Shaping Human-AI Interactions to Provide Improvement Pathways and Balance Competing Objectives

When an AI system is deployed, the individuals who use and or are evaluated by it form beliefs about how the system operates and use those beliefs to strategically present their preferences, behaviors, or attributes. The system then responds with feedback or a decision outcome, thereby creating a human-AI interaction loop. This thesis studies how to design and shape such interactions to achieve three goals: (1) help individuals develop accurate beliefs about the AI systems so they can improve and or secure favorable outcomes at minimal cost, (2) encourage improvement and or discourage gaming behaviors, and (3) ensure that the AI system continues to achieve its intended objectives, such as maximizing accuracy. To address these goals, the thesis is organized into three complementary parts that examine and study human-AI interactions from the perspectives of both evaluated individuals and AI systems. Together, the work presented in this thesis advances human-centered machine learning by providing principles and methods for designing AI systems that align with human needs, values, and capabilities. Methodologically, this thesis integrates theoretical analysis, data-driven modeling, human-subject experiments, and empirical evaluations on real-world and semi-synthetic datasets.

LLM Detection as an Intervention: Downstream Impact under Strategic User Behavior

As LLM adoption becomes more widespread, there is a growing interest in detecting LLM-generated content, for example through LLM detection tools and through heuristics based on language patterns. Detectors operate as an intervention that steers not only the detected attribute itself, but also downstream metrics such as LLM usage and output quality. In this work, we demonstrate how imperfect LLM detectors lead to counterintuitive impacts on these downstream metrics, by distorting how users are incentivized to use LLMs in their workflow. We develop a stylized model which captures how users strategically choose how much to use the LLM and how to post-process content to reduce the detected attribute. Using this model, we show that LLM detection can counterintuitively lead humans to increase their LLM usage. Moreover, even when reducing the detected attribute improves output quality, we find that introducing an LLM detector can lead users to produce lower quality outputs. In contrast, we show that detectors result in a clean "rise-then-fall" pattern for the detected attribute, which we empirically reproduce for word frequencies on arXiv abstracts. Altogether, our work illustrates how LLM detection can distort LLM usage and output quality, uncovering failure modes when LLM detectors operate as an intervention on these downstream metrics.

MESHA: Mechanism-Enforced Sequential Halving for Strategic Linear Bandits

We design and analyze \underline{M}echanism-\underline{E}nforced \underline{S}equential \underline{HA}lving (MESHA), an algorithm for Best Arm Identification (BAI) in strategic linear bandits. In this setting, each arm may strategically misreport its feature vector to maximize the probability of being identified as the best arm, when rewards are generated from the arms' true but unobservable features. The design of MESHA applies the naïve uniform sampling rule and an epoch-wise Grim Trigger Condition (GTC): the former reduces the impact of arms' strategic behaviours and the latter eliminates arms whose reported features severely deviate from the ground truth. Considering an arbitrary Nash Equilibrium, we prove that any arm would attempt to pass the GTC check to maximize its identified probability and derive an upper bound on the failure probability of MESHA within a fixed budget $T$. We also show that state-of-the-art linear BAI algorithms with $G$-optimal design would fail in such strategic environment, as the optimal design (OD)-based sampling rule based on strategically reported features may {\it starve} the optimal arm of any sampling budget. Finally, extensive numerical experiments indicate that MESHA outperforms baselines that rely on OD-based sampling rules as well as the feature-agnostic baselines, corroborating the efficacy of MESHA.

Off-Policy Evaluation with Strategic Agents via Local Disclosure

We study off-policy evaluation (OPE) under strategic behavior where decision subjects (or agents) respond to a decision maker's policy by strategically modifying their covariates. Such behavior induces a policy-dependent covariate shift, breaking the standard assumption in existing methods that covariates are exogenous to the policy. Related work addresses this challenge by imposing strong assumptions such as repeated interactions or full knowledge of agents' response behavior, substantially limiting its applicability to OPE. In contrast, we consider a one-shot OPE setting where the decision maker has only partial knowledge of the agents' response behavior. Our key insight is that disclosing local information through post-hoc explanations reveals agents' pre-strategic covariates prior to adaptation, mitigating the information loss induced by strategic behavior. Leveraging this structure, we estimate a statistical model for the agents' responses and construct a doubly robust estimator for policy value. By assuming that the agents' cost sensitivity follows a conditional log-normal distribution, we establish consistency of the proposed estimator and validate our approach empirically. More broadly, our results highlight how interaction design can mitigate information asymmetry by revealing otherwise hidden structure in agents' strategic responses.

Not Yet: Humans Outperform LLMs in a Colonel Blotto Tournament

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has spurred economists to study how humans and LLMs behave in strategic settings. We organized a series of round-robin tournaments in the Colonel Blotto game. This game attracts game theorists' attention due to high-dimensional action space and the absence of pure strategy Nash equilibria. In the first tournament, more than 200 human participants competed against one another. In the second tournament, several popular LLMs were invited to submit strategies. In the third tournament, we matched the number of LLM strategies to the number submitted by humans. We find that humans more often employ better-calibrated intermediate-level allocation heuristics and outperform the simpler, more stereotyped strategies submitted by LLMs. Strategic sophistication is key to success if and only if the necessary level of reasoning depth is reached, while lower and higher levels of reasoning offer no clear advantage over the primitive strategies. Among humans, field of study weakly predicts success: participants with STEM backgrounds perform better in the first tournament. Surprisingly, humans almost do not adjust their strategies across tournaments with different sets of opponents. This result suggests that humans base their choices primarily on the game's rules rather than on the identity of their opponents, treating LLMs much like human competitors.