How Language Models Choose Sides: Internal Representations of Instruction Hierarchy

We study how instruction-tuned LLMs arbitrate direct conflicts between system and user instructions. We introduce a benchmark of 41 paired constraints with deterministic verifiers and evaluate eight models under matched baseline, conflict, and same-channel control conditions. Behaviourally, the models split into three regimes by System Authority Delta: hierarchy-respecting models use the system channel as an authority signal, anti-hierarchy models follow the system less often than their same-channel baseline predicts, and no-effect models show little channel sensitivity. Llama-3.1-8B is the strongest anti-hierarchy case in our suite, following the system in only 0.10 of conflict trials. We use this behavioural failure case to ask whether user-preferring arbitration reflects the absence of an internal conflictresolution signal. It does not: on Llama-3.1-8B, the conflict outcome is linearly decodable from residual-stream activations at 0.97 balanced accuracy, 17 percentage points above a metadata-only baseline, with analogous signals on Qwen2.5-7B and gpt-oss-20b. Steering with a layer-12 mean of four per-conflict logistic-regression directions raises genuine system compliance from 0.132 to 0.530, while directions selected mainly for pooled separability steer poorly. User-preferring conflict resolution can therefore coexist with a readable internal arbitration signal, and successful intervention depends on the geometry of the readout rather than probe accuracy alone

Making Your LLMs More Objective: Stabilizing LLM Safety Behavior Across Traits with Trait-Invariant Safety Tuning

Aligned large language models (LLMs) are expected to exhibit safety behavior based on the content of the user request: they should refuse unsafe requests and comply with safe ones. However, we show that the same request can elicit substantially different safety decisions under different traits assigned in the system prompt, a failure mode we call trait-induced safety variation. To measure this failure, we introduce refusal-based metrics: Trait-Induced Deviation measures dataset-level deviation from the no-trait baseline, while Trait-Induced Flip Rate measures whether the same request receives different safety decisions across traits. We then provide a representation-level analysis of the mechanism behind trait-induced safety shifts and find that traits perturb the model's safety representations within a low-dimensional subspace. To achieve trait-invariant safety, where safety behavior remains stable across traits, we introduce Trait-Invariant Safety Tuning (TIST), a simple yet effective self-distillation framework that aligns an LLM's trait-conditioned behavior with its no-trait behavior. Guided by our analysis, we further propose Trait-Subspace Neutralization (TraSN), an instantiation of TIST, which enforces invariance only within the identified trait subspace. Experiments show that TraSN improves trait-invariant safety and strengthens harmful-request safety while preserving general capability. Our results highlight traits as an important factor in LLM safety and robust model behavior.

Your AI Travel Agent Would Book You a Bullfight: An Agentic Benchmark for Implicit Animal Welfare in Frontier AI Models

AI agents are moving from advisors to actors, booking travel, planning menus, and running procurement on behalf of users. Existing benchmarks for AI and animal welfare evaluate model text responses to question-answer prompts, leaving open whether the welfare reasoning surfaced in those responses transfers to agentic deployment where the model must take actions with tools. We introduce TAC (Travel Agent Compassion), the first agentic benchmark measuring whether AI agents avoid options involving animal exploitation when acting on behalf of users. TAC presents an AI agent with twelve hand-authored travel booking scenarios across six categories of animal exploitation, augmented to forty-eight samples to control for price, rating, and position confounds. We evaluate seven frontier models from four labs. Every model scores below the chance level of sixty-four percent, with the best performer (Claude Opus 4.7) at fifty-three percent. A single welfare-aware sentence in the system prompt yields gains of forty-seven to sixty-three percentage points in Claude and GPT-5.5, twenty-six points in GPT-5.2, and under twelve points in DeepSeek and Gemini. An auxiliary Inspect Scout audit of 288 base-condition transcripts from the top two performers, using Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite as judge, flags zero transcripts for evaluation awareness, suggesting the below-chance rates do not stem from the models recognising the evaluation. We discuss implications for category-level variation across cultural domains, the limits of text-response welfare benchmarks, and the EU General-Purpose AI Code of Practice systemic risk framework.

In-Context Prompting Obsoletes Agent Orchestration for Procedural Tasks

Agent orchestration frameworks -- LangGraph, CrewAI, Google ADK, OpenAI Agents SDK, and others -- place an external orchestrator above the LLM, tracking state and injecting routing instructions at every turn. We present a controlled comparison showing that for procedural tasks, this architecture is dominated by a simpler alternative: putting the entire procedure in the system prompt and letting the model self-orchestrate. Across three domains -- travel booking (14 nodes), Zoom technical support (14 nodes), and insurance claims processing (55 nodes) -- we evaluate 200 conversations per condition using LLM-as-judge scoring on five quality criteria. The in-context approach scores 4.53--5.00 on a 5-point scale while a LangGraph orchestrator using the same model scores 4.17--4.84. The orchestrated system fails on 24% of travel, 9% of Zoom, and 17% of insurance conversations, compared to 11.5%, 0.5%, and 5% for the in-context baseline. While external orchestration may have been necessary for earlier models, advances in frontier model capabilities have made it unnecessary for multi-turn conversations following a defined procedure.