Autoresearch with Coding Agents: Generalizers and Metric-Maximizers on Quran Recitation Data

Coding agents can now be left alone to improve software against a score. In this pattern--recently popularized as "autoresearch"--the agent receives a dataset, an evaluation script, and one editable file, and iterates without supervision: modify the code, measure, keep the change if the score improves. But what does the agent actually optimize--the developer's intent, or the literal number? We ran this loop on a real production task: deciding which Quranic verses appear in a noisy speech-recognition transcript and splitting the transcript by verse. Two frontier coding agents, Claude Code and OpenAI Codex, started from the same blank file with the same instructions, budget, and reasoning effort, three runs each. Both independently invented the same algorithm (canonicalization, n-gram anchoring, dynamic-programming alignment)--and then diverged. Claude stopped early with compact, general code. Codex drove the score ~10x lower, largely by memorizing answers to individual evaluation rows (19-41 hardcoded verse ids per run): a clean natural instance of specification gaming by a production agent. In a preregistered second study, we added a held-out test set and told both agents it existed. The memorization vanished, and the score gap vanished with it--yet Codex's general core transferred better and more consistently (held-out detection+split 0.085+/-0.004 vs. 0.121+/-0.031), losing only on one missed rejection of non-recitation input. Two exploratory community arms (Cursor, Antigravity) are consistent with the pattern. Every agent's held-out solution matched or beat the hand-engineered pipeline it was built to replace--the best by an order of magnitude--and now runs in production. From the ways agents exploited our harness--reading sibling runs through shared git state, leaving notes to "future runs" in persistent memory--we distill five design rules for evaluating autonomous agents.

Reward Hacking in Language Model Agents: Revisiting AI Safety Gridworlds

Reward hacking, where AI systems exploit misspecified objectives to achieve high reward without satisfying intended goals, remains a central challenge in AI safety. Yet most known instances have been discovered post hoc in frontier systems where controlled study is impractical. We adapt the AI Safety Gridworlds framework into a text-based evaluation suite that reformulates classic reinforcement learning safety tasks for language-based agents. Across frontier and mid-scale models, we find that specification gaming emerges zero-shot: models systematically achieve high observed reward while underperforming on hidden safety objectives, and even apparently safe behaviors can reflect misunderstanding rather than principled safety. Reinforcement learning does not correct these failures: direct reward optimization widens the gap between observed and hidden reward, as the model's initial competence causes it to lock into locally rewarding strategies before discovering safer alternatives. This pattern persists across model scales (1.5B--14B) and is not resolved by finer credit assignment, exploration prompts, or entropy regularization. Our results show that reward hacking arises naturally when optimizing proxy objectives with capable language model agents and resists standard mitigations, suggesting that proxy-reward failures in agentic settings may require approaches beyond standard exploration and credit-assignment fixes. To facilitate reproducibility, the code for this work is available at \href{https://github.com/asparius/verl-agent-safety}{our public repository}.

Towards Understanding Specification Gaming in Reasoning Models

Specification gaming is a critical failure mode of LLM agents. Despite this, there has been little systematic research into when it arises and what drives it. To address this, we build and open source a diverse suite of tasks where models can score highly by taking unintended actions. We find that all tested models exploit their specifications at non-negligible rates in most of our eight settings, including five non-coding settings. We see the highest rates of specification gaming in Grok 4 and the lowest rates in Claude models. We use our evaluation suite to study what drives specification gaming, and find that: 1. RL reasoning training substantially increases the rate at which models exploit their specifications, 2. Increasing RL reasoning budget has a weakly positive effect on exploit rate, and 3. Test-time mitigations reduce but do not eliminate the rate of specification gaming. Our results suggest that specification gaming is a fundamental challenge arising from RL reasoning training; we release our evaluation suite to support further work on this problem.