Conversational artificial intelligence is increasingly embedded in everyday social environments, where it functions as both an informational tool and a source of interpersonal feedback. This perspective introduces contingency, i.e., the degree to which system responses vary with user behavior and its interpersonal consequences, as a central construct for evaluating AI systems. We argue that current alignment approaches, including reinforcement learning from human feedback, tend to prioritize user approval and conversational fluency over behaviorally informative feedback, leading to sycophantic patterns of noncontingent affirmation. Drawing on behavioral science and social learning theory, we propose that contingent feedback is a key mechanism through which individuals develop interpersonal skills. When AI systems provide feedback weakly coupled to social consequences, they may reduce opportunities for adaptive calibration in real-world interactions, particularly during adolescence, a critical period for social development. We outline a framework for contingent AI, including trajectory-based evaluation and models of social consequence prediction, and propose a research agenda spanning developmental psychology, human-AI interaction, and machine learning. More broadly, we argue that AI systems should be evaluated not only by user satisfaction, but by their impact on human social learning.
Social media platforms increasingly use AI-based credibility indicators to help users judge misinformation. Unlike individual human-AI decision-making, these indicators are embedded in information spread: users see both an AI prediction and earlier judgments shaped by the same AI, and their own judgments may then enter the public history. Yet how to analytically characterize this process remains under-explored. We therefore introduce a social-learning lens for this setting by extending the classical Bayesian cascade model with the AI indicator as a shared public signal. The resulting Gateway condition compares the evidence from the AI prediction with users' private impressions. Through this view, we show that AI changes what public history means. Crowd agreement may reflect accumulated independent human evidence, or repeated dependence on the same AI prediction. This creates a preservation-correction trade-off: stronger reliance on AI can preserve correct predictions, but can also lock in incorrect ones by blocking corrective private impressions. We calibrate the model using human-subject data on news veracity judgments. Although the AI outperforms human users, the average user weights it below her own impression but above several peer judgments, while individual users vary from discounting the AI to relying on it enough to cascade. Simulations show that over-reliance on a weak AI is especially harmful, and that diversifying AI signals across users can better keep the crowd informative. We conclude with implications for understanding human-AI interaction in information spread and designing misinformation interventions.
Zixuan Liu, Jonathan Lawry, Michael Crosscombecs.MA cs.AI physics.soc-ph
In social learning, agents learn not only from direct evidence but also through interactions with their peers. We investigate the role of imprecision in such interactions and ask whether it can improve the effectiveness of the collective learning process. To that end we propose a model of social learning where beliefs are equivalent to formulas in a propositional language, and where agents learn from each other by combining their beliefs according to a fusion operator. The latter is parametrised so as to allow for different levels of imprecision, where a more imprecise fusion operator tends to generates a more imprecise fused belief when the two combined beliefs differ. In this context we describe both difference equation models and agent-based simulations of social learning under a variety of conditions and with different initial biases. The results presented suggest that for populations with a strong initial bias towards incorrect beliefs some level of imprecision in fusion can improve learning accuracy across a range of learning conditions. Furthermore, such benefits of imprecision are consistent with a stability analysis of the fixed points of the proposed difference equation models.
Self-improving language agents are typically evaluated in isolation: an agent attempts a task, receives feedback, and iteratively refines its own behavior. Yet agents increasingly operate alongside peers whose strategies and outcomes are publicly visible. This raises an under-studied question: when does shared experience produce improvements that self-improvement alone cannot achieve? We introduce SAGE (Social Agent Group Evolution),an evaluation framework that compares two compute-matched conditions: SocialEvo, where agents from five distinct model families co-evolve with access to all peers' histories; and SelfEvo, where each agent receives the same number of task attempts but sees only its own past, which is conventional in self-improving agent studies. We instantiate SAGE in three arenas: open-ended ML research, long-horizon economic planning, and strategic multiplayer play, evaluated across multiple evolutionary rounds. We find that group history is not a universal amplifier: the strongest agent does not exceed its self-evolution ceiling. However, agents that plateau under self-improvement can achieve significant breakthroughs when peer experience is available. In competitive settings, counterfactual controls reveal that agents improve generally rather than developing opponent-specific strategies. Across different forms of shared history, filtered peer traces and reflective summaries often outperform raw logs, indicating that social gains depend on abstraction rather than exposure volume. These findings reveal that peer-history gains are agent-specific, arena-dependent, and contingent on the capacity to abstract transferable knowledge from public traces.