SENTINEL-RL: Offloading Topological Reasoning from LLM Agents in the Security Operations Center

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly proposed as autonomous SOC analysts, but two limitations make them unreliable at enterprise scale: a finite context window cannot hold a multi-thousand-host authentication graph, and free-form generation offers no guarantee that a recommended containment action is consistent with the topology it operates on. We present Sentinel-RL, an agentic-SOC architecture that decouples topological reasoning from semantic reasoning: a heterogeneous graph attention encoder summarizes the live authentication subgraph into a fixed-dimensional state, a Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) policy maps this state to a constrained set of investigative actions, and an LLM agent loop is restricted to consuming the policy's recommendations and producing analyst-readable narratives gated by a critic. We instantiate the system on the LANL Comprehensive, Multi-Source Cyber-Security Events dataset and the Indiana University Quartz HPC cluster, reporting four results: (i) a two-phase CREATE ingestion pattern loads a 24M-edge authentication subgraph into Neo4j in 14.2 minutes on a single 32-core node, roughly 24x faster than the canonical MERGE-based pipeline; (ii) a sliding-window alert engine reliably trips a 25-event/10-second threshold in <=2.5 s across 50 trials; (iii) PPO training over 200 iterations converges to a mean episodic return of 8.74+/-0.31, with held-out precision of 0.91 and recall of 0.87 on labeled red-team events; and (iv) the integrated containment loop completes a full detect-investigate-recommend-human-approve cycle in a median of 6.3 s. We contribute a reusable engineering pattern (the hot-node deadlock workaround), a portable HPC deployment pattern (anchor-node co-location), and an enterprise-readiness analysis covering false-positive economics, reversibility guarantees, audit compliance, and the human-approval boundary.

From Chasing Ghosts to Missed Attacks: Perspectives and Perceptions of SOC Practitioners on LLM Integration, Risks, and Readiness

Security Operations Centers (SOCs) process large volumes of security events, requiring analysts to accurately detect and assess ongoing cyberattacks under time pressure. Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) suggest potential benefits for security operations, yet their practical suitability for real-world SOC workflows remains poorly understood. To address this gap, we conducted 25 semi-structured interviews with SOC practitioners who had prior experience with LLMs, complemented by interactive scenarios to anticipate challenges and identify opportunities for the responsible integration of LLM-based tools into SOC workflows. We identified 15 LLM use cases grouped into six functional categories. While LLMs are valued for automating repetitive, low-level tasks such as report automation, practitioners rate high-impact tasks such as incident analysis as not yet feasible, reporting limitations in technical depth, context awareness, and organization-specific knowledge. They locate these limitations less in the models than in the readiness of their SOCs and human factors driving over-reliance. Despite concerns, practitioners express a strong willingness to adopt LLMs, describing competitive pressure that leaves few alternatives. This work contributes an empirical, practitioner-driven analysis of LLM use across SOC roles and organizations and derives concrete design and integration requirements for human-centered, operationally safe LLM-assisted security operations.

NLLog: Lightweight, Explainable SOC Anomaly Detection via Log-to-Language Rewriting

System-generated logs underpin security monitoring, yet their rigid template-based format hinders both automated analysis and human comprehension. We present NLLog (Natural-Language Log), a lightweight pipeline that deterministically rewrites parsed templates into WHO-WHAT-SEVERITY sentences, pools them with term-frequency-inverse-document-frequency weighting, classifies sessions with tree ensembles, and back-projects evidence with TreeSHAP for analyst review. On Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) and Blue Gene/L (BGL) corpora, NLLog exceeds two reproduced matched-protocol baselines; across HDFS, BGL, and the AIT Alert Data Set, it sustains low false-positive rates with commodity-hardware latency suitable for security operations center triage. Coverage, sparse-versus-dense, faithfulness, and adversarial ablations show that fallback sufficiency is corpus-dependent, that an enrollment-time coverage check can surface refinement requirements before deployment, and that an auditable deterministic rewrite combined with lightweight dense encoding provides a measurable representation layer for log-anomaly detection and triage.

Toward Autonomous SOC Operations: End-to-End LLM Framework for Threat Detection, Query Generation, and Resolution in Security Operations

Security Operations Centers (SOCs) face mounting operational challenges. These challenges come from increasing threat volumes, heterogeneous SIEM platforms, and time-consuming manual triage workflows. We present an end-to-end threat management framework that integrates ensemble-based detection, syntax-constrained query generation, and retrieval-augmented resolution support to automate critical security workflows. Our detection module evaluates both traditional machine learning classifiers and large language models (LLMs), then combines the three best-performing LLMs to create an ensemble model, achieving 82.8% accuracy while maintaining 0.120 false positive rate on SIEM logs. We introduce the SQM (Syntax Query Metadata) architecture for automated evidence collection. It uses platform-specific syntax constraints, metadata-based retrieval, and documentation-grounded prompting to generate executable queries for IBM QRadar and Google SecOps. SQM achieves a BLEU score of 0.384 and a ROUGE-L score of 0.731. These results are more than twice as good as the baseline LLM performance. For incident resolution and recommendation generation, we demonstrate that integrating SQM-derived evidence improves resolution code prediction accuracy from 78.3% to 90.0%, with an overall recommendation quality score of 8.70. In production SOC environments, our framework reduces average incident triage time from hours to under 10 minutes. This work demonstrates that domain-constrained LLM architectures with retrieval augmentation can meet the strict reliability and efficiency requirements of operational security environments at scale.