Content moderation is a central form of digital governance, yet people disagree over what content should be removed from shared online spaces. While platforms aggregate human judgments to build moderation systems, it remains unclear how this process shapes which users are protected from content they perceive as toxic. We address this gap by combining large-scale judgment data with counterfactual simulations that trace how the demographic composition of moderator pools shapes the distribution of protection across users. Applying this framework to removal judgments from 16,221 U.S. respondents evaluating 102,463 comments from Twitter, Reddit, and 4chan, we find demographic heterogeneities in moderation demand. We further reveal a consistent pattern of in-group protection: reductions in perceived toxicity accrue disproportionately to users who share the demographic identities of the moderator pool. Crucially, moderator pools that mirror the demographic composition of self-identified moderators on Prolific widen these disparities relative to a nationally representative baseline, while even fully representative pools fail to ensure equal protection: Black and LGB users remain underprotected unless they are represented well beyond their population share. These findings show that unequal protection from perceived toxicity can arise structurally from the aggregation of stratified removal standards, making the demographic composition of moderation inputs a key determinant of who is protected online.
A trained reinforcement learning policy does not determine the complete behavior that users encounter: deployment code still schedules, admits, suppresses, or replaces its proposed actions. We contribute \emph{runtime action interference} (RAI), an AI control mechanism that preserves policy parameters while regulating action pacing and filtering configured action patterns after inference. RAI releases a proposed action only when its cooldown condition is satisfied and its content detector does not flag the action; otherwise, it dispatches a no-op. The detector covers specified toxic behaviors, including worker-unit harassment, while the cooldown controls action rate. We implement RAI in a replication of AlphaStar actor.py and make the implementation and reproducibility materials available through an open source code repository. We deployed RAI in a \textit{StarCraft~II} human participant study that compared two presentations of the same opponent with high capability and rate limited actions; we withheld its capability claim in one presentation and disclosed it in the other. On response scales from 1 to 5, we observed pooled fairness, trust, and toxicity means of 3.90, 3.50, and 2.00 under claim withholding, compared with 2.62, 4.31, and 2.85 under disclosure. Disclosure corresponded with lower perceived fairness and higher perceived toxicity across every expertise group, whereas trust increased among novices and experts but decreased among intermediate participants. Our human evaluation therefore shows that perceptions of an opponent controlled through RAI can vary substantially with the capability information presented to users, even when the configured control remains constant. We conclude that human-computer evaluations must separate control within the execution stack from capability disclosure and assess fairness, trust, and toxicity as distinct dimensions of human experience.
Rares A. C. Diaconescu, Iulia Slanina, Alina Florea +5cs.CL cs.AI
Reducing toxicity is often framed as a global alignment problem, yet perceptions of harmful language are subjective and context-dependent. We present the first comparative evaluation of training-free methods for aligning language generation to user-specific toxicity sensitivities across three inference-time intervention stages: pre-decoding (prompt conditioning and rewriting), in-decoding (token, logit, and representation steering), and post-decoding (candidate re-ranking). Evaluated against toxicity sensitivity targets derived from the PRISM dataset, all methods reduce alignment error by 28-47%. However, the results reveal a fundamental trade-off between alignment effectiveness, personalization, and general language quality, showing how toxicity sensitivity alignment is an inherently multi-objective problem.
LLMs have evolved from basic chatbots to the backbone of the AI ecosystem, now widely used in healthcare, schools, and government services. The domain-wide adoption of LLMs necessitates continuous evaluation to ensure their safety and fairness. Common issues encountered after deploying LLMs include inconsistent outputs and hallucinations of incorrect information. Although numerous LLM evaluation tools exist, most are limited to testing a single parameter at a time or require massive computational resources that are not accessible to most researchers. TriEval addresses these challenges by evaluating LLM outputs across multiple parameters, including bias, toxicity, and truthfulness together, while minimizing computing resources. The pipeline is compatible with both open- and closed-source models and runs on a standard laptop without a GPU cluster. TriEval has been tested on four models: Llama 3 8B, Mistral 7B, Gemma 2 9B, and Claude Haiku. The results show clear differences between open-source and closed-source models, especially in terms of toxicity and truthfulness. TriEval is being released as open source to enable broader access for researchers with limited computational resources.