Certifying What Helps Customer-Return Timing: A Screen-and-Confirm Test for Conditioning Signals, and Why Decay Is Nearly Enough

Practitioners enrich customer-return models with ever more signals (lifetime value, category, recency/frequency, calendar, geography), and the temporal-point-process (TPP) literature follows suit with covariate- and external-covariate-conditioned intensities. But does any of it improve the timing, and how would you know? A null ("feature X doesn't help") is only meaningful if the model could have found a signal. We make two contributions--a method and a measurement--to answer this credibly. (i) A screen-and-confirm protocol that certifies whether a candidate signal improves a TPP's event-timing likelihood: a positive control plants a coupling of known strength and confirms the model recovers it, so a real-data null can be read as "no signal" rather than "weak method." The control is validated for categorical and continuous encodings, and on a real clock-driven dataset (NYC taxi hour-of-day). (ii) A model-free ceiling quantifying how little of customer-return timing is point-predictable at all (a single-digit percentage of gap variance from any covariate; returns are near-memoryless). With these we certify a clean result on three public benchmarks (Amazon, Taobao, RetailRocket) and a real marketplace (Thumbtack): the inter-event clock--continuous-time decay, long known to beat frozen-intensity models--is nearly sufficient, and the conditioning the field keeps adding is redundant or harmful on top of it (statistically null on the public benchmarks, at most 0.06 NLL; null to mildly harmful on the marketplace). We do not claim to discover that decay helps; our contribution is the tools that turn "conditioning doesn't help" into a checkable, certified statement--plus an honest-evaluation account of the read-out/leakage pitfalls we hit and retracted.

Unsupervised Anomaly Detection of Information Operations Users via Behavioral and Language Patterns

Information Operations on social media networks have been identified as a significant threat to democracy and modern society, but they are challenging and expensive to detect by humans. Existing supervised IO detection methods fail to capture the dynamic nature of evolving IO user behavior, while existing unsupervised approaches rely on oversimplified assumptions of coordination among IO users that may not exist in practice. To overcome the limitations of existing methods, we formulate IO user detection as an anomaly detection problem and propose a novel unsupervised IO user detection approach called Temporal-bEhavior-laNguage Signals for information Operation Recognition (TENSOR), which leverages multimodal data, including temporal online user behavior, such as message posting activities, and the textual content of the messages. The motivation is that IO users are typically a very small fraction of all online users and have unique temporal behavioral and language patterns. Specifically, we train a Temporal Point Process (TPP) to capture abnormal temporal behavioral patterns of IO users because they are known to behave in a coordinated manner for IO campaigns. We further introduce a novel evidence function that converts LLM responses, which are generated from user post timelines, into quantitative scores to adjust the TPP outputs for better IO user detection. Experimental results show that TENSOR outperforms the baselines on five real-world IO datasets. Code is available at https://github.com/xiuzhenzhang/TENSOR.