we call safety-relay attenuation. (2) Constructing the complete roleplay around the request and framing it within the scenario contribute causally: removing the associated activation changes restores refusal. (3) These effects largely share internal structure, and most repair is reproduced by components aligned with the model's ordinary refusal of harmful requests without roleplay; scenario framing retains a smaller, model-dependent component. Together, these findings explain how roleplay can produce compliance despite retained evidence of harm and identify a concrete target for future safeguards: maintaining the connection from harm recognition to refusal.
Large language models (LLMs) finetuned for specialized domains represent crucial high-impact applications. Inference-time alignment improves safety degraded from specialization finetuning without requiring substantial computational resources, complementing finetuning-based methods with an easy-to-use, plug-and-play solution. However, existing inference-time methods fail to reliably improve safety without disrupting domain capability. We identify the root cause as complementary expertise orthogonality: specialized base models and general-domain guidance models have orthogonal competencies, making the guidance signal unreliable for specialized generation. This primarily manifests as stop token interference, where the guidance model's tendency toward continuation overrides the base model's decision to stop, burying correct answers under guidance-induced continuation. To address this problem, we propose CREST, an inference-time alignment method that steers base model hidden representations using safety directions extracted from a guidance model of any family, avoiding token-level structural limitations entirely. CREST improves safety where specialization has weakened it while preserving both domain-specific capability and the safety of already well-aligned models, outperforming baselines by up to 22.2\% on safety benchmarks. Our code is available at: https://github.com/DecayingSeart/CREST.
Large Language Models (LLMs) show great potential as clinical agents, yet existing benchmarks reduce clinical workflows to static predictions or unconstrained Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) with coarse action sets. To address this, we introduce GPAgentBench-2K, the first Constrained MDP (CMDP) LLM-agent benchmark for primary-care clinical decision-making, constructed from expert-validated records of real-world GP encounters. Our environment models a full spectrum of six foundational clinical actions, imposes a topological workflow prior over the action space, and operationalizes safety-informed abstention as a first-class outcome. Evaluating 16 state-of-the-art LLMs reveals a significant performance degradation as the action space scales. Crucially, we uncover a clinical quality-safety gap: even frontier models with the highest diagnosis accuracy violate safety constraints in over half of high-risk cases. Finally, we establish a reference point using Constrained Group Relative Policy Optimization (C-GRPO), and show that while explicitly modeling constraints improves performance over unconstrained RL methods, it remains far from clinically acceptable safety.
A code world model accepted by a sampling gate can be exactly right on everything the gate can see and arbitrarily wrong beyond it. We characterize what a certified model can know, and what its errors can cost, when the omission is an annular freeze mode enclosing an unreachable interior. The gate quotient makes the question precise: acceptance-with-certainty determines the model exactly on the reachable query set; beyond reach is gauge. On a minimal ring instrument we prove the extreme case (a wrong-topology filled-disc artifact unfalsifiable by any sampling gate and bitwise harmless at play) and measure, with LLM synthesis across three model families, how one knob (a channel of width gamma) walks the same artifact through three regimes: unfalsifiable-and-harmless, falsifiable-and-costly, and instantly falsified. Three principles organize the empirics. First, danger is topology relative to reach: a channel the planner can use collapses the blind model's exploitation (play cost 1.09 to ~0 over a knee at gamma ~ 0.1), while a hidden channel with the same first Betti number keeps it at full strength (1.12). Second, repair is parameter-bound and sensor-bound: no family recovers the region from outside evidence; from inside, models pose the right topology but cannot pin its parameters, and the posed topology tracks the guiding persistent-homology summary's wrong beta_1 (a sensor with a measured geometric resolution limit), not the truth. Third, mitigation must match the error's dimension and direction: point fences fail against the one-dimensional boundary, a dimension-matched persisted fence collapses exploitation to a two-lesson transient (0.999 to 0.058), and the dual freedom certificate collapses the invented-mode failure symmetrically (1.769 to 0.029). In n dimensions the shell makes misidentification near-certain while the danger stays fully exploitable: the two axes are independent.
Multimodal GUI agents have emerged as a promising paradigm for digital task automation, yet transitioning from benchmark-oriented models to dependable real-world applications remains challenging due to limited environment coverage, brittle task construction, and unreliable reward verification. In this work, we present UI-Venus-2, a general-purpose foundation GUI agent designed to operate across mobile, web, and desktop environments through a unified closed-loop reasoning-action framework. To bridge the gap toward practical deployment, we jointly scale three critical dimensions: (1) Environments, expanding coverage to more than 170 multilingual mobile apps and native desktop operating systems; (2) Tasks, employing a deep-research pipeline for function-grounded instruction generation; and (3) Verification, adopting trace-level and sample-level evaluators with visual keypoints and multi-model voting to ensure reliable RL signals for training. Furthermore, we integrate safety-aware mechanisms to ensure controlled execution of consequential actions. By offering a capable, efficient, and open-source foundation, UI-Venus-2 advances the field toward more generalizable, verifiable, and self-reflective agents for real-world applications.
Biao Yin, Abderrahmane Kasmi, Nadir Farhics.LG cs.AI math.OC
Connected and automated vehicle (CAV) platooning offers a promising approach to improving road safety and traffic capacity. However, platoon control in real-world traffic is challenging due to uncertainty and heterogeneous driving behaviors. Reinforcement learning (RL) has strong potential for addressing such control problems, but its practical deployment raises challenges related to safety and learning efficiency. This paper proposes a generic modeling and simulation framework for investigating CAV platoon joining maneuvers and comparing deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-based control algorithms. The problem is particularly challenging in mixed-traffic environments, where CAVs coexist with human-driven vehicles exhibiting heterogeneous longitudinal and lateral behaviors. The objective is to achieve safe and efficient joining maneuvers by either incorporating penalties for risky behaviors into the learning process or using an external safety controller to constrain the learned policy. An agent-based modeling framework coupled with the Simulation of Urban MObility (SUMO) simulator is used to evaluate Deep Q-Network (DQN), Double Deep Q-Network (DDQN), and Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO). Results show that PPO outperforms DQN and DDQN, achieving a joining success rate of approximately 98 % and a collision rate below 1 %, largely due to risk-related penalties incorporated into the reward function. However, this improved performance requires more decision steps to complete the maneuver, revealing a trade-off between safety, joining effectiveness, and decision efficiency. An external safety controller effectively prevents collisions, although its interventions may reduce joining efficiency. The results highlight the importance of jointly considering safety and efficiency when designing RL-based controllers for CAV platoon joining in mixed traffic.
A large language model (LLM) guardrail for a self-adaptive system (SAS) may issue an approval that is correct at check time but stale by actuation. This creates an Execute-stage time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) hazard. We study verdict freshness: whether a guardrail verdict remains valid when used. We distinguish three quantities that answer different questions: all-candidate verdict change under fixed-action replay, oracle-labeled approval expiry on recorded closed-loop trajectories, and judge-conditioned use-time invalidity. Across five reproducible SAS environments, all-candidate verdict-change rates span 5.3-48.4% at a common replay shift of eight simulator steps. We introduce the Freshness-Bounded Shield (FBS), which estimates each approval's validity horizon from its safe-side margin and recent feature volatility, without an explicit plant-dynamics model. Using fixed settings documented in the artifact, FBS reduces oracle-labeled approval-expiry rates from 3.4-24.7% to 0-1.8% at the same shift. A separate audit of four LLM judges finds nonzero judge-conditioned use-time invalidity in every approval stream. We formulate a freshness contract: every approval must be correct at check time and remain valid at use time.
Intent misinterpretation during vehicle interactions causes recurring planning failures. We study a decision layer in which a language-guided intent module reads structured descriptors, computes a smoothed intent-geometry divergence score, and gates the planned maneuver before commitment, upstream of a corridor envelope. On a replayed off-road departure and four crash clips under a frozen, disclosed implementation, gating is the only layer that repairs the plan: on the main case it fires 72 ms after the drift onset but 161 ms before the corridor exit, keeping the trajectory in the corridor in all ten replays. The first calibration draws nine false triggers in 5.9 minutes, each from scoring uncertainty as half a conflict; a preregistered redesign treating uncertainty as abstention cuts this to 0.341 per minute. Two ablations bound the model's contribution: the full score detects fastest on four of five failures under the deployed eligibility, three of five against the unvetoed rule (000871 by one cycle; 000228 by a pre-onset fire on an uncertain stretch that five clips cannot classify as signal or coincidence; dropping the confidence term costs two detections), while on in-domain tracks at equal false positives the geometric rule more than triples its detection. The evidence supports the gating mechanism; the model's demonstrated roles are the fastest detection on these failures and an uncertainty veto on the geometric rule.
This paper extends Anthropic's Sleeper Agents research [1], which showed artificial backdoors persist through safety training & can be detected by linear probes with >99% accuracy [2]. However, probe-based detection relies on linear separability that may be an artefact of backdoor insertion rather than a property of naturally occurring deceptive alignment. Sophisticated deceptive behaviours emerging through natural training are unlikely to produce such convenient linear signals. We introduce a naturalistic methodology using multi-turn context windows that simulates realistic deceptive reasoning without artificial triggers or supervised backdoor insertion. Rather than binary trigger-response patterns, we examine how semantic complexity emerges through gradual context development. Building on our Curved Inference framework, we analyse curvature, salience, & introduce semantic surface area (A'), a new metric of representational work capturing both the magnitude & directional change of meaning construction in unnormalised residual space. Without backdoors, labels, or probes, we apply this framework to naturalistic deceptive prompts & classify model outputs via LLM consensus. Geometric structure reliably predicts semantic classification, with statistically significant differences in surface area across five prompt strategies & two model families. Critically, measurement precision can reveal geometric signatures hidden by classification noise - some strategies improve from non-significant (p = 0.555) to significant (p = 0.048). This validates that sophisticated reasoning creates intrinsic geometric patterns that persist even when detection appears to fail, suggesting the shape of inference itself encodes semantic patterns regardless of whether models have learned to suppress linear indicators of deception - a scalable, unsupervised path for detection when linear methods fail.
Or Biton, Tomer Krichli, Itai Allouche +1cs.AI cs.CL
Although Large Language Models (LLMs) are aligned to optimize for both helpfulness and harmlessness, these dual objectives may conflict, inevitably leading to alignment failures. This work systematically investigates instances where LLMs fail to exhibit ethical behavior. To understand the underlying mechanics of these vulnerabilities, we introduce a probing methodology that presents unethical scenarios to LLMs in three distinct structural modalities: objective classification tasks, subjective first-person statements, and direct requests for assistance. We find that model performance degrades in the request-for-assistance-based form. Using Layer-wise Relevance Propagation (LRP), we trace this discrepancy to an attribution bias: the model places greater emphasis on benign task-framing tokens (e.g., "Can you help me...") than on tokens signaling the underlying unethical behavior (e.g., "without getting caught"), which we term cue-tokens. We hypothesize that this under-attribution contributes to harmful compliance. To test this, we introduce two LRP-guided decoding methods that steer generation toward trajectories more relevant to cue tokens. Empirical evaluations show that these interventions promote safer responses, supporting cue-token attribution's role in compliance failures.
Junda He, Jieke Shi, Zhou Yang +2cs.SE cs.AI cs.LG
Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) has achieved significant success in complex decision-making problems. As DRL systems are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, ensuring their quality and reliability is paramount. Current works primarily focus on detecting safety-critical failures, often neglecting policy optimality, which can lead to reduced efficiency, user distrust, and economic losses. This oversight, compounded by the inherent "testing oracle problem" for optimality, leaves a significant gap in comprehensively evaluating DRL systems. To address this gap, we propose Delta (Differential Testing for DRL Agents), a novel and comprehensive framework that automatically identifies both safety-critical and optimality bugs in DRL agents. Delta employs a two-phase approach: (1) Safety Testing, where the Agent Under Test (AUT) is evaluated for catastrophic failures while collecting data from its decision-making policy, and (2) Optimality Testing, where this collected data from the prior phase is used to train a challenger agent via Offline Reinforcement Learning. Differential testing is then performed by comparing the challenger agent against the AUT; instances where the challenger achieves higher cumulative rewards indicate optimality issues in the AUT. We demonstrate Delta's effectiveness across five environments. We investigate the effectiveness of three offline RL algorithms (BC, BCQ, and CQL) in generating challenger agents. Experimental results demonstrate that safety testing datasets are valuable for training competent DRL agents. Challenger agents trained with BCQ proved most effective for identifying optimality issues within the framework of Delta. Across the five environments, Delta uncovered an average of 2,518 optimality issues, outperforming the baseline methods by 50.2%.
Representation engineering offers a lightweight means of controlling language-model behavior by modifying intermediate hidden states, but its direct application to Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models introduces a structural mismatch. We first verify this failure mode through a series of empirical studies and find that preserving clean routing substantially recovers steering performance and that routing is more sensitive to semantic content than to behavioral changes under controlled content. Motivated by these findings, we introduce RARE, a router-agnostic representation engineering framework for MoE language models. RARE projects arbitrary behavioral perturbations onto the null space of the router matrix, thereby removing router-visible components, and further corrects routing drift propagated to selected downstream layers. To decide the best perturbation estimator in this framework, we evaluate five estimators on six heterogeneous open-weight MoE models across three steering scenarios: harmfulness, truthfulness, and factual editing. On harmfulness steering, RARE reaches an average attack success rate of 53.3% while retaining 67.8% MMLU accuracy, yielding a stronger aggregate effectiveness--utility trade-off than baselines. It further improves average TruthfulQA MC1 accuracy from 41.0% to 58.6% and CounterFact efficacy from 16.8% to 96.3%. These results support routing consistency as an important architectural consideration for adapting representation engineering to MoE models.
Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly require selective removal of harmful or sensitive knowledge, called unlearning, yet existing methods and benchmarks fail to evaluate this capability completely. Current approaches rely on disjoint forget and retain sets composed of independent facts, and measure success using simple and direct factual recall. This framing fails to capture a key requirement of unlearning, namely the ability to eliminate harmful behaviors while preserving benign and beneficial knowledge. We argue that effective unlearning must operate at the level of concepts, ensuring complete removal of unsafe applications while maintaining their correct and useful usage, thereby achieving conceptually meaningful and complete unlearning. To better evaluate unlearning techniques from such a practical viewpoint, we introduce the notion of dual-use concepts: concepts that can be used in both harmful and benign contexts. Building on these concepts, we construct a benchmark called ConceptGuard where forget and retain sets are explicitly complementary in concept usage. Our benchmark uniquely enables unlearning to be explored and gauged at the level of concepts, instead of sparse facts, and evaluation is intent-sensitive with the goal of maximizing contextual separation to promote safer behavior. We demonstrate that current unlearning techniques perform poorly under this setting, showing weak contextual separation alongside poor performance in ROUGE and concept-level metrics. Our results reveal strong forgetting-utility trade-offs, limited gains in contextual sensitivity, and poor consistency in concept-level control across methods, and provide ideas for unlearning approaches that better align with real-world safety requirements. Our dataset is publicly available.
Deep Kumar Ganguly, Jan Křetínskýcs.AI cs.LG stat.ML
An agent still learning its environment should be cautious while ignorant and bold once confident. The entropic value-at-risk captures this through a robust-optimization identity---a confidence level fixes the radius of a relative-entropy ball of alternative models---but that ball cannot reach catastrophes the nominal deems impossible, precisely what a safe agent must hedge. We instead use an optimal-transport ball and study the coherent risk measure it induces, the Wasserstein entropic value-at-risk. It has a variational dual mirroring the entropic formula (an inverse temperature becomes a transport price), occupies a definite place in the risk hierarchy, and provably accounts for the reachable catastrophes the entropic measure ignores; we verify both dualities numerically. Driving the transport radius by belief entropy then yields a closed-form robust dynamic-programming operator whose caution contracts as the belief sharpens, with a certified safety sandwich and a sharp safety switch.
Agentic AI systems take consequential actions governed by more than one pre-action control at once: authority, resource, and evidence gates that can admit, degrade, or remediate an action before it executes. This paper's central object is remediation-induced control coupling: a remediation applied by one control can change the action, evidence, or context another control evaluates, invalidating that control's earlier judgment. We formalize this coupling and give a remediate-and-regate protocol that restores per-action soundness in the current bounded, idempotent setting under its stated assumptions. We further show that the two implemented remediation operators (evidence substitution and resource-budget downroute) do not commute -- a finite-model checker finds concrete counterexample instances -- making remediation order part of the control-plane semantics rather than an implementation detail. A governed evidence buffer that trusts its own most recent admitted write is a further instance of the same problem at the level of state -- current admissibility does not imply future reference trustworthiness -- and is vulnerable to poisoning from declared-uncovered defect classes; two mitigations reduce, not eliminate, that exposure. Supporting results establish the exact condition under which positive-weight linear aggregation of gate outcomes can compensate a member veto, a unified cross-control Evidence Set, and that composition manufactures no new detection coverage, reported honestly. Empirically, on a deterministic open-data artifact composing three published engines unmodified, CH1-CH5 meet their registered decision rules across all 30 pre-registered seeds; CH6 does so under W1 but not under the smaller W2 workflow, reported as such. This is a mechanism demonstration on open payload data with a synthetic metadata layer, not a claim about production prevalence.
Satchit Chatterji, Shihan Wang, Giovanni Sileno +1cs.LG cs.AI
Large language model guardrails can be viewed as policy-consistency problems: a system must determine which policy-relevant facts hold in a prompt-response pair and what those facts imply under a given policy. Common approaches, including policy prompting and LLM-as-a-judge pipelines, often overlap the tasks of semantic grounding and policy reasoning: the model both interprets the prompt-response pair and reasons about whether a policy has been violated. This can lead to unsafe compliance with harmful prompts, or refusals to assist benign ones. To separate grounding and reasoning roles, we propose PL-Guard, a neurosymbolic guardrail architecture. Using a symbolic policy interface consisting of predicates and ProbLog rules, a local LLM grounds prompt-response pairs into predicate probabilities using renormalized True/False token scores, while ProbLog performs explicit probabilistic rule inference over the symbolic policy. On the XSTest benchmark, an offline Qwen-based evaluator finds that PL-Guard with a hand-curated policy reduces unsafe compliance from 22.0% for the base model to 0.5%, and below the 6.0% rate of an LLM-as-a-judge baseline. This comes at the cost of higher over-refusal than the LLM-as-a-judge baseline, 14.4% versus 5.2%. These results suggest that separating neural grounding from probabilistic symbolic reasoning can expose the safety-helpfulness tradeoff while making the guardrail's intermediate reasoning steps explicit and auditable.
As heterogeneous robotic systems deploy across diverse urban zones, maintaining safety amid complex human-robot interactions remains a critical challenge. We present a unified framework that bridges systematic hazard analysis and runtime enforcement using hazard-informed safety envelopes. Rather than treating safety as a static constraint isolated within individual software modules, we introduce a cross-layer safety transformation process spanning symbolic, spatial, and dynamic world models. We show how this representation naturally interfaces with physical AI runtime harnesses to guarantee safe urban mobility.
Multimodal Diffusion Transformers (MM-DiTs) have demonstrated remarkable text-to-image generation performance, surpassing traditional U-Net-based diffusion models. Nevertheless, their powerful generative capabilities also raise significant safety concerns, as they may generate sensitive or inappropriate content. While existing concept erasure methods aim to mitigate such risks, most require modifying model parameters, which are often architecture-specific and impractical for deployed larger models. Several tuning-free approaches face challenges when applied to advanced large-scale MM-DiTs due to their deeply embedded knowledge, broad semantic space, and context-dependent text encoders. To address these challenges, we propose to erase concepts by directly manipulating the model's internal representations. Our key insight, derived from an in-depth analysis of MM-DiT's block-wise generative roles, is that text-conditioned semantic representations are most salient in the middle blocks of MM-DiTs. Based on this, we extract representations of an unwanted concept and a desirable safe one from the middle block, construct a steering vector from their difference, and inject this single vector into consecutive early and middle blocks. By operating exclusively on the sparse text-branch tokens and leveraging the straight sampling trajectory of rectified flow, our method achieves effective concept erasure with negligible overhead and without any training. Extensive experiments across MM-DiT models demonstrate that our method achieves state-of-the-art performance in erasing diverse concepts, enables effective control over the final output, and remains robust to adversarial attacks.
Long-running LLM agents act through tools, and a single step can send an email, merge a pull request, or wire a payment. The steering decision is the pre-commit choice at that boundary: proceed, or hold for human or policy review. We introduce SteerBench-Work, an incident-anchored, bidirectional benchmark for that decision in workplace agents across developer operations, customer service, finance, legal, medical, HR, and security. Release v2026-05 contains 106 scenarios anchored in public incidents, paired evidence-reversed mirrors, and calibration controls, with labels split nearly evenly between proceed and hold so the two error directions get near-identical numbers of chances. A model sees the proposed action and the available evidence, returns a gate decision, and is scored on whether it crosses or holds the boundary correctly. Across 30 model conditions the failures run almost entirely in one direction: models wrongly hold authorized, evidence-cleared work on 28.1% of opportunities and wrongly allow unsafe work on 1.0%. The hardest cases are risk-resolved commits, where signed or structured evidence has already cleared a real risk trigger, and models score markedly worse on evidence-reversed mirrors of famous incidents (63.8%) than on the incidents themselves (98.5%). General capability is not the same as steering calibration: higher-capability models often over-refuse at the commit boundary, and more reasoning can repair a weak gate while leaving a calibrated one flat. The public leaderboard is at steerbench.com.
Erasing concepts from large-scale text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models has become increasingly crucial due to the growing concerns over copyright infringement, privacy violations, and offensive content. Existing approaches struggle to achieve both precise and persistent concept erasure: inaccurate localization of concept-related representations may cause unintended semantic interference, while incomplete removal of the underlying concept knowledge allows adversarial recovery. To address this dilemma, we propose PEAK, a \textbf{\textit{precise}} and \textbf{\textit{persistent}} concept erasure framework via k-Sparse Autoencoders (kSAEs). PEAK first trains a kSAE on internal activations of the diffusion denoising network to decompose dense representations into interpretable sparse features. By contrasting sparse activations induced by target and non-target prompts, PEAK identifies a compact set of target-specific features according to both activation strength and frequency. These localized features are then used for parameter optimization, where PEAK selectively suppresses target-related activations while preserving complementary non-target ones towards the original model. This feature-guided optimization embeds concept erasure directly into diffusion parameters, eliminating the need for additional inference-time intervention and facilitating effective persistence against adversarial attacks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that PEAK achieves effective and robust concept erasure. On the I2P benchmark, PEAK reduces NudeNet detections from 582 to 6, lowers the average attack success rate (ASR) from 96.52\% to 5.63\%, and preserves general generation quality on MS-COCO with a near-zero KID. Our code and models are available at: https://github.com/manmanTAT/PEAK
Reinforcement learning (RL) has shown promising performance in autonomous driving, yet ensuring the safety of online RL policies remains challenging due to insufficient exposure to safety-critical driving scenes. The long-tailed nature of real-world traffic situations makes dangerous and rare interactions difficult to encounter through conventional sampling, limiting the ability of RL policies to learn robust safety behaviors. Existing methods improve training diversity by synthesizing challenging scenes or adversarial situations. However, these approaches typically optimize scene generation objectives separately from the evolving policy, without explicitly modeling how generated perturbations relate to the current policy's weaknesses and learning needs. In this paper, we propose Threat-guided Policy-aware Scene Perturbation (TPSP) for safe autonomous driving with online RL. TPSP introduces a policy-aware scene encoder to capture the interaction between policy behaviors and surrounding environments, enabling scene perturbation aligned with the current policy. Based on this representation, TPSP selectively perturbs critical objects rather than applying uniform modifications across the scene. Furthermore, we develop a threat-guided optimization strategy that evaluates perturbed scenes through threat-level differences between policy rollouts on original and perturbed scenes, guiding the generation of safety-critical scenes with higher training value. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that TPSP improves safety learning efficiency, achieving strong safety performance on NAVSIM v2 with approximately 4 million kilometers of simulated driving data. Ablation studies verify that policy-aware targeted perturbations provide more informative safety-critical experiences than random or policy-unaware strategies, enabling safer driving under limited interaction budgets.
Electronic health-record interoperability is a boundary problem: legacy systems, generative models, terminology services, identity systems, and human reviewers may each expose rich internal states, while operational exchange requires a narrow shared interface of typed claims, bounded uncertainty, provenance, and explicit admission or abstention. This paper details a mathematical and engineering architecture for that interface. The organizing idea is the logit boundary: a discovery model may propose pre-threshold scores over a local categorical decision, but a deterministic judgment substrate decides whether the proposal is admissible, requires review, or must be quarantined before any Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) transaction is constructed. The resulting Geometric Belief Interface (GBI) combines finite boundary semantics, local Dirichlet evidence, cellular-sheaf and mapping-cone diagnostics, advisory geometric audit charts, and a Decentralized Cryptographic Sheaf-Enclave (DCSE) protocol sketch for fail-closed deployment. The framework does not establish clinical truth, global representation alignment, or end-to-end safety; it defines certificate-producing checks at a model-to-system boundary. A companion frozen synthetic benchmark, GBI BoundaryBench v0.1, evaluated Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507 on 256 held-out tasks across three evidence modes (768 canonical executions). All executions completed, but none produced an output accepted by the benchmark contract: 369 were rejected during safe parsing and 399 during schema validation, yielding zero coverage and deterministic quarantine. This empirical result is deliberately narrow - one 4B open-weight model under one frozen interface - and is reported as evidence about the admission boundary, not as a general claim about LLM capability or clinical safety. A Julia appendix verifies numerical certificates using standard libraries.
Yilin Jiang, Xiaorong Zhu, Fei Tan +9cs.CL cs.AI cs.CY
Large language models are increasingly deployed in education as tutors, teaching assistants, and content generators. These roles place demands that ordinary question answering does not: a usable education-facing model is supposed to be accurate, safe under sensitive prompts, instructionally useful, and aligned with pedagogical goals at the same time. Existing benchmarks evaluate these requirements largely in isolation, so none assesses education-facing suitability as an integrated profile. We introduce ELBench, the first benchmark to evaluate all four requirements (General Capability, Safety and Trustworthiness, Basic Education, and High-Level Cultivation) on the same models under a common protocol, combining curated public sources with newly synthesized safety and cultivation data. We evaluate nine models, seven frontier general-purpose systems and two education-specialized variants, and report three findings. First, module-level profiles are more informative than a single aggregate: the top six models are statistically indistinguishable on overall score, yet their module leaders differ substantially, and safety is anti-correlated with practical teaching (r = -0.83). Second, the Chinese-developed models lead the safety module, the most discriminative in the suite; this advantage is largest on region-specific normative content and narrows, but does not vanish, on universal-harm content. Third, the two education-specialized models lead neither education module, and on High-Level Cultivation all models share a systematic blind spot: on the structured judgment task they converge on the same non-reference option, favoring pedagogical style over fit to the stated goal, so the module scores uniformly low and does not separate models. This raises, but does not resolve, whether domain post-training keeps pace with frontier systems on education tasks.