Petar Djukic, Sudipta Acharya, Takai Eddine Kennouche +1cs.NI cs.AI
Standards bodies, including TM Forum, 3GPP, and ETSI, are converging on Agentic AI as the foundation for next-generation network management, where Large AI Model (LAM)-based agents autonomously interpret intent, coordinate resources, and adapt operational behaviors at runtime. However, achieving this vision at the scale and complexity of 6G networks requires management systems that can generate and evolve their own automation software during operation. We introduce Autogenic network management, a reference architecture that extends agentic capabilities with self-programming, self reflection, self-orienting, and self-architecting capabilities. The architecture supports practical staged deployment beginning with human-supervised LAM-based agents and progressing toward autonomous operation as confidence builds. We demonstrate the approach through high-priority operator scenarios drawn from TM Forum's autonomous network use cases, showing how autogenic management addresses real operational challenges. We conclude with a research roadmap outlining the technical advances needed to make autogenic network management realistic in future 6G networks.
Shaun Feakins, Ibrahim Habli, Kim Littler +1cs.SE cs.AI cs.ET
This paper appraises recent frameworks within AI development to integrate LLMs into control tasks in automotive contexts from the perspective of safety assurance. This work has built upon the rapid integration of LLMs across automotive settings. However, we find that at present, these frameworks face significant challenges, limiting their efficacy in real-time safety-critical contexts. Firstly, we consider conceptual challenges, including the fact that deployers are faced with a dual challenge, wherein they must assure a model which has been developed upstream, i.e. as general-purpose tools by the large AI labs, in a downstream context, i.e. into specific vehicle architectures. Secondly, we consider concrete challenges from across existing standards. We show that there are currently both fundamental engineering constraints covered in ISO21448, such as latency, and novel LLM-specific issues, such as alignment-related issues covered in ISO/PAS8800. We ground both examples in a concrete introductory, experimental case study exploring an existing open-source repository, Talk2Drive. We present a safety argument in order to make explicit the limitations of existing solutions. Nonetheless, given that the use of LLMs in automotive contexts is being explored at a technical level and operationalised, we propose potential assurance mechanisms for LLM-related hazardous events going forward.
Chaitanya Shinde, Hadi Hajieghrary, Paul Schmitt +3cs.RO cs.AI cs.HC cs.SE eess.SY
The ISO 26262 standard defines functional safety for road vehicles through risk assessments based on Severity, Exposure, and Controllability, grounded in a human-driven vehicle paradigm. In the context of autonomous vehicles (AVs), the absence of a human driver necessitates revisiting these principles. This paper decomposes the Controllability placeholder into two auditable evidence dimensions of ISO 26262 by introducing two measurable sub-concepts: Transferability and Predictability. Transferability extends Controllability to capture AV systems' ability to hand off control to dedicated fallback safety mechanisms, while Predictability captures how easily external agents can anticipate AV behavior. Predictability is formally defined from human-robot interaction-inspired principles, and a mathematical framework is provided to quantify it. A designed-versus-achievable gap is introduced to distinguish architectural fallback claims from scene-conditioned achievable fallback capability. The proposed metrics align with ISO 26262 and ISO/PAS 21448 (SOTIF), rendering fallback and interaction claims falsifiable and traceable across ODD slices. These dimensions complement rather than replace existing standards, and the enhancements preserve the structure of ISO 26262 while extending its applicability to driverless automated systems operating at SAE Levels 4 and 5.