SyncSBC: Decentralized Swarm Behavior Prediction for Synchronized Autonomous Control

Robot swarms utilize many independent limited-sensing agents to produce complex emergent behaviors without requiring centralized control. However, little research explores how agents can infer swarm-level behavior from purely local perception, a capability critical for detecting faults and behavior changes. In this paper, we introduce Synchronized Swarm Behavior Classification (SyncSBC), which combines improvements in machine learning and distributed consensus to classify collective swarm behavior and synchronize swarm decision-making in an entirely decentralized manner. We show that SyncSBC achieves high classification accuracy and low synchronization delay, making it suitable for real-world deployment. Finally, we use SyncSBC to demonstrate two promising swarm applications on real robots where we show that swarms utilizing SyncSBC can accurately identify anomalies in robot behavior and autonomously coordinate collective changes in swarm behavior. Videos, code and supplemental experiments are available at https://sites.google.com/view/sync-sbc/home.

Mission-Level Runtime Assurance for LLM-Assisted ISR Swarms over a Verification-Aware Fabric

Swarms of LLM-assisted autonomous robots are increasingly proposed for cooperative intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in contested environments. A growing class of their assurance failures arises not within any single platform but across the swarm: individually-compliant actions compose into a mission-level violation: a prohibited objective split across platforms to evade per-platform lim- its, or a collective budget quietly exceeded. Per-platform guardrails miss these by construction, and contested communications let the violation hide behind lost or delayed evidence. We present a three-tier (platfor- m/squad/mission) compositional runtime-verification framework that de- composes a mission policy into per-agent and cross-agent aspects, aggre- gates per-platform verdicts over a verification-aware messaging fabric, and fuses them with an evidence-aware, two-axis (security x complete- ness) algebra whose provenance names the platforms that jointly trig- gered a violation. Because the fabric makes evidence loss and silence observable, unsupported negative verdicts are downgraded to an explicit unknown rather than reported as mission-wide all-clears. On a simulated ISR mission, an indirect prompt injection that causes real LLM planners to split a prohibited collection task across four platforms is invisible to every per-platform monitor yet detected compositionally with full prove- nance; under an injected fault campaign a best-effort central monitor emits silent false all-clears while the verification-aware fabric emits none