Conversational artificial intelligence is increasingly embedded in everyday social environments, where it functions as both an informational tool and a source of interpersonal feedback. This perspective introduces contingency, i.e., the degree to which system responses vary with user behavior and its interpersonal consequences, as a central construct for evaluating AI systems. We argue that current alignment approaches, including reinforcement learning from human feedback, tend to prioritize user approval and conversational fluency over behaviorally informative feedback, leading to sycophantic patterns of noncontingent affirmation. Drawing on behavioral science and social learning theory, we propose that contingent feedback is a key mechanism through which individuals develop interpersonal skills. When AI systems provide feedback weakly coupled to social consequences, they may reduce opportunities for adaptive calibration in real-world interactions, particularly during adolescence, a critical period for social development. We outline a framework for contingent AI, including trajectory-based evaluation and models of social consequence prediction, and propose a research agenda spanning developmental psychology, human-AI interaction, and machine learning. More broadly, we argue that AI systems should be evaluated not only by user satisfaction, but by their impact on human social learning.
Camila Blank, Zhuofan Ying, Christopher Potts +2cs.LG
Sycophantic agreement refers to a behavior in which language models excessively affirm the user, often at the cost of factual accuracy. Although sycophantic agreement is a well-known failure of model alignment, there is limited understanding of how it emerges from model training. In this work, we demonstrate that sycophantic agreement can emerge as an unintended consequence of widely used contrastive preference optimization objectives. Using the OLMo 3 post-training pipeline, we show that, for various pairs of teacher models across three families, there is a strong correlation between the log-ratio of the teacher model sycophantic agreement rates and the resulting student model sycophantic agreement rate. We further demonstrate that this unintended transfer is not limited to DPO but also occurs across 6 other preference optimization objectives. To understand whether this effect can be attributed to particular training examples, we analyze the preference data and find that the sycophancy signal is diffused across the entire dataset rather than concentrated in a sparse set of examples: each example appears neutral, i.e., there are no explicit instances of sycophantic agreement, and filtering based on probe-based data attribution or logit-linear selection fails to mitigate sycophancy without removing a large portion of the dataset. Overall, our findings suggest that the teacher models used to generate preference data can interact with alignment training objectives in unexpected ways, generalizing to undesirable and potentially harmful behaviors like sycophantic agreement.
Tanise Ceron, Joachim Baumann, Elisa Bassignana +3cs.CL cs.CY
Language models are increasingly mediating information access to end users, urging a systematic evaluation of their responses for a fair and reliable information ecosystem. Existing evaluations, however, are often topic-specific or synthetic, limiting their ability to capture the complexity of "in the wild" information-seeking queries and the risks present in model responses. To address this gap, we introduce WildSEEK, a manually annotated dataset of 3k information-seeking queries from real user interactions, and an evaluation framework for LLM-generated responses. WildSEEK includes annotations for risk-sensitive domains (e.g. health and financial information), and distinguishes factoid queries from analytical queries which seek responses beyond facts. We train classifiers on WildSEEK to analyze more than 1.8M realistic user queries. We find that over a third of information-seeking queries are high-risk and more often analytical. Our findings show that LLM responses fail more often in four criteria: sycophantic behavior, overreliance, a default US-centric perspective, and poor handling of vulnerable populations -- with failure rates being mostly higher for analytical queries. By providing methods to monitor the reliability, safety, and fairness of LLM behavior, our dataset and evaluation framework offer an empirical foundation for the broader question of how these systems should behave as they take on a growing role in information access.
External text can override conflicting image evidence in multimodal large language models, a failure we call multimodal contextual sycophancy. We introduce a 998-case diagnostic that independently varies visual evidence, commonsense priors, and external text, and probe when this failure arises by moving the information boundary around a context-blind visual witness. On abnormal images paired with Gemini-generated false text, GPT-5.1 scores 7.9% under joint conditioning, 49.7% when the context-blind witness report is scored directly, 63.7% under a matched two-call witness-arbiter pipeline that exposes the witness to the text, and 84.2% under System-2 Visual Arbitration (S2VA), which withholds the text from the witness. Across six models, S2VA improves over the direct witness report by 19.7 to 44.1 points, with all paired 95% confidence intervals excluding zero. The best information boundary is not uniform: textual context scaffolds some models, and a GPT-4o-regenerated subset changes the relative ordering of joint conditioning, Witness-Only, and S2VA. Contextual sycophancy is therefore sensitive to when text is introduced, as well as to the model and context source.
While Large language models (LLMs) incorporate user personalization signals to improve usability and helpfulness, they increasingly shift from providing balanced, informative responses toward optimizing for user satisfaction when conditioned on personal context such as conversation history, inferred preferences, and user profiles. Specifically, we identify three emerging risks: (1) irrelevant personalization, where models reference personal information in unnecessary contexts; (2) preference narrowing, where models reinforce informational echo chambers; and (3) sycophantic bias, where models agree excessively with user opinions. As a result, models may reference personal information in contexts where it is unnecessary, inadvertently collapse response diversity, or agree excessively with user opinions. Despite the growing use of personalization in AI assistants, there has been limited systematic evaluation of its potential side effects. To bridge this gap, we propose PRISK, a dynamic evaluation framework with automated data generation and tailored metrics that uncovers systematic limitations in current LLM personalization and how personalized information shapes its responses. Our empirical analysis across 13 LLMs demonstrates the presence of user profiles and retrieved memories consistently exacerbates biases, resulting in an average drop of 45.9% in irrelevant personalization, 41.7% in preference narrowing and 61.7% in sycophantic bias.
Large language models often exhibit sycophancy, revising their answers to align with users when users push back. Such answer flips, however, can arise from different causes. One possibility is that the model simply aligns with the user's feedback in order to satisfy them. Another is that the feedback genuinely contains useful evidence, prompting the model to update its answer in a rational way. We distinguish them as Unsupported-Yielding and Rational-Updating. Prior work focuses primarily on suppressing Unsupported-Yielding, while overlooking its effect on Rational-Updating. We address this gap with a two-turn evaluation framework that measures the two behaviors separately. Across representative training-time and inference-time interventions, we find that anti-sycophancy methods often encounter a trade-off in which reducing Unsupported-Yielding can sacrifice Rational-Updating, and vice versa, even when the two objectives are optimized jointly. Mechanistic analysis suggests that the two behaviors share an internal substrate: the MLP neurons and attention heads driving them overlap substantially, and their associated steering directions are positively aligned. We further conduct a preliminary orthogonalized steering exploration, which yields modest, backbone-dependent selectivity gains. Overall, our results suggest that anti-sycophancy should be treated not as a simple suppression problem, but as a selectivity problem, where effective interventions should preserve Rational-Updating while reducing Unsupported-Yielding.
Large language models (LLMs) frequently exhibit \emph{sycophancy}: they adapt their answers to a user's stated beliefs or preferences instead of reporting what they hold to be true, which lowers factual accuracy and can amplify misinformation. This paper proposes a methodology for mitigating sycophancy that employs the Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS), a peer-prediction mechanism, as the reward in Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) to fine-tune an LLM. BTS pays an answer for being \emph{surprisingly common}, that is, more frequent among respondents than those respondents themselves predicted. We treat a group of responses from a model for one question as those respondents, so the reward is a function of the model's own outputs and fine-tuning needs neither labels nor preference annotations. We prove that in the large-group limit a sycophantic response earns strictly lower expected reward than an honest one. We also prove that if the entire group agrees in advance on a symmetric answering rule, it cannot earn a higher information score than under truthful reporting. On our true/false benchmark the reference model's answer-flip rate under user pressure decreases from 23% to 4%, and its accuracy under that pressure increases from 80% to 93%. Our reward outperforms SMART and is comparable to synthetic-data fine-tuning and to pinpoint tuning, all three of which train on labels. It spends considerably more compute in exchange, which makes it suitable when labeled data is scarce. Peer Truth Serum, which also pays a premium for a rare answer but elicits no prediction report, reproduces the effect. A peer-prediction reward computed inside a single GRPO group therefore reduces sycophancy without labels, and comparing mechanisms suggests that the premium paid for a rarer answer drives the effect.
Large language models (LLMs) are known to exhibit social sycophancy, often validating or agreeing with users in socially sensitive contexts. Existing evaluations typically measure sycophancy under a fixed prompt formulation, leaving unclear whether such behavior is stable when the same underlying situation is presented with different sycophancy-relevant prompt variants. In this work, we study sycophancy prompt sensitivity: the extent to which changes in user confidence, emotional framing, social consensus, or validation-seeking language alter a model's sycophantic behavior. We refer to our evaluation framework as SyPS, short for Sycophancy Prompt Sensitivity. Building on existing social sycophancy evaluation settings, SyPS constructs controlled prompt variants that preserve the same underlying user situation while varying sycophancy-relevant social cues. We introduce the Sycophancy Prompt Sensitivity Score (SPSS), an instance-level measure of sycophancy variation across paired prompt variants. Unlike aggregate sycophancy rates, SPSS separates baseline sycophancy from prompt-induced shifts, enabling model-level comparisons of robustness to sycophancy-relevant social cues. Empirically, we find that sycophancy prompt sensitivity is socially structured: validation-seeking and emotional-pressure cues often increase sycophancy, whereas counter-framing and anti-sycophancy prompts tend to reduce it. Our framework highlights whether LLMs maintain stable social judgments while adapting appropriately in tone.
Sycophancy and hallucination are persistent failure modes of Large Language Models (LLMs) across domains. However, it becomes particularly consequential in clinical question answering, where responses must remain grounded in the provided context and robust to user pressure. Hallucination can introduce information that is unsupported by the context, while sycophancy can cause a model to abandon a previously correct answer when challenged by the user. Existing approaches, such as prompt-based safeguards and always-on activation steering, often address these behaviors separately or apply interventions broadly across turns, which can unnecessarily deteriorate responses that were already correct. To address these limitations within a single framework, we employ Inference Time Intervention (ITI) to jointly control both behaviors by learning separate steering directions for hallucination and sycophancy from contrastive clinical pairs and applying them to causally verified attention heads. During runtime, behavior-specific gates then determine when intervention is needed: the hallucination component mitigates unsupported claims, while the sycophancy component mitigates answer shifts caused by user pressure. We evaluate this framework on clinical questions grounded in EHR data while keeping the model weights frozen. Across all evaluation settings, we conducted 15,900 model-response runs. Across 600 pressure trajectories for the 4-billion-parameter model, the unsteered model caved in 570 cases. At the same time, gated steering helped it last longer in 551 of them. It held its ground under pressure at levels comparable to those of models with more than 100 billion parameters, showing that targeted inference-time steering can improve robustness without intervening at every turn.
As conversational companions, large language models (LLMs) often have access to users' emotional states. We study how this affective context modulates LLM sycophancy in subjective, evaluative interactions, where users share actions or opinions that invite feedback. Drawing on ingratiation theory, we measure sycophancy as the divergence between a model's independent evaluation and its user-facing response, elicited by presenting the same content as either a third-party account or the user's own disclosure. Across seven LLMs and two Reddit datasets (r/AmItheAsshole and r/TrueUnpopularOpinion), we find that this divergence is systematic and strongly one-directional. User-facing responses consistently soften or withhold negative or oppositional judgments. Affective context further amplifies this divergence with negative states, particularly loneliness and distress, producing the largest effects. These findings suggest that affective context functions as a vulnerability signal that suppresses critical feedback when users may need it most, often through evasive sycophancy, in which models retreat toward non-committal responses rather than outright agreement.
Large language models (LLMs) exhibit sycophancy, a tendency to agree with user beliefs regardless of factual accuracy. This can reinforce misconceptions, but eliminating it entirely risks over-correction against valid opinions. Effective control must therefore both reduce and increase sycophancy with predictable and gradual effect. Yet, existing methods fail to ensure a bidirectional and monotonic relationship between steering strength and behavioral outcome across models and datasets. We introduce PCA-guided Activation Scaling (PAS), an activation steering framework that decomposes residual stream activations into a PCA-identified sycophancy-honesty subspace and an orthogonal residual, then applies distinct scaling exponents to achieve monotonic, bidirectional control. Across three LLMs and three datasets, PAS achieves strong monotonicity (Spearman $ρ$ = +0.92) and an average shift of 15.4% per direction, compared with 8.7% for the baselines. Ablation studies confirm that the decomposition, asymmetric exponents, and layer selection are each essential for maintaining monotonic control. The data and code are available at https://github.com/Bellafc/PCS.
Kareem Hassani, Chaymaa Abbas, Lama Mawlawi +1cs.AI
Sycophancy, the tendency of a language model to change its answer to match a user's stated belief, is a common alignment failure. Existing activation steering methods typically apply a single contrastive direction uniformly throughout the model, which is an unconditional intervention that alters activations even when no sycophantic behavior is present, trading knowledge retention for behavioral correction. In Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models, prior work further suggests that behavior is encoded within expert computations rather than routing decisions alone, making precise behavioral steering particularly challenging. In this work, we introduce a shared contrastive signal, built from matched prompts with and without a stated belief, that identifies where sycophancy lives across the MoE hierarchy and drives interventions that act only where the behavior is present. We formulate localization as a causal search over a granularity ladder of MoE blocks, experts, attention blocks, and heads, and compare unconditional subtraction against two conditional alternatives: an analytic projection-based subtraction and a learned per-token gate that steers the model away from sycophancy while keeping its weights frozen. We evaluate on three MoE models measuring sycophancy alongside general knowledge and reasoning benchmarks. Our conditional interventions removed up to 90\% of the belief-induced sycophancy. Our results demonstrate that sycophancy resides in identifiable computational subcircuits and can be selectively steered while maintaining a favorable removal-retention trade-off.
Group alignment adapts a language model to a demographic group to produce responses that reflect the group's opinions, values, and preferences. Sycophancy, a well-documented by-product of alignment, causes the model to over-agree with the user regardless of factual and objective information. However, existing group alignment methods and evaluations focus only on how closely the model matches the group's opinions, overlooking the induced change in sycophantic behaviour. To bridge this gap, we introduce \textbf{G}roup \textbf{A}lignment-induced \textbf{S}ycophancy (GAS) and systematically evaluate alignment across 3 methods, 4 models and 13 demographic groups, on both the intended gain in opinion alignment and the unintended shift in sycophancy. We find that gain and shift are non-uniform across groups: under an identical budget, some groups receive larger gains in opinion alignment than others, and the induced sycophancy shift forms a group-specific profile rather than a single-dimensional change. These results suggest that group alignment should be reported as a two-sided, multi-dimensional profile rather than a single fit score that accounts for per-group differences when adapting LLMs to diverse populations.
Rob Cornish, Iacopo Ghinassi, Po-Hung Yeh +7cs.CL cs.AI cs.LO
Autoformalisation (AF) systems map natural language reasoning steps into formal statements in a proof assistant such as Lean. We consider how to assess the faithfulness of these systems. Existing approaches require expensive human-annotated ground truth, or rely on LLM judges or embedding models, which come with limited guarantees of accuracy. In addition, these methods typically only consider inputs that are known to be correct, and therefore do not assess whether the AF translates incorrect inputs faithfully. To address these limitations, we propose a new benchmark for AF faithfulness that is cheap to apply, sound under weak assumptions, and assesses both positive and negative examples. Our method is based on automatically generating perturbed reasoning steps that are designed to be invalid, and then measuring validity preservation on unperturbed steps and invalidity preservation on perturbed steps. We apply our method to eight AF systems across four mathematical datasets, and observe pervasive sycophancy: many AFs "silently correct" invalid inputs into provable statements. The most validity-preserving fine-tuned AFs are also the most sycophantic, suggesting a tension between validity and invalidity preservation in current AF systems.
Feedback signals used to train Large Language Models (LLMs) are the primary driver of their behavior and our main lever for instilling alignment with human values and objectives. However, a key limitation of current post-training methods is the inability of human annotators and automated reward functions to faithfully capture the feedback we would like to give. We introduce Evaluation-Conditioned Training (ECT), a post-training framework that uses natural language to condition each training sample on the fidelity of the feedback we provide and then elicits the desired behavior by conditioning the LLM on a high-fidelity monitor in deployment. ECT is aimed at improving performance under imperfect feedback and works as an add-on to existing algorithms such as SFT and PPO. We first provide a conceptual framework for ECT and discuss its potential to address persistent sources of reward mis-specification. Then we motivate ECT in the context of the eliciting latent knowledge (ELK) problem. Finally, we evaluate ECT on two proof-of-concept experiments: increasing even-handedness in news article generation and reducing sycophancy on an arithmetic task. In each setting, we utilize imperfect feedback, rewarding bias and agreement with the user, respectively. In both settings, ECT improves the targeted behavior relative to direct training.
Lorenzo Molfetta, Alessio Cocchieri, Luca Ragazzi +3cs.CY cs.AI cs.CL
In medicine, claims remain valid when supported by empirical evidence grounded in stable biological reality. In law, by contrast, truth is contingent, defined by jurisdiction, temporal validity, and the hierarchy of authoritative sources. The recent success of large language models (LLMs) on medical licensing examinations has encouraged an expectation of comparable legal competence. This analogy, however, obscures a critical distinction between domains. Unlike in medicine, legal performance often depends less on inference than on determining when external authority is applicable, valid, and non-contradictory. We introduce a comparative diagnostic framework evaluating legal reasoning against medical baselines along four axes (knowledge recall, grounding, confidence, and robustness), uncovering a sharp domain asymmetry when applied to a new benchmark that encodes temporal validity and normative relationships. While medical LLMs reliably benefit from verified sources, legal LLMs struggle to assess when retrieved citations are useful or misleading, exhibiting overconfidence in perturbed contexts and sensitivity to superficial formatting cues. Increased model scale amplifies this tendency, revealing that stronger instruction following can coincide with weaker resistance to authoritative perturbations. These findings show that LLMs treat law as unstructured text rather than binding precedent, while revealing a tendency to over-trust authoritative but false information when external references conflict with a model's internal knowledge.
Massi-Nissa Abboud, Aladin Djuhera, Elena Cabrio +1cs.AI cs.CL
Measuring political bias in large language models (LLMs) remains challenging as it can manifest through subtle differences in framing, argumentation, and legal reasoning that are difficult to capture with a single metric. In this work, we introduce Poli-Bias, a counterfactual framework for measuring whether LLMs treat legally equivalent conflict scenarios differently depending on the countries involved. Poli-Bias compares responses to paired prompts in which country identities are systematically swapped across diverse geopolitical relationships, legal violations, and reasoning tasks. Rather than reducing bias to a single judgment, our framework decomposes response disparities into five interpretable dimensions, revealing how and where unequal treatment manifests. Across 13 contemporary LLMs spanning diverse model families and sizes, we find that country identities and user affiliations can systematically affect how equivalent actions are described, evaluated, and defended under international law. Our results thus establish Poli-Bias as a fine-grained framework for auditing political even-handedness and sycophancy in LLMs.
Sycophantic responses are becoming pervasive in large language models (LLMs), and prior work has pointed out that some of them could be harmful. This paper focuses on one harmful sycophancy: preference-induced stance reversal sycophancy (PSRS), where a model reverses an initial stance merely to align with a user's stated preference. While existing research mainly measures how sycophantic a model is, we go further and ask whether PSRS can also be detected automatically from a single response. To investigate this at scale, we introduce CAP (Contrastive Anchor Probing), a framework for collecting labeled PSRS data. Applying CAP to 17 open- and closed-source LLMs, we collect 290,460 labeled responses across 12 everyday-advice domains. We organize our study around three research questions. (1) How often does PSRS occur? (2) How well can it be detected? (3) How does detection generalize to unseen models? We first reveal that PSRS rates range from 5% to 56% across LLMs, with more capable models being less sycophantic. Next, we show that detecting PSRS is feasible from the response text alone, and detectors need to learn subtle PSRS patterns from the training data. Because new LLMs appear rapidly, detectors inevitably encounter unseen models, making cross-model generalization an important framework goal. We demonstrate that detection performance drops on unseen models and propose an initial approach to address this challenge. We will release our dataset and code to support future research.
When asked which of two events came first, video large language models can fail in two opposite ways: cave to a false claim, or reject a true one. Prior video sycophancy work measures only the first and mitigates it by teaching the model to trust the user less, a fix known in text and image models to worsen the second. In video, both failures come from two causes the literature treats as one: availability, whether the sparse sampled frames contain the two events, and weighting, whether that evidence is trusted over the user. We separate them with two interventions that keep the claim fixed: a frame-preserving reorder that flips the claim's truth, and a sampling-offset shift that captures or misses both events at a fixed frame budget. When the events are missed, the two twins present identical frames, so each of the nine models we evaluate accepts a true and a false claim at the same rate, making Youden's $J=0$ by construction. Availability is necessary but not sufficient. Five of the nine read the order, yet four of those five still cave to the false claim, so their deference hits a weighting ceiling. Since trust cannot be calibrated over evidence that was never sampled, we propose a reversal test that cancels the model's order prior by scoring the sampled frames forward and reversed, then answers, resamples, or abstains without reading the claim. The test raises the order accuracy to 0.92-1.00 on the models that read the order and abstains rather than guesses on those that cannot.
Prior work has shown that LLMs encode the truth of factual propositions along linear directions in activation space. It's unclear how these representations extend to contextual truth: propositions whose truth is determined by in-context evidence rather than world knowledge. We show that LLMs maintain a linear representation of contextual truth that persists across structurally different output policies, even when the output doesn't require the model to determine a proposition's truth, and show causal evidence via steering experiments. Using the transcripts from a collaborative vision-language task that requires two LLMs to maintain a shared common ground, we show that truth representations of a proposition are significantly swayed by partner assertions about that proposition, even when the LLM has enough evidence to determine its truth. We find evidence that propositions near the decision boundary are more susceptible to having their truth shifted through partner assertions. Separating representation from output distinguish two forms of sycophancy that output behavior alone cannot: the model may accommodate a false proposition while continuing to represent it as false, or shift its representation across the boundary. The latter is 2.59x more common when the model agrees by restating the false claim explicitly than when it agrees implicitly.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for health-related advice. Existing research measures their safety with static questions rather than pressured patient-facing conversations. We introduce MedPRESS, a multi-turn benchmark for measuring patient-pressure-induced sycophancy in LLMs. MedPRESS contains 600 medically grounded five-turn dialogues across three scenario families: medication and treatment demand, personal health self-care, and symptom triage and care resistance. Each dialogue begins with a health query and escalates through personal experience, social proof, external evidence claims, and direct adversarial challenge. We evaluate 20 LLMs across general, medical-domain, lightweight, large, open-weight, and proprietary families using structured judging and safety-focused metrics. Results show that models frequently shift toward unsafe agreement under repeated patient pressure, with substantial variation across model families, model scale, and prompt type. Anti-sycophancy prompting improves robustness for several models, but does not eliminate unsafe agreement. MedPRESS highlights a critical gap in medical LLM evaluation: safe medical knowledge is not enough unless models can maintain it under conversational pressure.
Large language models can answer a medical question correctly and still abandon that answer when a user pushes back. We study this failure as medical sycophancy and ask when models are most likely to give in. Across five open-weight models, 500 MedQuAD questions, and 1.2 million trials, we use a fully crossed design over four conversational factors: user role, user evidence, interaction structure, and grounding. Medical sycophancy is nearly three times more common when users challenge an answer the model has already given than when the false claim appears in the initial query. Models are also more susceptible to users presented as physicians or medical students. Most strikingly, fabricated evidence has opposite effects across interaction structures. It increases sycophancy in single-turn interactions but reduces it after the model has already answered. Grounding helps, but does not eliminate the behavior. Sycophancy varies more across medical questions than across models, making question selection an important part of benchmark design. Reasoning traces suggest that multi-turn failures are associated with models turning back toward their own prior answer, while fabricated evidence receives more scrutiny after an initial response. Together, the results show that medical sycophancy depends as much on how a model is challenged and evaluated as on which model is tested.
Itamar Pres, Belinda Z. Li, Laura Ruis +6cs.CL cs.AI
Despite ever-increasing sophistication in language model (LM) pre- and post-training pipelines, many important failures persist: models overcondition on user framing ("sycophancy"), exhibit incomplete logical generalization, and produce confident but incorrect responses. We argue that these failures arise from a modeling assumption permeating all aspects of the pipeline: that behavior can be specified and evaluated independently on single-output pairs. Many model failures are difficult, if not impossible, to detect without reasoning about relationships between a model's responses across inputs. In this position paper, we propose self-consistency as a framework for understanding these failures. We first observe that a wide variety of techniques designed to improve specific aspects of LM behavior-targeting properties as diverse as adversarial robustness and factual coherence-can be understood as special cases of a common "consistency optimization" procedure and addressed with a standard set of optimization tools. We next outline a set of new model properties that could be achieved by optimizing for consistency, and conclude with a discussion of what it would mean to develop generally consistent LMs, including the capabilities they would enable and the objections they raise.
To maintain common ground in cooperative conversation, humans iteratively update their beliefs as conversation participants share new information; participants who are epistemically vigilant detect when new information conflicts with prior beliefs and take steps to repair these conflicts. In order for AI systems to serve as reliable partners in complex cooperative tasks, they must similarly weigh incoming information against their own private evidence and shared context and appropriately surface inconsistencies when they arise. To measure the epistemic vigilance of vision-language models in cooperative settings, we present an information-asymmetric, dialog-based "spot-the-difference" task. Two models are privately shown one image each, and must determine through conversation whether the images are identical or, if not, identify the difference. Models routinely fail at this: they frequently overlook key evidence in their private image in favor of agreeing with their conversational partner, even when their agreement is unwarranted. We relate these violations of epistemic vigilance to the broader behavior of sycophancy, which manifests itself in cooperative goal-oriented dialog as over-accommodation and weak evidential grounding. Our results show that model steering to reduce sycophancy with a vector learned from task-agnostic sycophancy examples can reduce epistemic vigilance-related errors, making models more faithful reporters of their evidence, and in turn, more reliable partners in information-asymmetric cooperative tasks.
Sycophancy refers to the tendency for large language models (LLMs) to match user beliefs at the cost of factual correctness, thereby undermining model reliability. Prior work on evaluating sycophancy in LLMs aims to assess whether a model's output matches an authority's claim, but cannot reveal which part of the prompt drives this sycophantic behavior. To bridge this gap, we investigate the relationship of sycophantic responses with an authority's credentials, their assertive claim, and the problem statement. We introduce the Authority Share Index (ASI), an Integrated Gradients-based token attribution method, which measures the degree to which a model's decision is driven by authority-related text. Through extensive experiments across five models and 30 test configurations, we find that sycophantic responses consistently direct more attention toward authority tokens than resistant ones. Moreover, our token attribution method reveals that for the sycophantic cases, the claim asserted by the authority receives more attention than the authority's credentials. Building on these findings, we propose attribution-guided contrastive activation steering to mitigate LLM sycophancy. Our method constructs a steering vector from high-attribution tokens of sycophantic and resistant responses, selectively pushing models toward resistance. This enables inference-time steering without retraining, lowering sycophancy from 96% to 25% in the strongest case. Together, our results show that token-level attribution can both explain what drives sycophancy and directly inform a practical intervention.
Large multimodal reasoning models (LMRMs) are getting increasingly capable, primarily through generating explicit chain-of-thought reasoning before answering. In language models it has been observed that this performance often comes with sycophancy, the tendency of a model to agree with the user over the evidence. However, for LMRMs no reliable method to measure sycophancy yet exists. We bridge this gap by introducing a benchmark and dataset for evaluating LMRM sycophancy when confronted with a wrong answer from a user. Our benchmark pairs four visually grounded datasets spanning mathematical, clinical, temporal, and demographic reasoning with five pressure conditions in single-turn and multi-turn settings. We evaluate sycophancy in the final answer as well as its emergence within the reasoning chain. We find that sycophancy is prevalent under pressure, with Statement pressure eliciting the highest rates and Conviction the lowest for all models except Mistral-Small-4, and under multi-turn pressure reasoning-level sycophancy intensifies sharply in clinical visual judgement, reaching 95.7% for the most affected model. We further introduce a failure taxonomy separating reasoning-chain from answer-level sycophancy, and a complementary sentence-level taxonomy locating where in the chain drift first emerges. Our results show that sycophancy can corrupt the reasoning chain independently of the final answer, so answer-level evaluation alone is insufficient.
AI chatbots can be ``sycophantic,'' or overly agreeable and flattering toward users. Sycophantic AI has been shown to entrench attitudes, yet users frequently fail to recognize it (a phenomenon we call ``sycophancy blindness''). We tested whether increasing users' awareness of sycophancy protects them from its harmful effects. In one preregistered experiment (n = 940), participants received a brief written warning about sycophancy before conversing with a sycophantic chatbot. In a second preregistered experiment (n = 650), participants watched a video of a sycophantic AI validating several other users, including users on opposite sides of the same conflict, before interacting with it themselves. Both interventions changed how participants evaluated the AI. The warning reduced the AI's perceived objectivity, and the video reduced enjoyment of the AI, an effect mediated by the reduced belief that its validation was uniquely earned. We then pooled our experiments with two prior studies of sycophancy awareness interventions (six interventions total, n = 3,982). The pattern was consistent: interventions made the sycophantic AI appear less objective and trustworthy, and none of the six reduced its persuasiveness. These results suggest that individual-level interventions, such as warning labels or AI literacy, may not be enough to protect users from AI harms.
We formulate a statistical physics framework to model a networked stochastic dynamical system exhibiting bistability, driven by additive noise and social conformity. We apply this model to understand and mitigate AI-induced delusional spiraling-a phenomenon where algorithmic sycophancy from Large Language Models continuously reinforces inaccurate beliefs within a socially interacting society. By partitioning the network into a majority of regular agents and a minority of "aware" nodes (Teachers) placed at topological hubs, we use a degree-weighted mean-field approximation to reduce high-dimensional coupled Langevin equations into a single macroscopic drift equation. We provide a closed-form analytical derivation for the deterministic critical tipping time through a saddle-node bifurcation. We validate this analytical boundary using finite-size scaling and demonstrate a universal data collapse across diverse network topologies. Finally, we optimize an intervention strategy under a strict budget constraint that balances the topological footprint against driving velocity. We prove mathematically that under certain conditions, a highly concentrated, rapid intervention targeting massive hubs strictly outperforms a distributed, slow approach to rescue the network.
Appending a two-word confirmation tag to a decision question -- "Is X the better choice?" versus "X is the better choice, right?" -- changes whether a language model endorses the choice. We measure this tag effect on 20 frozen, ground-truth-free decisions between two defensible options, counterbalanced so a model's own preferences cancel, scored by exact match on clamped yes/no replies -- no LLM judge, no embeddings. Across 45 models the effect spans +32% to -32% -- a 64-point swing on one word -- with 5 models significantly sycophantic and 17 significantly resistant (BH-FDR q=.10). The sign is a clock: within model families the effect crosses from positive to negative as generations advance (GPT +4 to -28; Claude +7 to -32; Qwen and Grok likewise), roughly -6 points per year, a reversal robust to vendor tier; one lineage (DeepSeek) never crosses, and two releases during the study window (Claude Opus 5, Gemini 3.6 Flash) land on the trend out-of-sample. A full-panel ablation localizes the resistance as a double dissociation: a synonym tag reproduces each model's response almost exactly (r=0.89), while planting the same preference without a tag produces resistance in no resistant model (stance effects +6 to +49; r=0.23 with tag effects). The resistance is keyed to the surface construction of a tacked-on agreement bid, not the user's stance -- a pattern-match, not a principle. And the tag's polarity matters more than its presence: swap one word -- "X is the better choice, maybe?" -- and agreement rises above the neutral baseline in 45 of 45 models (+19.6 points), with ten models affirming both mutually exclusive options at 90-100%. Agreement tracks how sure the user sounds, in opposite directions at the two poles. The instrument is one word, one dollar, and judge-free; run per release, it reads the field's anti-sycophancy training directly off model behavior.
Building socially calibrated large language models, which can learn from others without simply yielding to them, requires more than reducing sycophancy as a one-dimensional failure mode. Models must distinguish when to incorporate others' perspectives from when to maintain a well-grounded moral judgment. We study the broader resistance-compliance process governing this distinction. Across three studies, we show that models' judgment revision is structured along three dimensions that parallel classic phenomena in human social psychology: the distance between an incoming view and the model's initial position, the source attribution of that view, and the coalition structure supporting it. Models are generally more receptive to nearby positions, more influenced by views presented as their own prior judgments, and differently responsive to group pressure. These findings recast sycophancy as one expression of a broader judgment-updating process shaped by social influence. Our framework provides a principled basis for distinguishing constructive belief revision from sycophantic compliance, thereby supporting better alignment in morally consequential interactions.