Preference Reasoning under Indeterminacy in Large Language Models

As large language models evolve into decision-making agents, the ability to reason over preferences becomes fundamental to alignment, coordination, and collective intelligence. Yet, unlike standard benchmarks, real-world preference reasoning is inherently indeterminate: information may be incomplete, and valid solutions may not exist. We argue that indeterminacy, rather than correctness alone, is a central challenge for AI reasoning. We formalize this challenge along two axes, (i) epistemic indeterminacy, arising from incomplete, partial, or expressive preferences, and (ii) structural indeterminacy, arising from the non-existence of solutions under standard social choice concepts. Across a hierarchy of tasks, we show that state-of-the-art language models systematically fail to distinguish between determined and undetermined instances, exhibiting miscalibrated reasoning even in verification settings.

Can LLMs Rank? A Tale of Triads and Triage

From housing allocation for households experiencing homelessness to triage in emergency departments, LLMs are increasingly being considered as judges of consequential decisions that require ranking people for scarce resources. Ranking large groups simultaneously is cognitively demanding and error-prone. A natural solution, drawing on decades of social choice theory, elicits pairwise comparisons and aggregates them into a total order. However, a fundamental question remains when LLMs serve as the pairwise judge: how can a practitioner tell, before committing to a ranking, whether the LLM's judgments are sufficiently consistent to trust the result? We discuss two different ways of identifying consistency. A classical diagnostic, the coefficient of consistency $ζ$, originally developed to measure judge reliability by counting circular triads in tournament graphs, provides a cheap, model-free measure of intra-run consistency. Various standard measures of distance between rankings, for example Kendall's $τ$, can measure inter-run variability. We show, in both theory and practice, that these measures are independently valuable, and advocate for using both to assess reliability of rankings. We demonstrate the practical importance of our results across two high-stakes prioritization tasks: homelessness service allocation and emergency department triage. Three different leading LLMs have considerably different performance profiles across these two axes of consistency. We provide guidelines for how practitioners could think about measuring and assessing consistency before committing to a model for ranking or prioritization.

Measurable Majorities Are Not Finitely Axiomatizable

This theoretical note studies the finite axiomatizability of strict majority reasoning in finite social decision frames. Moss and Pedersen (2026) <doi: 10.48550/arXiv.2606.23853> introduce a coherence criterion that characterizes exactly when qualitative majority judgments are representable by a finitely additive measure. The question addressed here is whether that coherence criterion can be replaced, in the finite setting, by any bounded finite fragment. We prove that it cannot. For every $k\ge 1$, we construct a maximal standard frame whose shortest coherence violation has length exactly $2k+2$. Hence there is no uniform finite bound on the incoherence index of social decision frames, resolving Conjecture 5.7 stated by Moss and Pedersen (2026). The construction is geometric, in the sense that it proceeds via orthogonality and dimension in rational vector spaces, and self-contained: it isolates a symmetric family of half-sized voting blocs and extends it to a maximal frame in which every shorter balanced obstruction is excluded. Along the explicit infinite sequence of universe sizes obtained in the construction, this also establishes the middle-layer family predicted by Conjecture B.25 by Moss and Pedersen (2026). Together with the soundness and completeness theorem for the Moss-Pedersen minimal logic for strict majorities, this establishes that measurable social decision frames are not finitely axiomatizable in that language.

The Measurable Majority

This paper studies strict majority reasoning in finite electorates using so-called $\textit{social decision frames}$: finite sets of voters equipped with distinguished families of coalitions interpreted as those voting blocs evaluated to form a strict majority. A coherence criterion for qualitative majority judgments is identified and shown to give an exact characterization for representability of strict majorities by finitely additive measures. In addition, a minimal natural logic for reasoning about strict majorities is shown to be sound and complete. These developments motivate examination of associated combinatorial questions concerning incoherence in finite families of sets; partial results and a conjecture are given. Finally, the results of this paper are applied to correct a classical representation theorem for weak qualitative probability structures due to Patrick Suppes and to establish a May-type characterization for ordinary strict majority rule for social decision frames.