CUBICS: Situation-aware performance estimation for safety-relevant ML components

Machine learning (ML) is a key technology driving innovation today, but ensuring ML safety remains a major challenge for safety-related applications. A promising idea is to build proven-in-use arguments from field data, e.g. by running ML components (MLCs) in shadow mode or within safety envelopes so that their outputs can be monitored as 'safe probes' without affecting safety. These probes can then be used to build a statistical argument about field performance in a Bayesian way. However, many Bayesian field-data approaches in safety engineering model failures as a simple Bernoulli (or binomial) process with a single global failure probability and i.i.d. trials, which is rarely adequate for MLCs whose performance depends strongly on context. Statistical evidence is also about coverage of relevant situations, including edge cases, and building a single integrated statistical model for the entire system is usually not feasible. To address these challenges, this paper introduces CUBICS, a context-modular framework for per-component, situation-aware performance estimation of safety-relevant ML components. CUBICS partitions the operational design domain into situations and, for each safety-relevant component, defines a set of situation-specific assumptions and probabilistic guarantees that are represented and updated in a Bayesian manner using Subjective Logic (SL). By combining these guarantees with beliefs about how often each situation occurs, CUBICS derives an overall risk estimate for each component without requiring a monolithic system-level statistical model, and thus provides a building block for modular, field-data based safety assurance.

Do Not Forget the Obvious - RISC: A Risk-Informed Slice-Coverage Protocol for Safe Autonomous Driving

Aggregate metrics may not fully reflect performance in insufficiently examined high-risk driving conditions. We propose RISC (Risk-Informed Slice Coverage), a practical protocol for risk-guided stress testing and coverage-qualified evaluation. Risk-guided stress testing directs a finite audit budget toward risk-relevant sub-datasets, called risk slices, while coverage-qualified evaluation reports results together with explicit statements about which slices are sufficiently or insufficiently covered. The protocol translates safety concerns into machine-readable risk slices, uses lightweight signals to tag candidate data, selects a compact audit set by risk, and qualifies the results using coverage evidence. An LLM can optionally support this process by surfacing relevant but potentially overlooked conditions during test planning, thereby helping engineers not to forget the obvious. RISC is model-agnostic and can be applied to perception modules, driving models, and other autonomous-driving subsystems. We instantiate the protocol for monocular pedestrian perception using 1,000 frames from the Zenseact Open Dataset, image statistics, and a YOLO-based detector proxy. In this proof-of-concept study, risk-guided selection increases critical failure discovery from 34.0% under random sampling to 98.5%. RISC provides a lightweight, assurance-oriented evaluation layer that complements scenario categorization, coverage assessment, and broader testing-and-verification workflows.

From Operational Design Domain to Action: A Systematic Behavioral Taxonomy for Autonomous Driving

Operational Design Domain (ODD) specifications describe where an automated driving system (ADS) is permitted to operate, but they do not prescribe what the ADS must demonstrably do once deployed within that domain. This gap between operating condition specification and behavioral validation represents a critical unresolved challenge in ADS safety assurance. This paper presents a structured, standards-grounded taxonomy of 21 behavioral competencies organized across three operational domains-Highway (HWY), Urban (URB), and Hub (HUB)-derived systematically from the PEGASUS six-layer model-based ODD. Each behavior is decomposed along longitudinal and lateral control axes and characterized against a four-property framework: Safety (gap maintenance, conflict avoidance, kinematic stability), Compliance (legal rules and behavioral norms), Comfort (rider dynamics and trust), and Efficiency (mission completion and product-level metrics). We further demonstrate that the crossing of ODD layer parameterizations with behavioral competency specifications yields concrete scenario families suitable for systematic behavioral testing and SOTIF coverage evidence. The taxonomy is grounded in AVSC00008202111, SAE J3237, and SAE J3016, and is validated as an operational specification layer through its deployment in a rule-enforced trajectory optimization system. The Hub domain is identified as a structurally distinct, underspecified domain warranting dedicated research attention.

Validate the Dream Before You Trust Its Verdict: Admissibility for World-Model Simulators

Across robotics, World Models (WMs) are increasingly used to evaluate action policies by simulating the consequences of actions in an imagined world, and returning a success or safety verdict. Yet a verdict is only as trustworthy as the WM that produced it, and the WM itself needs to be certified. In video-generation WMs, fidelity metrics such as Fréchet Video Distance (FVD) reward visual realism, but ignore whether the world responds correctly to the policy's actions, including those unseen in training. Classical simulation-based validation assumes a trusted simulator evaluating an untrusted policy, whereas generative WMs are themselves unverified learned artifacts. Hence, we argue that any WM used as a test oracle must first be accredited before its verdicts can serve as evidence. Building on credibility practices from safety-critical simulation, including Verification, Validation & Accreditation (VV&A), Safety of the Intended Functionality (SOTIF), and scenario-based testing standards, we define an admissibility ladder (L0-L4) that a WM must climb before its closed-loop verdicts are accepted as assurance evidence. Our framework is embodiment-agnostic, and is instantiated in autonomous driving (AD), where assurance methods for traditional simulation are most mature. Applied to two driving WMs, the lower rungs reveal a reversal: the model that ranks higher on visual generation quality (L0) ranks lower on action-following (L1-L2), so visual fidelity does not predict the action-robustness a closed-loop verdict depends on.

I'm Sorry Driver, I'm Afraid I Can't Do That: Appraising the Safety of LLMs within Automotive Contexts

This paper appraises recent frameworks within AI development to integrate LLMs into control tasks in automotive contexts from the perspective of safety assurance. This work has built upon the rapid integration of LLMs across automotive settings. However, we find that at present, these frameworks face significant challenges, limiting their efficacy in real-time safety-critical contexts. Firstly, we consider conceptual challenges, including the fact that deployers are faced with a dual challenge, wherein they must assure a model which has been developed upstream, i.e. as general-purpose tools by the large AI labs, in a downstream context, i.e. into specific vehicle architectures. Secondly, we consider concrete challenges from across existing standards. We show that there are currently both fundamental engineering constraints covered in ISO21448, such as latency, and novel LLM-specific issues, such as alignment-related issues covered in ISO/PAS8800. We ground both examples in a concrete introductory, experimental case study exploring an existing open-source repository, Talk2Drive. We present a safety argument in order to make explicit the limitations of existing solutions. Nonetheless, given that the use of LLMs in automotive contexts is being explored at a technical level and operationalised, we propose potential assurance mechanisms for LLM-related hazardous events going forward.