One common trade-off in the use of large language models involves reducing the size of the model while increasing the amount of computation at inference time, for example by using a wider beam search. In this paper, we examine the constrained case of this "model size vs. inference compute" trade-off, in which the model outputs are constrained by a strict grammar at inference time. Our results demonstrate that the constrained trade-off behaves differently from the unconstrained trade-off. We investigate the task of converting a prose query into an equivalent SQL query (text-to-SQL). Performance is evaluated on the Spider text-to-SQL benchmark, using the Qwen2.5-Instruct model family ranging in size from 0.5B to 7B parameters, all at 4-bit precision. We experiment with two approaches to varying inference compute: (i) beam search with a variable number of beams; and (ii) sample+vote, i.e., sampling several constrained outputs and then voting on their execution results, where the number of samples is varied. On the 1034-example development set, we find that: (a) both beam search and sample+vote improve accuracy, especially on smaller model sizes; (b) the "model size vs.\ inference compute" trade-off is not advantageous in this experiment, because moving to a larger model size typically results in higher accuracy than increasing inference compute on the same model size; (c) beam search outperforms sample+vote at a matched inference budget. This latter result is of particular interest since it contrasts with the findings of the unconstrained trade-off.
Francisco M. Arrabal-Campos, Francisco G. Montoya, Alfredo Alcayde +1cs.AI cs.CL cs.LG
A cognitive architecture is more than the module that reasons: it must also decide how long to think and what deserves the effort. We built a minimal but complete system - a recurrent reasoner with adaptive halting, a homeostatic control field, and a value module - and asked of each part: does this function emerge from gradient descent, or must it be computed? Competence emerges. Stopping appears to emerge too, and to be worth more than everything decidable in advance, but that appearance is instrumentation: payoff at matched mean compute climbs from 0.467 (uniform) through 0.546 (difficulty) to 0.698 (ex-ante value), and the further climb to 0.921 (posterior self-observation) does not survive audit. PonderNet-style halting returns a halting-weighted mixture of hidden states while forced-depth baselines return one, and the language head is trained on the mixture alone; equalizing the readout annihilates the apparent advantage of native execution (residual +0.000 [0.000, 0.000]). Value does not emerge: trained couplings capture zero of a payoff an explicit allocator captures completely (+0.151, routing correlation +0.79), so the second-order decisions that pay must be computed, at least where value is orthogonal to content, as here by construction. On a frozen LLM actuator the same instruments show self-consistency voting to be a measured bound (+0.0236 [+0.0150, +0.0326]) and inter-sample agreement nearly worthless as a stopping signal, its mass concentrating on wrong answers. Every null we assert carries a mechanism and a positive control, and the protocol is part of the contribution. Executing our own falsifiable prediction, value under commitment pays +0.1312 [+0.1124, +0.1502] in a cliff-cost family, some seven times the smooth-family estimate - not because the cliff shifts information ex ante, but because it multiplies the attainable range fivefold (5.1x [3.4, 8.2]).
Lizhuo Zhang, Mengmeng Tang, Chenfeng Long +2cs.CL cs.AI
Majority voting over multiple LLM samples is widely used to raise answer accuracy, yet its gain varies erratically: on hard questions it can even backfire. This paper gives a quantitative account of this failure. A pluralistic agreement index Gamma is defined as the expected fraction of the samples of a wrong run that agree with the consensus, normalized by a reference scale d=(1-p)/(C-1), and is decomposed into a mechanical component (what a vote delivers given only a per-case answer preference) and a preference-unexplained residual. The mechanical null is difficulty-matched and leak-free: each case is resimulated at its own accuracy and option preference, estimated from the case's other runs, so no run predicts its own agreement. On GPT-4.1 the decomposition shows benchmark-associated direction (an observational ordering over n=4 cells per benchmark, not a significance claim). On multiple-choice GPQA-Diamond, the per-case answer preference explains 81-93% of the held-out test-run agreement index: the shared-bias-dominates account over-claims here, because a wrong but attractive option the whole cohort latches onto is captured by the per-case preference channel (whether that preference is induced by shared training bias is not identified). On open-domain AIME, the mechanical preference explains only 59-78% (21-29% if shrunk to pure noise), and a preference-unexplained residual of 1.56-2.80 Gamma units survives, which a run-level preference-heterogeneity reference more than absorbs (1.4-2.1). A self-consistency backfire on hard questions is reproduced (binned voting gap down to -0.09, coupled CI [-0.12,-0.07]), and the highest-agreement bin reaches an accuracy of only 0.42-0.83, a 1.2-3.6x lift over base rate: agreement is graded evidence, not certification. No new voting method is proposed; code and evidence are committed and reproducible.
Matthew T. Ford, Francis Bahk, Jingjing Wang +4cs.AI cs.CL
Agents increasingly interpret a person's natural-language preferences by querying an LLM for numerical preference judgments, e.g., by asking how much the person would be willing to pay for an item. A growing body of work estimates a utility function from these judgments and then chooses actions based on their estimated utility. This pipeline assumes the judgments are approximately self-consistent: that a single utility function can reproduce them. But are they? To study this question, we measure the self-consistency of cardinal LLM preference judgments. For example, the difference in stated willingness-to-pay between two items should match the stated payment that makes a person indifferent to exchanging them. We develop statistical tests and interpretable measures of how far observed responses depart from the best-fitting self-consistent utility function. Experiments with flight, apartment, and hotel examples across six LLMs reveal large persistent inconsistencies. This suggests that LLM-derived preference judgments cannot be faithfully summarized by a single utility function.
Power Sampling sharpens a language model's distribution over complete generation trajectories, offering a verifier-free way to improve reasoning at inference time. It also has the potential to serve as a general-purpose front end for a broad range of downstream sampling methods. However, we uncover a striking paradox: Power Sampling can drive more probability mass toward correct trajectories while degrading the downstream inference it is intended to enhance. Using self-consistency as a representative case, we observe accuracy drops of up to 18.5 percentage points across models and reasoning benchmarks. We trace this paradox to two mismatches. Dose mismatch arises because a fixed exponent induces drastically different amounts of distributional change across problems. Coverage mismatch arises because global sharpening concentrates mass on a narrow set of dominant paths: high pass@k, often interpreted as evidence of preserved diversity, can therefore coexist with the loss of broad reasoning-path support required for downstream aggregation, search, and selection. Guided by this diagnosis, we replace uniform trajectory exponentiation with a deformation-controlled, support-preserving Power target that calibrates sharpening across problems while limiting the suppression of moderate-probability paths. In a same-budget instantiation with weighted self-consistency, the repaired sampler reverses the losses caused by global Power and outperforms standard multi-sample inference across reasoning benchmarks.
We propose claim-level falsification as a principle for test-time scaling and instantiate it through Claim-Level Reliability Assessment (CLR), a training-free framework that reallocates test-time compute from additional solution sampling to targeted verification. Since whole-trace evaluation often obscures decisive errors due to signal dilution from routine tokens, CLR condenses each reasoning trace into a compact set of decision-critical claims, thereby isolating its logical anchors. Furthermore, recognizing the inherent difficulty of generating entirely correct solutions under fixed model capabilities, CLR shifts the focus to semantic falsification. This approach exploits a fundamental asymmetry between solution construction and claim refutation. Constructing a valid solution requires a flawless reasoning path, whereas refuting an incorrect claim requires identifying only a single decisive flaw. This targeted search for negative evidence systematically compresses the survival space of high-confidence incorrect traces, effectively suppressing erroneous consensus via nonlinear reliability scoring. Across four LLMs and four reasoning benchmarks under matched budgets, CLR generally improves upon pass@1 and self-consistency. On GPT-OSS-20B/CMIMC25, for instance, CLR exceeds pass@1 by 27.15 percentage-points and raises self-consistency accuracy from 77.50\% to 82.19\% with 37.0\% fewer tokens.
Self-consistency via majority vote reduces per-problem accuracy on most GPQA Diamond problems for small instruction-tuned models: 56.6% of problems for Qwen2.5-7B and 65.7% for Llama-3-8B. The obvious remedy is a verifier-free confidence gate. This version reports that the most natural repair also fails, and separates three signal failures that v1 treated as one. A token-entropy gate fails for a measurement reason: averaged over a chain of some 602 tokens, the statistic is a measurement of the prose rather than of confidence in the answer. On Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct-Turbo, 198 problems at 64 samples each, a sample whose answer contradicts its own problem's plurality still emits that answer at a median margin of 20.52 nats, with 75.7% above 10 nats. Both quantities were pre-registered and tested once on 69 problems no exploratory analysis had read; both passed. The unit is the whole result: pooled across the benchmark the margin separates correct from incorrect samples by +0.0604 on the fraction above 10 nats [+0.0183, +0.1017], excluding zero; per-problem and paired it does not, at -0.0168 [-0.0527, +0.0182], crossing zero. The claim is not that token log-probabilities carry no information, but that a signal with real across-question discrimination is close to useless for the within-question decision a router faces. The plurality-agreement gate's failure remains without a mechanism, and we report it as an open problem. These new claims rest on one model: a registered second-model replication was sampled and could not be evaluated, and we report that rejection rather than the result. We separately report that on hosted serverless inference at a small budget, three reasoning-native models could not be evaluated, for three separately measured reasons; all three are downloadable, so this bounds what a metered per-token API buys rather than what is knowable.
Nikita Kozodoi, Zainab Afolabi, Jack Butlercs.LG cs.AI stat.ML
Test-time scaling improves LLM accuracy but multiplies inference cost, making the accuracy gained per unit of compute the metric that matters in deployment. Self-consistency is one of the established approaches, which spends this budget entirely on the output side by sampling repeated reasoning paths. We study Test-Time Augmentation (TTA), which extends self-consistency by also perturbing the input, aggregating predictions across transformed versions of the input, and ask whether input-side diversity converts compute into accuracy more efficiently than output-side diversity. We perform a systematic, matched-compute comparison: we evaluate three simple input-side strategies (semantic rephrasing, lexical perturbations, and visual transformations) across six datasets covering general and multilingual knowledge, mathematical reasoning, multi-modal question answering, and sentiment classification, against chain-of-thought prompting and self-consistency. Semantic rephrasing delivers consistent and statistically significant accuracy gains while Pareto-dominating self-consistency on cost-effectiveness, delivering roughly 1.8X more accuracy per dollar and outperforming it on five of six tasks. We further analyze the number of augmentations, multi-modal strategies, and base model scaling, finding that TTA is most cost-effective for mid-tier models where a stronger model is unavailable or too expensive. Our findings indicate that for current mid-tier LLMs, varying the input converts inference compute into accuracy more efficiently than varying the reasoning path alone. The TTA implementation is available at https://github.com/aws-samples/sample-genai-reflection-for-bedrock.
We independently reproduce two recent methods for making large language model (LLM) reasoning more reliable, and stress-test them across domains and models (RPC across four new task domains with Qwen3-8B, LCF across four 7-8B models). The first, RPC, aggregates token probabilities and self-consistency at inference; the second, LCF, trains projectors that split hidden states into "content" and "logic" and edits the logic part toward a valid region. Validating such reliability claims matters because the original evaluations are run by each method's own authors and were never independently reproduced or stress-tested across models and domains, and LCF shipped no public code. We re-run RPC's published-path aggregation and re-implement LCF's projector, contrastive, and intervention pipeline, then extend both to text-to-SQL, legal extraction, fallacy identification, and precedent grading, and probe LCF's representation directly. RPC reproduces the original grid exactly on the authors' released reasoning paths; on four new domains its edge over self-consistency is never significant (ties or small mixed differences, paired p >= 0.28), and on BIRD, the one domain where we vary the budget, the edge grows with K as predicted but its largest gap (+2.5 accuracy at K=32, p=0.16) reverses to -0.25 when we enlarge the sample to n=200. LCF's logic-validity direction is real but weak (0.82 separability at the single best sub-layer versus 0.95 for a semantic-attribute control); its one positive effect (Qwen3 $Δ$Prob) is not significant (p=0.56), while it significantly reduces $Δ$Prob on two of the other three models.
On-policy (Self-)Distillation (OPD / OPSD) has shown strong potential for post-training large language models (LLMs). However, existing methods still rely heavily on external supervision, including ground-truth signals, environmental feedback, or guidance from larger models, and therefore fall short of genuine "self"-distillation. In this study, we show that on-policy self-distillation can be achieved using only a model's own generations via internal consistency. We propose Unsupervised On-Policy Self-Distillation (U-OPSD). U-OPSD first samples multiple rollouts and constructs a pseudo-solution by majority vote under a self-consistency threshold. It then conditions a teacher distribution on the shortest pseudo-solution and distills it into prefixes of the model's longest incorrect completion, allowing the model to correct itself precisely where it is confidently wrong. Across diverse benchmarks, base models, and training settings, U-OPSD consistently improves over the base models and matches or surpasses supervised methods with ground truth (GT), such as OPSD and GRPO. On AIME24, AIME25, HMMT25, MATH500, and AMC23, U-OPSD improves over the base model by 8.5% and 10.7% on Qwen3 non-thinking mode at the 4B and 8B scales, respectively, and outperforms OPSD by an average of 3.2% and 2.3%. In thinking mode, U-OPSD remains on par with OPSD, outperforming it by 0.9% at 4B and matching it at 8B, while surpassing GRPO by 0.7% and 1.1%, respectively.
Omatharv Bharat Vaidya, Connor Thomas Jerzak, Zayne Rea Sprague +2cs.AI stat.ML
Self-consistency assumes the most frequent answer among sampled reasoning traces is the most reliable, but this can fail in causal reasoning: samples often repeat the same confounding error, and votes fragment across multiple valid answers, letting an invalid answer win despite a valid minority trace. We introduce CALVER (Causal Axiom-Level VERification), a training-free symbolic verifier that scores structured traces against Pearl's causal criteria, including -separation, backdoor adjustment, and intervention, and selects the highest-scoring candidate without consulting a reference answer. On CLEAR find-one-valid queries that admit multiple graph-valid answers, CALVER reaches 42.1% where plurality, a reward model, an LLM judge, and model confidence remain near 30% on identical frozen pools. Scaling the judge to 72B does not close the gap. In an audited clean-core subset, 11 of 21 graph-valid CALVER selections differ from the benchmark's listed answer while still satisfying the requested predicate. The advantage widens with the sampling budget and reproduces across ten published Bayesian networks, a second model family, and settings where the model must build the graph from text. CALVER also improves thresholded average-treatment-effect decisions against exact ground truth, generalizes to logic under a truth-table checker, and scores each candidate in milliseconds on CPU. CALVER needs only a causal structure, supplied outright or built from the text; wherever that holds, selection can aggregate via causal validity.
Preference optimization improves mathematical reasoning in large language models (LLMs), but reliable chosen-rejected pairs usually require verified answers, human annotations, or external reward models. We investigate whether preference supervision can instead be derived from the model's internal representation geometry in a semi-supervised setting. Our analysis shows that reasoning trajectories generated across different mathematical problems form structured global point clouds in which correct and incorrect trajectories exhibit different geometric organization. Based on this observation, we propose Cloud-ScPO, a topology-guided preference-mining framework that uses a small labeled set to construct multiple correct and incorrect reference Clouds. Each trajectory is represented by a mean-pooled hidden state and scored against connectivity-induced components using a component-level soft $k$-nearest-neighbor measure averaged across reference banks. We combine this cross-problem Cloud signal with prompt-level self-consistency: self-consistency determines the answer-level preference direction, while Cloud scoring selects concrete trajectories and filters pairs by their score margin. Experiments on GSM8K and MATH-Numeric across four model settings show that Cloud-ScPO consistently improves over ScPO, with gains of up to 4.49% on GSM8K and 4.19% on MATH-Numeric. Pair-level analyses further show that Cloud-ScPO maintains comparable correctness reliability while more effectively separating informative chosen trajectories from incomplete, repetitive, or otherwise low-quality rejected responses.
Large language models (LLMs) can generate fluent reasoning traces that nevertheless lead to incorrect answers, making response-level uncertainty estimation important for abstention, human review, and adaptive compute allocation. Existing approaches generally fall into three categories: passive single-trace methods use token-level confidence signals, sampling-based methods compare multiple complete traces at higher generation cost, and active prefix-based methods probe partial traces to study answer stabilization or preference transitions. However, none actively re-elicits an answer from a completed reasoning trace to measure its consistency with and support for the original answer. To address this gap, we introduce Trace-Conditioned Answer Consistency (TrAC), a correctness-supervised uncertainty quantification framework that combines active and passive signals anchored to one completed reasoning trace. Its active component, Prefix-Conditioned Elicitation (PCE), re-elicits a short answer conditioned on the completed trace and represents both its consistency with the original answer and its token-level probabilistic support. Its passive component, Trace Uncertainty Profile (TUP), summarizes how token-level uncertainty evolves throughout the original generation without additional decoding. A lightweight head then integrates the two representations into a response-correctness score. Across five mathematical reasoning benchmarks and three LLM families, TrAC improves macro AUROC by 1.8% and reduces AURC by 3.4% relative to eight-sample self-consistency, while using one complete reasoning trace and a short cached answer probe. When eight samples are already available, augmenting sample consensus with re-elicitation further improves macro AUROC by 4.3% and reduces AURC by 8.3%, without additional full-trace generation.
Itamar Pres, Belinda Z. Li, Laura Ruis +6cs.CL cs.AI
Despite ever-increasing sophistication in language model (LM) pre- and post-training pipelines, many important failures persist: models overcondition on user framing ("sycophancy"), exhibit incomplete logical generalization, and produce confident but incorrect responses. We argue that these failures arise from a modeling assumption permeating all aspects of the pipeline: that behavior can be specified and evaluated independently on single-output pairs. Many model failures are difficult, if not impossible, to detect without reasoning about relationships between a model's responses across inputs. In this position paper, we propose self-consistency as a framework for understanding these failures. We first observe that a wide variety of techniques designed to improve specific aspects of LM behavior-targeting properties as diverse as adversarial robustness and factual coherence-can be understood as special cases of a common "consistency optimization" procedure and addressed with a standard set of optimization tools. We next outline a set of new model properties that could be achieved by optimizing for consistency, and conclude with a discussion of what it would mean to develop generally consistent LMs, including the capabilities they would enable and the objections they raise.
Large Language Models (LLMs) explore problems through chain-of-thought, but this exploration is buried in unstructured prose. On high-stakes tasks, users cannot tell which steps are well-supported, which alternatives were seriously considered, or how the final conclusion compares to those the model discarded. We propose a framework that ensembles the reasoning structure, not just the answers, of multiple LLMs by weighted merging of Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) extracted from reasoning chains. We weight each step by how many traces independently attest to it, to return "Consensus Reasoning". Across six benchmarks spanning statutory interpretation, graduate-level science, narrative multi-hop reasoning, and first-order logic, our ensemble outperforms a matched-budget majority-vote baseline, with a maximum accuracy gain of 3.1% on MuSR-MM (narrative multi-hop reasoning). On a single model, the framework matches or exceeds self-consistency at the same trace budget while additionally exposing an inspectable consensus reasoning graph. Ensemble weights correlate with LLM-judge rankings of reasoning quality at Spearman $ρ= 0.30$-$0.51$, and consensus subgraphs are preferred over alternatives leading to the majority-vote answer in 54.4-65.4% of head-to-head comparisons across five of six datasets. We observe that our framework can also be used to analyze diverse reasoning perspectives for a problem.
Mohammad Arvan, Hossein Haeri, Natalie Parde +1cs.CL cs.AI cs.HC
We describe the UIC-AIHealth4All system for ArchEHR-QA 2026, a shared task on grounded question answering from electronic health records. We participated in Subtasks 2 (evidence identification), 3 (answer generation), and 4 (answer-evidence alignment). For Subtasks 2 and 3, we propose an answer-first pipeline in which the model generates candidate answers citing specific note sentences before classifying the full evidence set, exploiting the asymmetry between judging relevance in the abstract versus relative to a generated answer. For Subtask 4, we apply self-consistency voting over five independent model calls, retaining links by vote threshold. Our pipeline ranked third on evidence identification (Strict Micro F1 62.90), ninth on answer generation (Overall 31.90), and fifth on answer-evidence alignment (F1 79.81). A post-hoc linguistic analysis of 45 stylistic features reveals that model outputs remain 3.2 Flesch-Kincaid grade levels harder to read than clinician-authored references despite matching their word and sentence counts, suggesting readability warrants explicit optimization in clinical NLP systems. Code and prompts are available at https://github.com/mo-arvan/archehr-qa-2026-uic-aihealth4all.
With the rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs), modern systems not only possess strong foundational capabilities and extensive knowledge, but can also solve complex problems via long, multi-step reasoning. However, as reasoning traces become longer, LLMs may produce a substantial amount of hallucinated content during the reasoning process, which is often difficult to detect. In this work, we conduct a fine-grained analysis of hallucinations arising in LLM reasoning and find that the reasoning traces are particularly prone to Context-Sensitive Factual Hallucinations: cases where the model actually has the relevant knowledge, yet makes factual errors due to contextual interference during reasoning. To address this issue, we propose Step-level Self-Consistency Group Relative Policy Optimization (SSC-GRPO), which assigns step-level rewards to reasoning traces by computing self-consistency scores of individual steps across multiple rollouts. Compared with prior methods, SSC-GRPO achieves state-of-the-art performance on both mathematical reasoning benchmarks and hallucination leaderboards. Our results offer a new perspective for detecting and mitigating hallucinations in the reasoning process of large language models.
Test-time collaboration, including self-consistency, best-of-N selection, critic models, and verifier pipelines, is often credited with broadly improving LLM reasoning, yet its gains are uneven and sometimes negative. We ask when training-free collaboration should be expected to help. For a fixed candidate pool, we decompose a selector or verifier's net gain into measurable factors: recoverable mass, verification-signal coverage, conditional selection quality, and harm to already-correct outputs. This reframes collaboration as a candidate-selection problem rather than as an intrinsic property of a multi-agent topology. Across LiveCodeBench, MATH Level-5 hard subjects, and GPQA-Diamond, gains are bounded first by the oracle gap and then by signal fidelity, which we measure directly as candidate-level agreement between verifier verdicts and official labels. On LiveCodeBench, a public-test verifier (MCC 0.825) gains +8.14 percentage points (pp) over a first-sample baseline; a generated-test verifier (MCC 0.248) improves by +2.70pp and is not statistically distinguishable from an LLM selector, but operates at near-zero harm versus the selector's 4.69% harm rate. On MATH, a symbolic answer-equivalence selector beats self-consistency by +4.67pp, while LLM selectors are negative. On GPQA-Diamond, recoverable mass is only 3.03% and 87.54% of candidate pools are answer-identical; a weaker model's pools shrink both further, suggesting that oracle gap is a joint property of task, model, and sampling configuration. Our framework yields a practical pre-deployment diagnostic: estimate the oracle gap, then measure coverage, signal fidelity, and harm before investing in collaboration.
Patrik Wolf, Thomas Kleine Buening, Andreas Krause +1cs.CL
In-context learning is commonly interpreted as a form of conditional inference, in which the prompt specifies a context and the model's output is treated as an estimate of the corresponding conditional distribution. If this interpretation holds, then LLM estimates should satisfy basic probabilistic identities. In particular, the law of total probability asserts that prior-weighted conditional distributions aggregate into population-level marginals over any valid partition of the population. In this work, we investigate to what extent LLM estimates adhere to this self-consistency principle. We use binary trees as an evaluation scaffold to recursively partition a population into increasingly fine-grained subpopulations. We then prompt LLMs with verbalized subpopulation descriptions in context, aggregate the resulting estimates back into population-level estimates, and compare them across partitions of varying granularity. Applying this protocol across problem domains and state-of-the-art frontier models, we show widespread violations of basic consistency properties. An in-depth study of persona prompting reveals a pattern we call the macro fallacy: estimates reconstructed from more fine-grained subpopulation responses are often better aligned with human reference data than direct population-level estimates. This effect persists across variations in tree structure and estimation task, and can be partially recovered through implicit prompting. Together, these findings suggest that models possess relevant subpopulation knowledge but do not reliably propagate it into aggregate estimates. This gap establishes statistical self-consistency as an unsaturated, reference-free criterion for evaluating LLMs.
Selecting the correct answer from a pool of candidate reasoning chains is the engine of test-time scaling, yet the standard selectors each carry a cost: self-consistency inherits the errors of the single model it resamples, and trained reward models need labeled data and transfer poorly off-distribution. We study a third signal, free at inference time: cross-model consensus, the degree to which independently trained models, each solving the problem once, agree on a final answer. We treat the panel as an LLM-jury, in which the verification signal is the structure of agreement itself, with no model scoring another's work. Across seven benchmarks it selects correct answers better than self-consistency and far better than a model scoring its own candidates: on competition math it closes the entire gap to an oracle selector, while self-scoring closes almost none. The mechanism is error decorrelation: independently trained models err differently, so their wrong answers scatter while the correct one accumulates agreement. We make this precise with a parameter-free law, derived in closed form, that predicts consensus accuracy from three measured panel statistics to a mean absolute error of $0.03$ and exposes the method's ceiling: a shared-error floor where models share a misconception, near zero on math but non-trivial on science. Against four trained verifiers spanning discriminative, outcome, and generative reward models, the free LLM-jury matches the strongest inside their math training domain and is the top selector outside it. Cross-model consensus is thus a verifier we can characterize in advance: a law that says when to trust it, and a floor that marks where it cannot.
Test-time scaling (TTS) reliably improves reasoning in large language models, but whether it transfers to small open vision-language models remains unclear. We examine this on EXAMS-V, a multilingual visual multiple-choice benchmark, comparing self-consistency, describe-then-reason with PRM-guided beam search, and two post-hoc selectors across Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct and Qwen3.5-4B. What matters is the conditions under which TTS runs, not the search or verification machinery. The largest factor is parseability: an early prompt format left many chains reasoning correctly yet never committing to an answer letter, which a standard answer cue and a guided repair step largely remove. A larger decoding budget removes the rest: raising the per-chain token limit from 1k to 2k recovers 3.7 pp, whereas sampling more chains (8 to 16) adds only 0.15 pp. Once chains have room to finish, elaborate methods contribute little: PRM-guided beam search trails plain self-consistency by 0.39 pp at over eight times the cost, and neither a training-free generative critic nor a trained multimodal PRM beats majority vote across both policies. The largest gain comes instead from the policy model itself (+11.4 pp). Our best configuration reaches 84.1% on the held-out ImageCLEF 2026 test split, ranking first on the Visual MCQ leaderboard.
LLM-as-judge (Zheng et al., 2023) is increasingly the default for evaluating AI systems in enterprise pipelines, often scaled to ensembles (Verga et al., 2024) or "mixture-of-experts" (Shazeer et al., 2017) panels of judges. These systems share a key assumption: that consistency -- agreement among judges, or among a model's own samples -- indicates correctness. We show this assumption is unreliable. Agreement is not accuracy: a model can agree with itself, and different models can agree with each other, out of shared bias, a memorized heuristic, or an option-position prior rather than truth. We ask when agreement is nonetheless a usable proxy, in a large-scale cross-runner study: 53 runners drew K=50 samples for assigned overlapping cases across comparisons of model tier, prompting, and scale on GPQA Diamond and AIME -- 265,000 samples. Using majority-correctness as the deployment label and a hierarchical runner-clustered bootstrap, agreement is a positive but weak predictor (rho 0.20-0.59, all positive under item-clustered resampling) whose usefulness is regime-dependent: best for unsaturated mid-tier models and for allocating compute, and worst -- over-confident yet no more accurate -- for the most consistent frontier model (agreement >=0.8 on 77% of GPQA case-result entries, 48% of those wrong). An exploratory cross-family check on three Claude tiers shows the same frontier over-confidence, with confident errors recurring across providers above a marginal-preserving null. Self-consistency is thus a conditional proxy for correctness, not a standalone confidence score. We publicly release the de-identified per-run rows and answer distributions.
Large-Language Models (LLMs) can be prone to flawed and unfaithful reasoning that decoding strategies like Self-Consistency (SC) fail to detect as they evaluate only final-answer agreement while ignoring the logical validity of intermediate steps. This raises three fundamental questions: How can we reliably quantify uncertainty in LLM reasoning? Can semantic, structural, and causal awareness select more faithful reasoning compared to naïve majority voting? and How robust is reasoning topology under adversarial conditions? To address these questions, we introduce GRAPHEVAL, a graph-based reasoning framework that re-frames uncertainty quantification (UQ) as a holistic reasoning fidelity problem. We propose a novel UQ metric, Graph Reasoning Coherence Score (GRCS), that quantifies semantic-structural consensus of the reasoning space and captures pathological mode collapse and confident hallucinations. We find that GRCS is the only metric that is consistently negatively correlated with reasoning faithfulness across both more capable and smaller models. Additionally, we introduce Graph Self-Consistency (GSC), a medoid-based decoding strategy that trades nominal accuracy for reasoning fidelity, exposing the degree to which SC is inflated by unfaithful lucky guesses in smaller models, while preserving or improving accuracy in more capable ones. Finally, through adversarial medoid ablation, we demonstrate that the GSC-selected path acts as a "load-bearing path" and forcing models away from it degrades reasoning faithfulness and, in targeted cases, causes drops in accuracy.
Many decoding methods for large language models can be understood as shifting probability mass toward outputs that are more likely under the model, either locally at the token level or globally at the sequence level. Therefore, their success depends on a fundamental question: when does sequence probability, that is, the conditional probability of a continuation given a prompt, actually align with correctness? In this paper, we set out to quantify this relationship across decoding methods, models, and benchmarks at four levels: across decoding methods, across hyperparameters within a method, across prompt-answer pairs within a dataset, and across repeated responses to the same prompt. We find that higher sequence probability is often predictive of correctness across prompt-answer pairs within a fixed dataset. However, this relationship does not generally transfer to decoding decisions: increasing sequence probability by changing hyperparameters or methods does not reliably improve accuracy. Further, sequence probability is not a good indicator of correctness for responses to the same prompt. These findings clarify when decoding can and cannot be expected to improve correctness, and provide practical guidance for decoding, self-consistency, and verifier-free self-improvement.
An oracle that tells you the probability of some future event can change that very probability because you act on the answer. We argue that this performativity is OK as people consult oracles to be informed, and hence moved, by the answer. We worry about instead that asking for a self-consistent answer, one that still holds once it has been announced, may leave the oracle with several answers to pick from, and whichever rule it uses to pick is a lever it could learn to pull. We propose to take away that choice: The oracle reports a credal set instead of a point estimate, which lifts the oracle's reaction function to an isotone operator on a lattice. We make the oracle report that operator's least fixed point, which exists because of Knaster and Tarski. As that answer is fixed by a rule laid down in advance, nothing is left to choose by the oracle. We show that solution exists, is self-consistent, is never empty, can be computed by iterating from below, and equals the ordinary point estimate if the question is not performative after all. For simple queries about probabilities, we propose to restrict answers to intervals and show that, under a mild monotonicity assumption, the answer is simply the interval from the no-information baseline to the self-fulfilling equilibrium one would end up at by iteratively querying a point oracle until the answer is self-consistent. As our proposal is purely order-theoretic, it carries over unchanged to arbitrary random variables and to bounded continuous statistics of their law. Finally we show that a fixed finite family of polytopes suffices to approximate every answer uniformly, which turns the construction into a terminating computation. We close by placing the construction inside the Scientist AI programme, where it offers a choice-free criterion for a step that programme currently hands to audited human judgement.
Prompt-based spoken language understanding (SLU) with large language models (LLMs) often suffers from inconsistent intent--slot structures due to decoding stochasticity, particularly in multi-intent scenarios. In view of this, we propose Semantic Frame-Level Multi-Task Self-Consistency (SFL-MTSC), a novel structured aggregation framework operating at the semantic frame level. Instead of output-level majority voting, SFL-MTSC decomposes predictions into intent-specific frames, applies domain--intent grouping and slot-level clustering, and evaluates cluster reliability using path support scoring. Reliable frames are retained and re-integrated to form the final prediction. Zero-shot experiments on the MAC-SLU benchmark dataset show improved slot F1 and overall accuracy over single-path inference, while intent accuracy remains largely stable across most settings.
Itamar Pres, Laura Ruis, Melat Ghebreselassie +2cs.LG cs.AI
Language models (LMs) that faithfully describe their own behavior can more easily be audited, understood, and trusted by users. This paper describes Self-Consistency Training with Reinforcement Learning (Self-CTRL), a method that optimizes for consistency between a LM's self-explanations and behavior on related inputs by updating explanations to better predict behavior or updating behavior to better match explanations. We apply our method in two domains. First, we study a formal probabilistic reasoning task in which LMs must learn to imitate a family of biased samplers and evaluated on their ability to report the associated biases. We find that consistency training improves the correlation between self-reported and behaviorally-measured latent biases from $R^2=0.24$ to $R^2=0.64$ on a set of held-out distributions, matching the generalization of direct ground-truth supervision. Second, we study a constitutional AI domain in which LMs must describe when they will refuse or comply with user requests. Here, Self-CTRL produces rules that faithfully describe the model's behavior on held-out requests, improving the refusal predictions of a third-party auditor model from $36\%$ to $92\%$. In the other direction, behavior updates improve alignment, reducing HarmBench failure rate from $15.0\%$ to $0.5\%$ without substantially increasing refusal on harmless prompts. By aligning explanations and behavior, our work provides a general recipe for training AI models to be safer, more transparent, and more controllable.
Large language models (LLMs) are often hypothesized to perform implicit Bayesian inference, yet a key coherence condition, the martingale property of predictive beliefs, has been shown to fail in controlled synthetic in-context learning settings. We revisit this question in a more typical usage regime: generic multiple-choice question answering. Exploiting the discrete answer space, we compute exact predictive distributions and study belief dynamics induced by autoregressive answer resampling. We introduce prompted predictive resampling (PPR), where an LLM generates a sequence of answers to the same question. Empirically, PPR reveals early-stage belief drift, indicating martingale violations. However, after sufficient resampling steps, the belief process self-stabilizes and converges to a coherent predictive distribution. Based on this observation, we further propose (i) a seed-answer prompting strategy to accelerate stabilization, and (ii) a self-consistency loss that amortizes early-stage drift into the model via fine-tuning. Experiments on multiple-choice QA benchmarks show that our methods substantially reduce belief drift and improve predictive coherence without sacrificing accuracy.
Large language models are increasingly deployed in agentic pipelines that depend on the model evaluating its own outputs without external verification. The reliability of these pipelines depends on an implicit assumption: that the model applies relevant concepts the same way when it generates an output and later evaluates that output. We propose a new measure, generator-evaluator self-consistency, to test this assumption directly and apply it to 10 frontier models across 491 concepts. We find, first, that there is substantial variation in self-consistency. Second, we find that in a clinical setting with physician-validated mistakes (Proniakin et al., 2025), across models, those with higher self-consistency are linked to greater vulnerability to mistakes. Thus, even when models consistently apply concepts they may not be safe to deploy. This is evidence of a consistency dilemma in LLMs: self-consistency is operationally useful, but models that are more consistent are also more prone to mistakes.
Logan Mann, Yi Xia, Ajit Saravanan +6cs.CV cs.AI cs.CL cs.LG
Multimodal Foundation Models are increasingly used as reasoning agents, making reliability, knowing when a model may hallucinate, critical. A common intuition, which we call the Attention-Confidence Assumption, holds that reliability follows from "structural" visual perception: tight attention on relevant regions should signal a trustworthy answer, while scattered attention signals confusion. We challenge this through the VLM Reliability Probe (VRP), a systematic cross-family study of reliability signals in contemporary Vision-Language Models (VLMs). We introduce structural-attention metrics, cluster counts (C_k) and spatial entropy (H_s), to quantify the visual encoder's gaze, and track its evolution (Delta H_s) across layers. This reveals a "Symbolic Detachment": models often "Early Lock" visual features only to diffuse attention later, severing early perception from final generation. Contrary to the grounding hypothesis, we find a "Cluster Failure": spatial attention has near-zero correlation (R approx 0.001) with accuracy. Instead, reliability is a phenomenon of generation dynamics and internal-state distributions. Self-Consistency, the agreement rate across sampled reasoning paths, is the dominant predictor of truth (R = 0.429). Scaling causal interventions exposes a sharp architectural divergence: LLaVA locks its prediction in a fragile late-stage bottleneck, whereas PaliGemma and Qwen2-VL distribute reliability globally, staying resilient even when ~50% or more of their most predictive layer is destroyed. For current VLMs, reliability signals are detached from visual grounding maps and are best inferred from generation-time dynamics and hidden-state probes.