Social deduction games (SDGs) such as Werewolf have become challenging testbeds for AI agents. These games require complex social skills such as reasoning, deception, and collaboration. While recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have driven significant progress in SDG agents, current approaches are predominantly text-based, overlooking the multimodal nature that is fundamental to human social interaction. To bridge this gap, we introduce CaM-Wolf, the first SDG agent that integrates multimodal perception and generation. CaM-Wolf processes video inputs from other players, employs a causal-aware Reasoner trained via reinforcement learning to establish logical chains between observable behaviors and hidden roles, and presents itself through an animated avatar. Our experiments and user study show that CaM-Wolf achieves superior agent gameplay performance and enhances the quality of human-AI interaction. This work represents a significant advancement towards creating more human-like AI agents capable of participating in nuanced social dynamics. Our code is available at https://3dagentworld.github.io/avatar_wolf.
Evaluating LLM agents in hidden-information multi-agent settings is hard: final outcomes are high-variance and rarely reveal why an agent decided as it did. We study this in a 9-player Werewolf environment where agents act under strict, code-level information isolation, and we build an auditable framework that maintains an external belief state over hidden roles, logs belief updates and belief-action deviations as structured evidence, and supports a defensive offline improvement loop that reviews bad cases before any strategy change. Across 1,080 frozen games spanning belief-disabled, active-belief, kernel-ablation, camp-restricted, consumption-policy, and high-load arms, and including a seed-paired A0/A1 comparison, the active-belief condition is associated with substantially better good-side outcomes: in the 200-seed A0/A1 comparison the good-side win rate rises from 0.205 to 0.390 (paired McNemar $χ^2 = 16.4$, $p < 0.001$), with fewer irreversible witch-poison errors. We do not, however, attribute this shift to belief content. Direct action-belief consistency is low ($\approx 0.21$), and giving belief only to the werewolves helps the good side more than giving it only to the good side, which argues against a simple holder-benefit account; we therefore report the effect as an association and treat its mechanism as unresolved. The contribution is the audit framework itself: it makes the effect measurable, exposes low direct action-belief consistency, rejects an unreliable forced-consumption intervention with evidence, and separates strategy effects from load confounds. We accordingly position external belief in high-noise hidden-information games primarily as an auditable cognitive baseline that also carries decision-relevant signal, turning opaque agent behavior into replayable evidence for safer, controlled iteration.