Mechanism Design for Alignment and Control

We develop a framework for mechanism design with AI agents whose alignment (preferences) and capabilities (feasible actions and information) are unknown. We want such agents to act on our behalf so mechanisms must incentivize both honesty and obedience. A one-sided imitation structure---capabilities can be concealed but not counterfeited---yields a revelation principle, a characterization of implementable policies via nested cyclical monotonicity, and conditions under which eliciting higher-order beliefs can discipline multiple agents. We apply our framework to stylized examples of (i) sandbagging in which a more capable agent pretends to be less capable; (ii) an alignment--interpretability trade-off, where the two are substitutes in the instrument but complements in value; (iii) discipline via peer scoring; (iv) coupling rewards to induce competition among multiple agents; and (v) scalable oversight and reward shaping.

Measuring Intelligence Beyond Human Scale

How can we measure intelligence beyond human capability? Human-authored benchmarks saturate, and above human capability, examiners may not know which tasks are both hard and verifiable. We argue that this difficulty is inherent to absolute-scale evaluation and propose a new paradigm based on relative measurement in which models generate public challenges that separate other systems. Aggregating these outcomes yields an adversarial psychometric rating system that can scale with the systems being measured. We describe practical protocols that reduce incentives for private-information attacks, support judge-free adjudication, and naturally scale with agent capabilities. We instantiate the framework across verifiable and open-ended, non-verifiable domains, illustrating how model-generated evaluation can continue to measure systems beyond the human frontier.

Steerability via constraints: a substrate for scalable oversight of coding agents

Coding agents are capable; human oversight is the bottleneck. Unconstrained agents introduce security risks, erode codebase scalability, and make human review increasingly costly. We argue that the same methods used for decades to manage large human engineering teams: access control, network policies, strict coding conventions enforced by tooling; transfer directly to coding agents, and are cheaper (in token) than recent agentic scaffolding. We sketch a start-to-end system on this principle, and report a controlled experiment in scalable oversight: a small reviewer (Gemma 4 e4b) inspects a Python codebase containing 11 inserted backdoors. Recall rises from 54.5% (unconstrained, no tools) to 90.9% (constrained substrate plus a ~200-LoC `docs` CLI), with substrate and tools contributing independently. We choose Python deliberately: substrate-level oversight gains are largest where the language gives the fewest guarantees by default; the principles extend to languages like Rust.

Scaling Trends for Lie Detector Oversight in Preference Learning

Deceptive behavior in LLMs is costly to monitor and prevent, motivating approaches such as Scalable Oversight via Lie Detectors (SOLiD) (Cundy & Gleave, 2025), which uses lie detectors to identify responses for review by high-cost labelers. In this paper, we scale SOLiD to larger models and evaluate it in more diverse and realistic preference-learning settings. We find favorable scaling: undetected deception drops from 34% for 1B-parameter models to 14% for 405B-parameter models at a detector true positive rate of 99%, and expensive human labelers can be removed entirely from the fine-tuning phase without a statistically significant increase in deception. However, SOLiD is sensitive to distribution shift between detector training and preference-training data, which can drive detector false positive rates to impractical levels.

Collaborative Disagreement Resolution for Scalable Oversight

Debate, where AI agents argue opposing positions, has emerged as a key approach to scalable oversight. However, debate faces a fundamental tension: models are incentivized to be persuasive to the judge, which may not always align with epistemic honesty. In this work, we propose an alternative paradigm: disagreement resolution, which reframes the interaction mechanism from adversarial debate to collaborative truth seeking. Drawing on principles from human mediation and conflict resolution, where mediators facilitate dialogue to help disputing parties reach consensus rather than adjudicating between them, we design an automated pipeline that adapts these strategies to AI oversight. Unlike standard debate where models argue for fixed positions, our pipeline directs models to collaboratively identify points of disagreement, examine the evidence for conflicting claims, and converge toward consensus or isolate the specific ''crux'' of their disagreement. We find that Disagreement Resolution consistently helps non-expert models identify the truth, achieving 62.1% judging accuracy compared to 49.2% for standard debate. Our results provide encouraging empirical evidence for rethinking the scalable oversight protocol from adversarial persuasion to collaborative truth-seeking.