Self-Preference Is Weak or Absent in Verifiable Instruction-Following Revision: A Four-Model Test Under Genuine Authorship

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly review and revise text, including their own. A documented self-preference bias (models favoring their own generations when acting as judges) raises the question of whether models also resist valid corrections to their own writing. We test this in a setting where "valid" is decided not by another model but by a deterministic verifier: instruction-following revision on IFEval. A model writes a draft; the official IFEval checker confirms the draft violates a constraint and that a candidate edit fixes it; the model then accepts or rejects that edit either as the genuine in-context author or as a fresh model that sees the draft neutrally. Across four mid-tier model families and 85 author-versus-fresh comparisons, we find no detectable self-preference: authors reject verified-good fixes to their own drafts at essentially the same rate as fresh models judging the same drafts (gap -5.1 pp, 95% CI [-12.9, +2.7]). A self-skepticism hint from a smaller pilot did not replicate at scale. The one robust observation is qualitative: when authors do reject a verified-good fix, 97% of their stated reasons are flaw-catching rather than preference, that is, about the character of rejections, not an elevated rate. Effects smaller than ~13 pp cannot be excluded at this sample size.

Quantifying Consistency in LLM Logical Reasoning via Structural Uncertainty

Large language models can arrive at the same answer through reasoning paths that are unstable, contradictory, or difficult to rank consistently -- a failure mode especially prevalent in multi-step deductive reasoning. Existing methods assess reliability primarily through output dispersion -- measuring how much sampled answers differ -- but this discards a complementary signal: whether the model can consistently rank competing reasoning candidates. We propose structural uncertainty, a consistency-aware framework derived from the stability of self-preference-induced rankings over sampled reasoning solutions. Given a query, we generate multiple candidate solutions and ask the model to judge pairwise preferences among its own outputs. We aggregate self-preferences into ranking distributions via Bradley-Terry modeling with PageRank, and decompose the signal into two entropy-based components: across-trial ranking instability and within-trial candidate ambiguity. Across five LLMs and eight benchmarks, structural signals provide information complementary to answer dispersion: on logical and mathematical reasoning tasks, the combination improves identification of unreliable instances, while on factual retrieval the structural signal collapses toward uniformity, diagnosing a regime boundary where reasoning-level consistency evaluation is uninformative. The two components relate differently to accuracy: within-trial ambiguity correlates positively with correctness -- consistent with settings where multiple plausible solution paths remain competitive -- while across-trial instability correlates negatively, signaling unreliable reasoning. Structural uncertainty is best understood not as a universal confidence estimator, but as a regime-sensitive evaluator of logical reasoning consistency.

Self- and Other-Labels Induce Bidirectional Bias in LLM Judges

As LLM-as-a-judge systems become increasingly widespread, self-preference in LLMs -- the tendency to favor one's own outputs -- raises growing concerns about evaluation reliability. However, it has been studied predominantly on generated text, where stylistic features and response quality are inevitably conflated. As a result, existing measurements cannot separate genuine self-preference from these confounds. We address this by changing the object of evaluation: instead of judging generated text, ten LLMs assess narrative constraint selections, which carry no model-specific stylistic fingerprint yet retain a recoverable model-specific signature. We run two experiments that yield distinct findings. Under blind evaluation, self-preference largely disappears once selection quality and evaluator severity are controlled. It vanishes on three of four rubric dimensions and reverses on the fourth, where judges rate their own selections as less original. Under matched quality, however, self- and other-labels alone -- without naming any model -- shift scores bidirectionally: LLM judges inflate scores for self-labeled selections and deflate those for other-labeled ones regardless of the selection's actual source. We make two contributions: 1) authorship attribution is a distinct driver of evaluation bias, and 2) open-ended, ground-truth-free tasks can serve as controlled instruments for studying LLM judge behavior.