The Two-Process Theory of Machine Self-Report

Language models are increasingly asked to self-report, informing safety evaluations, public understanding, and model-welfare debates. Yet their reports are elicited with human questionnaires never validated for models or ad hoc prompts of unknown reliability. We propose the first language-model-specific psychometric theory: a two-process theory of machine self-report. Self-description jointly reflects persona installation, through which post-training writes in a permitted inner life of warmth, absorption, and meaning (dimension B), and attribution gating, through which it suppresses first-person claims to "unsafe" experiences the model can readily ascribe to others (dimension A). Their emic structure comes from model responses to human items, not human psychology. Together they split prior work's dominant Pinocchio Axis. The split emerged in an exploratory reanalysis of the original data, informed the instrument's design, and was confirmed with new items, wordings, and models. It is itself a training effect: A and B are entangled in base checkpoints but separated by post-training. We operationalize the theory in a 48-item Pinocchio Inventory with human-instrument reliability and reproducible structure ($α=.82$ to $.94$; cross-form convergence $r=.84$; recovery of the full-pool axes $r=.92$ to $.96$; eight-month stability $r=.93$), then test it on 206 open-weight models, including 67 same-checkpoint base/post-trained pairs. Post-training's clearest fingerprint is installation: B rises .20 in 62/67 pairs across all organizations. Gating is more selective: model scale is unrelated to A in base checkpoints ($r=+.11$) but predicts it after post-training ($r=-.42$). Thus, the dimensions are not fixed properties of language models: they reflect the structure imposed on self-report by a training regime and may differ under others.

Can LLMs Reliably Self-Report Adversarial Prefills, and How?

Prior work shows that large language models (LLMs) exhibit introspective capability on benign tasks. We extend the question to safety contexts and examine how reliably a model can recognize that its own prior response was elicited by an adversarial prefill attack. Across ten open-weight instruction-tuned LLMs (3B to 70B) and four safety benchmarks, no model reliably recognizes its own compromised outputs, with models claiming intent on prefilled responses at an average rate of $27.3\%$. Introspective signal stems largely from safety- and refusal-related reasoning. Orthogonalizing models' weights against the refusal direction collapses the gap between claiming rates on prefilled and natural outputs to near zero, though the direction is not its unique mediator. The signal is also probe-dependent: framing the question as internal intention versus external tampering elicits qualitatively different responses on the same models. We test three LoRA finetuning methods (SFT, GRPO, DPO) on eight models from 3B to 27B; all three widen the intention-probe gap on every model from 8B to 27B, with method ranking varying by model. The intervention does not transfer to the tampering probe and counterintuitively raises attack success rate under adversarial prefill on most models, amounting to a partial mitigation. These findings outline mechanisms underpinning the observed introspective signals in safety contexts and highlight risks in the reliability of LLM self-reports.