Looking in the Mirror: Introspecting Side-Effect Misalignments Induced by Fine-Tuning

Fine-tuning enables a source model to acquire desired capabilities and behaviors in a target domain while retaining much of its general-purpose competence. However, this adaptation process can also degrade alignment properties that were present in the source model. Recent work has shown that large language models can be trained using LoRA-based modules known as introspection adapters (IAs) to describe behavioral changes induced by fine-tuning. However, existing studies primarily consider settings in which the model is fine-tuned on datasets explicitly designed to implant a specific behavior and is then asked to explain the implanted behavior. This differs from practical deployment scenarios, where the central concern is often side-effect misalignment: unintended degradation of alignment caused by fine-tuning on tasks that are not obviously related to safety or alignment. To bridge this gap, we formulate a novel problem setting called \emph{side-effect introspection}, in which the target of introspection is not a behavior explicitly implanted through fine-tuning, but rather alignment shifts that emerge as unintended side effects, and we construct a dataset for this setting. Furthermore, to enhance sensitivity to internal model changes, we propose the Delta-Aware Introspection Adapter (DAIA), a novel mechanism designed to explicitly process both base-model activations and activation differences induced by fine-tuning. Our empirical evaluation shows that introspection learning generalizes to unseen fine-tuned models and safety categories, and that DAIA consistently outperforms existing introspection adapters.

Forecasting Side Effects of Activation Steering

Activation steering modifies a language model by adding a learned direction to its hidden activations, enabling targeted behavioral changes without retraining. While effective, steering often produces unintended side effects on other behaviors, making it difficult to deploy safely. We therefore ask: can these side effects be forecasted before steering is applied? We answer this question by constructing a cross-effect matrix over a taxonomy of 67 behaviors across three open-weight language models. We find that side effects are common, structured, and often asymmetric, revealing interactions that cannot be explained by existing similarity-based heuristics. Despite this complexity, we show that side effects are largely predictable before steering is performed. Their magnitude depends primarily on the target behavior, while their direction can be forecasted from the model's unsteered representations with substantially higher accuracy than simple baselines. Our results demonstrate that activation steering has systematic and forecastable side effects, enabling proactive safety auditing and more informed deployment of steering interventions.

When Debiasing Backfires: Counterintuitive Side Effects of Preprocessing-Based Stereotype Mitigation

Preprocessing-based methods for stereotype mitigation, such as pre-/post-training on debiased corpora, are widely used in NLP. While these approaches reduce measurable stereotypes for targeted groups, we find they often induce unintended shifts-side effects, where stereotyping or counter-stereotyping can increase relative to neutral baselines for other demographics, including across unrelated demographic categories. We demonstrate these side effects across two model families (encoder-only and decoder-only), multiple preprocessing strategies (removing stereotypical sentences, removing group mentions, and swapping group references), and both pre- and post-training at different data scales on Wikipedia. Standard benchmarks frequently miss these shifts. Using attention-rollout analysis, we observe that such side effects are not accompanied by large changes in attention flow, complicating mechanistic explanations. We discuss implications for evaluation, provide actionable diagnostics, and argue for side-effect-aware, transparent mitigation practices.

Gaming-Resistant Insurance Contracts for Autonomous AI Agents: Strategy-Proof Toll Mechanism Design

Paper A defines a time-consistent actuarial runtime that prices each side-effect-bearing action against a contractually fixed safe default and gates execution against a reserve budget. It treats the operator as passive. This paper makes the operator strategic. We characterise a five-attack space for autonomous AI-agent insurance contracts and prove when the actuarial runtime is gaming-resistant. Two attack surfaces -- post-toll safe-default selection and within-boundary action splitting -- are closed by Paper A's minimal-authority and no-splitting clauses. The remaining three require new contract clauses. First, common-control aggregation prevents cross-boundary re-routing from reducing toll below the boundary potential applied to total exposure. Second, interface failures such as invalid JSON are contract-relevant events, not safety wins: treating them as zero-toll safe defaults can reward unreliable models, while escalation fees reverse the incentive. We validate this interface-compliance theorem on committed cross-model traces from the companion empirical paper. Third, a model-identity menu with a componentwise-minimum penalty schedule makes truthful reporting of the deployed model weakly dominant. We then compose these clauses with Paper A's runtime guarantees to obtain joint incentive compatibility over the five-attack space. Finally, a two-parameter premium family discharges operator individual rationality and weak budget balance at the truthful equilibrium. The result is an incentive-compatibility layer for actuarial control of autonomous-agent side effects.